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Abstract
This study addresses the extent to which China's central state devolved ownership and
investment levels in its energy sector to other actors during the modern reform period (1978-
2008). The project focused on China's coal and electric power industries, leveraging
industry and government data, interviews, two firm case studies and a unique survey to
measure policy, ownership and investment change over time. The results show that such
devolution has been neither incrementally advancing nor consistently lacking, but has
fluctuated according to the national electric power balance. The study suggests that China's
central state actively manages the range of firms in the strategic coal and electric power
industries as a dynamic portfolio of assets, resulting in such fluctuation.
These findings run counter to what the dominant theories in the literature would otherwise
predict. Neo-liberal theory would predict the incremental reduction of central state
ownership in these sectors, as is evident in many of China's other sectors. Arguments
predicated on the ability of the central state to sustain "self-reproducing authoritarianism"
would predict fairly stable levels of central state investment and ownership in this strategic
sector through time as well as quite limited liberalization. Finally, a theory privileging elite
politics would indeed predict fluctuations, yet at different turning points in time than those
found in this study, and without the sustained pattern that is evident in the extended time
period under examination, which spans four distinct political eras.
This first implication of this study is that neo-liberal means can be deployed to achieve state-
led ends. Second, the study provides evidence that such means of economic liberalization
reform need not be cumulative and are, in fact, reversible. Third, the case studies reveal that
firm decisions have a significant impact on the execution of these powerful broad central
state policy changes that periodically reshape the structure of China's energy sector. Finally,
this study also raises important implications relating to public policy, and in particular the
ability of the Chinese state to fulfill aggressive greenhouse gas emission reductions in an
effort to mitigate climate change.
Thesis Supervisor: Edward S. Steinfeld
Title: Associate Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER ONE
Liberalization as a Means: A Portfolio Approach to Energy Supply
The Outcome and the Argument in Brief
"[flnstability is not the result of poor management or other inadequacies. Nor is it the
expression of external dependency. It is rather at the heart of politics: creating and
maintaining conditions for the exercise of power...lIt leads actors in the private sector to
insure themselves' biv strengthening networks (which are a mix of public and private
actors), multiplying contacts and relations with the public sector... The lack of a precise
boundary between what is punished and what is allowed, between what is authorized,
tolerated, and condemned, between licit and illicit, and the games surrounding conflicts of
principles - all this creates the space for political intervention... and also leads to permanent
negotiations among actors.,-
The Outcome - Fluctuating Industy Structure
Powerful international trends of economic liberalization in the past three decades
have restructured a spectrum of sectors, ranging from basic manufacturing to energy
supply. Governments have instituted reforms that have lowered barriers to entry for
ownership and investment, driving rapid economic growth in a similarly rich variety of
national institutional environments, particularly in the developing world. Osborne and
Gaebler best captured the dominant non ative approach to the relationship between this
economic diversification process and the function of government, arguing that an
effective state must learn to stop "rowing" the economy by direct means of ownership
and start "steering" it through indirect means of regulation. The currency of such policy
prescription has transformed economic liberalization into a policy "end", rather than a
policy "means". As a result, liberalization is often framed as a goal of reform, rather than
one of many tools of development available to the state.
Beatrice Hibou, "From privatizing the economy to privatizing the state" in Beatrice Hibou (ed.),
Privatizing the state (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 16 .
2 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming
the public sector. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1992).
China has been widely cited as one of the world's grandest examples of the benefits
of economic liberalization. 3 The loosening of government restrictions on economic
transactions and forms of asset ownership, the delegation of control or decision-making
rights from the state to firms, the introduction of more flexible pricing according to
scarcity, increasingly unencumbered trade between firms, and other policies are all forms
of liberalization rightly credited as guiding China's economic boom of the past three
decades. This historic economic growth has been fueled by equally historic growth,
much less studied, in energy production.
While some scholars have argued that economic liberalization policies have spread
to include China's energy sector, others suggest that this sector's more strategic nature
has required high degrees of state dominance. The evidence presented in this dissertation
fits neither description. The ownership and investment structure of China's coal and
electric power industries over time does not reveal a pattern of incremental and
cumulative liberalization, as neo-liberal theory would otherwise predict. Ownership and
industry structure does not provide evidence of consistent, direct central state dominance
either, as variants of developmental state theory and arguments citing China's self-
reproducing authoritarianism would otherwise predict. Rather, central state ownership
and investment growth in these critical industries has fluctuated. During some periods
central state ownership is consolidated and during others such ownership is diluted to
include private and public capital from domestic and foreign sources. This fluctuation is
3 See for example Scott Rozelle, Albert Park, Jing Huang and Hui Jin, "Liberalization and rural market
integration in China," American Journal of Agricultural Economics (1997): 635-642; Jeffrey Sachs and
Wing-Thye Woo, "Understanding China's economic performance," Journal of Economic Policy Reform 4,
no. 1 (2000): 1-50; and Lawrence Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland, "Reform without losers: An
interpretation of China's dual-track approach to transition," Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 1 (2000):
120-143. Policies of economic liberalization are distinct from policies related to outright privatization.
For a useful discussion of such distinction see: Sujian Guo, "The ownership reform in China: what
direction and how far?," Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 36 (2003), p.562.
driven by active central state management of these industries according to patterns of
national electric power balance (shortage vs. surplus). China's case illustrates that
economic liberalization that divests and diversifies energy ownership and investment to
include foreign, local non-state and local state firms can be reversed, and reversed in
predictable patterns.
The Argument - A Portfolio Approach to Industrial Organization
This dissertation focuses on state actors and firms. The study suggests that China's
central state treats the range of firms in the strategic coal and electric power industries as
a dynamic portfolio of assets to be managed actively by the state, resulting in fluctuating
growth rates of state ownership and investment over time. The interventionist tools of
what has been termed state-led "late development" (or the "developmental state" in more
recent years) are often framed in opposition to the state-reducing and market-enabling
tools of neo-liberal development models. This dissertation argues that these are not
necessarily separate models of development, but rather collections of tools on a policy
continuum that remain available to the state over time. The study's findings show that
neo-liberal means can be deployed to achieve state-led ends and that liberalization,
therefore, need not be cumulative and continuous but rather can be reversed under certain
circumstances.
Structural Risks, Ideational Frames, and Functionalist Policies
The creation and expansion of a national energy system presents governments with
inherent risks that must be managed if an economy is to be supplied with the energy it
requires to grow. Some risks are structural, and inherent to the sector itself. Energy
systems are characterized by high levels of capital intensity (e.g. oil refining), long-cycle
investments with extended pay-back periods (e.g. oil exploration and production), natural
monopolies (e.g. electric grid transmission), and high levels of risk that result from the
combination of these attributes. Energy flows may also carry the added complexity of
perceived national security externalities, such as supply risk in the form of oil import
dependency on one partner. These structural aspects of the sector create certain
functional needs of large-scale capital agglomeration, long-term management of short-
term demand cycles and longer-term investment supply cycles, the creation and
enforcement of safety standards, the oversight of transmission and dispatch, and other
others. The role of the state in such an industry is therefore of critical concern, both in
theoretical and empirical terms, and the range of possible policies available is shaped by
these functional needs.4
While all states must mitigate such complex sources of risk, their approaches for
managing this risk differ markedly. On one side of the spectrum, the US federal
government has shifted much of the capital risk and investment cycle risk to private
firms, long prominent in its national energy sector, and much of the regulatory risk
(environmental, labor, etc.) has been ceded to state-level governments.5 These private
firms have therefore increasingly become involved in informing the local and federal
regulatory process, creating issues of market power and corporate malfeasance that led in
large measure to the investigation and collapse of firms such as the Enron Corporation.
Other variants of this "neo-liberal" organization of the sector include England and Wales,
4 For a useful examination of the role of government in energy markets, please see C. D. Foster,
Privatization, public ownership, and the regulation of natural monopoly (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1992).
5 See for example Robert Hirsh, Power loss: the origins of deregulation and restructuring in the American
electric utility system (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
in which strong labor unions and state monopolies in upstream energy supply industries
were dismantled by the British state to strengthen competition. 6 As in the US, investment
cycle risk and capital risk in England and Wales are borne by private firms, with some
exceptions of public ownership, such as the nuclear industry. Foreign firms were
encouraged to invest, with major waves of US capital inflow following the privatization
of the late 1980s. In comparison with the US, regulatory risk is concentrated more at the
level of the central state, resulting in a more active regulatory presence ensuring
competition. 7
Towards the other side of the spectrum, France has attempted to inject aspects of
competitive pressures and incentives through private ownership in some industries of its
national energy system while maintaining much of the investment cycle, capital and
regulatory risk in the hands of the central state in other industries.8 The French state
retains 85 percent ownership of the firm Electricite de France (EdF), the nation's
effective monopoly electricity supplier, yet only 5 percent of Total, S.A., France's
"supermajor" oil firm. Industry and state interests relate through corporatist
representation on firm governance boards. In sum, common risks inherent in energy
provision are constantly faced by all states and require functional responses to serve clear
needs, yet their responses of how best to organize industry and policy to manage such
risks are diverse. This diversity emerges from both ideational frames that shape the
6 See for example Carles Boix, "Privatizing the Public Business Sector in the Eighties: Economic
Performance, Partisan Responses and Divided Governments", British Journal of Political Science 27
(1997): 473-96.
7 See for example Maarten Arentsen and Rolf Kunneke, "Economic organization and liberalization of the
electricity industry: In search of conceptualization", Energy Policy 24, no. 6 (1996), pp. 541-552.
8 See for example: Dominique Finon, "French Energy Policy: The Effectiveness and Limitations of
Colbertism", in European Energy Policies in a Changing Environment, Francis McGowan (ed.) 1996;
Pepper Culpepper, "Capitalism, Coordination, and Economic Exchange: The French Political Economy
since 1985," in Changing France: The Politics That Markets Make, Peter Hall and Bruno Palier (ed.) 2006.
assessment of risk and also functional responses that shape the range of policies to
manage such risk.
As this study suggests, the organization of China's energy sector is also distinct,
and serves as another node on this international spectrum. Growth rates of Chinese
central state ownership and investment in coal and electric power generation industries
over the past 30 years have not declined, and therefore not mirrored patterns of the neo-
liberal model, variants of which are found in the US and the UK. China's energy
development has also not mirrored patterns of the more corporatist model of France.
China's central state has not maintained a monopoly in these areas either. Understanding
the timing and pattern of the fluctuation that is evident in ownership and investment
levels requires understanding the functional needs of the energy sector and the ideational
forces that influence the scope and execution of China's portfolio approach to energy
management.
Functionalist analysis is useful in understanding the range of policy options
available to the Chinese state in ensuring energy supply, and in particular why that range
includes the state's active support of firms other than those owned by the central state.
Major changes in China's economic growth rate affect the capacity of central state-owned
firms to deliver adequate coal and electric power supply, and therefore affect the policies
adopted by central state actors. Assuming that the central state maintains higher
economic growth as a priority, high rates of annual economic growth (usually above nine
percent) strain existing limited central state-owned energy production capacity and create
a functional need for the state to identify and support alternative means to increase
supply. Under such circumstances, the central state elects to diversify ownership and
investment, thus expanding the portfolio of types of firms participating in coal and
electric power provision.
However, even when there have been significant economic liberalization reforms in
coal and electric power industries, the ownership and investment share of these critical
local state-owned, private, and public/private hybrid firms have not cumulatively
superseded central state-owned firms. Instead, periods of lower growth and resulting
energy surplus provide the opportunity for the central state to reassess industry structure
and to re-exert control. Were the state's portfolio approach strictly functionalist, the
often less-efficient central state-owned firms in coal and electric power generation would
be shuttered during periods of energy surplus, as their output is no longer needed and less
able to fulfill demand efficiently. In fact, the central state often uses such periods to
remove local- and foreign-owned competitors from the market. Some of these finms are
shuttered while others are allowed to be acquired by eager central SOE incumbents.
These periods of lower growth remove the pressures of short energy supply, and
ideological concerns over ownership in this critical industry regain political force. The
central state accomplishes such change through the exercise of, primarily, levers of
market access, contract price parameters, and personnel management that remain under
the authority of a stable set of central state entities. China's coal and electric power
industries are actively managed portfolios of firmnns, not the self-regulating systems of
market actors as strict functionalism would suggest.
The structure of China's coal and electric power industries provides a useful
roadmap for following the fluctuations of policy and the state's portfolio approach. The
two case studies illustrate the mechanisms through which such policies are negotiated
between central state, local (largely provincial) state, and firm. In periods of high
economic growth, neo-liberal policies of loosening prices and diversifying ownership can
be pursued by the central state to achieve goals of "late development", such as rapid
capital agglomeration and industrialization, only to be curtailed in periods of lower
growth. China's case illustrates how use of such neo-liberal policies does not preclude
the state from reasserting traditional interventionist catch-up policies later in the
development process (e.g. consolidation or nationalization), despite the presence on the
terrain of powerful firms and local state interests created in the process of reform.
China's central state has proven quite successful in allowing periodic reductions in state
ownership, pricing authority, and monopoly producer rights to ensure the growth of what
is arguably the most politically critical sector of the economy. It has also proven quite
successful at reasserting its claims on assets after these private, local state, and foreign
investment surge during periods of liberalization.
The State of the Literature
Three Primary Approaches
Scholars have sought to explain the evolution of national energy sectors through a
variety of frameworks relating to the political economy of reform. Three are of primary
importance to this study. The first approach views change in the energy industry as a
story of linear global economic liberalization. As two leading analysts write: "Since the
initiation of reform in 1978, three major themes in China's energy sector have been
decentralization, the shift to liberalized markets, and internationalization". 9 According to
this view, major early neo-liberal experiments in the governance of the US, UK and
9 Nathaniel Aden and Jonathan Sinton, "Environmental implications of energy policy in China,"
Environmental Politics 15, no. 2 (2006), p. 268.
Chilean energy systems of the 1980s migrated east to influence the energy policies of the
developing world by the early 1990s. This neo-liberal approach suggests that China was
not immune to this trend and major changes in the portfolio of finns and state functions
in China's energy sector reflect a fairly linear, delayed evolution of liberalization in step
with these global shifts."
China scholars have also attempted to explain this larger process of economic
evolution and have adopted a variant of this global story, tailored more to China's
transitional economy conditions. This China-specific interpretation views the central
state as pursuing an incremental liberalization reform agenda that began on the periphery
of the Chinese economy (agriculture) and gradually spread through halting steps to core
sectors such as energy. Critical to this story is the assumption that such reforms added
economic capacity through the nurturing of peripheral actors that were able to strengthen
and eventually to supersede the state-owned economy in agriculture, manufacturing, and
increasingly energy.' China's energy sector is therefore liberalizing late, but still on a
gradual evolutionary path of "growing out of the plan".
The second broad approach views changes in China's energy sector as examples of
a developmental or neo-developmental state that is maintaining variations on a theme of
self-reproducing authoritarianism. Energy is a critical part of the "commanding heights"
of any economy and therefore considered too important to the state to allow the
10 Carlos Rufin, The Political Economy of Institutional Change in the Electricity Supply Industry
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003); James Williams and Navroz Dubash, "Asian electricity
reform in historical perspective," Pacific Affairs (2004). See also Stephan Haggard and Richard Kaufman,
The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) and John Williamson, The Political Economy of Policy
Reform (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994).
1 One of the most convincing versions of this approach has been Barry Naughton, Growing out of the
Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a recent
counter-argument see Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: entrepreneurship and the
state (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
substantial introduction of market mechanisms and powerful non state-owned firms. As
a result, the limited liberalization that has taken place in China's energy system has
occurred under tightly constrained parameters set by the central government. The central
government consistently seeks to assert its authority in the long-tenrm and enters the sector
in much the same manner as it has in the past. State ownership is actively supported and
investment by firms, particularly abroad, is part of a long-term state-led strategy through
central state-controlled enterprises.12
Empirically, at the industry level, the data regarding the fluctuation in shares of
central state ownership and investment in China's coal and electric power industries
collected in this study does not support the conclusions of the first approach advancing
neo-liberal theories of incremental change. The central state clearly reasserts itself in
these industries and becomes a direct player in the market, even after periods of
economic liberalization. In addition, at the firm level, the two case studies analyzing the
rise of locally-owned electric power firms chronicle the strong reassertion of the central
state through full nationalization of one firm and the forced semi-merger of another. The
evidence at the industry and firm level also refute the second theory of self-reproducing
authoritarianism, which argues that a pluralization of actors and ownership has not
occurred in this strategic sector. The existence and importance of periods of distinct
economic liberalization and the empowerment of local and non-state corporate actors are
clear.
A third approach to understanding change in China's energy sector is one based on
12 David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs vol. 84, no. 5 (2005).
For a strong state argument relating to industrial reform, growth and state-connected firms see Yasheng
Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
elite politics. This perspective does incorporate fluctuations in liberalization and
retrenchment policies over time, and links such change to shifts in the primacy of
competing elite political factions within the central government. According to this view,
the timing of fluctuations in central state ownership and investment in China's energy
sector is symptomatic of what some scholars term "political-business cycles" (PBCs).
According to this view, leaders who are economically liberal oriented, once they are able
to assume political authority, develop and promulgate policies of economic liberalization
that work their way through the energy and other sectors. In contrast, once conservative
leaders wrest political authority from such competitors, economic retrenchment policies
are enforced.13
The portfolio argument forwarded in this study does not reject these theories in full.
Instead, it recognizes the importance of economic liberalization policies in driving energy
supply growth (as argued in neo-liberalism) as well as the implicit importance of the
state's focus on ownership that informs the authoritarian approach. This study's argument
provides a basic framework that explains under what circumstances these aspects of
change most influence China's energy sector. For example, ideational frames are
influential in this sector during periods of low growth, but become secondary to ensuring
energy supply during high growth periods. This study does recognize the central
importance of national leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, who shifted China's development
goals after the Cultural Revolution. However, elite political shifts do not regularly result
in the industry structure changes that are the focus of this study. Each of these three
approaches are addressed below.
3 Richard Baum captures a variant of such a dynamic through his discussion of "fang/shou" cycles. See
Richard Baum, Buring Mao: Chinese politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994).
Creeping Liberalization
The first argument views change in the energy industry as a story of a global
"creeping liberalization" that reduces the scope of direct state intervention in the
market.14 Scholars analyzing the evolution of state intervention focus primarily on the
creation and independence of the formal regulator or expert commission. Change over
time is traditionally explained largely in linear, normative terms, marked by progress
towards competitive markets, independent regulators, and the eventual removal of direct
state involvement in the economy. Figure One illustrates the rapid international diffusion
of neo-liberalism in electricity markets through the measure of two particular institutions:
independent regulatory authorities and private property rights. As Carlos Rufin notes:
"Far from being sheltered from such [liberalization] reform efforts because of high sunk
investment and natural monopoly conditions, infrastructure sectors such as
electricity...have constituted the core of the reform program; in fact, the ESI [electricity
supply industry] has arguably been in many cases the 'flagship' showing the way for
change". 15
14 For more recent examples of this argument in this context see: Tian Zhu, "China's Corporatization Drive:
An Evaluation And Policy Implications," Contemporary Economic Policy 17, no. 4 (1999): 530-9; David
Levi-Faur, "The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism," The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 598, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 12-32; Covadonga Meseguer, "Policy Learning,
Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 598, no. 1 (March 1,2005): 67-82; Nancy Brune and Alexandra Guisinger, "Myth or
Reality? The Diffusion of Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries", Yale University MacMillan
Center Working Paper (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University, 2007).
15 Carlos Rufin, The political economy
, 
of institutional change in the electricity supply industry: shifting
currents (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003), p. 1.
Figure 1. Diffusion of Regulatory Authorities and Privatization
in Electricity Markets
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Source: David Levi-Faur, "The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 598, no. 1 (March 1, 2005), p. 18.
The idea of such liberal diffusion in the energy markets of the developing world
was strengthened in the early 1990s through the demonstration effect provided by
successful experiences of restructuring in developed economies such as England and
Wales, Norway, and the US, but also success in developing economies such as Chile.
The reformrn success of these nations provided considerable evidence that well-functioning
and efficient energy markets at the minimum required several institutional reforms,
including: the creation of independent regulatory authorities to replace direct state
"owner and manager" control over assets; ownership reform through the
commercialization and corporatization of assets into firms to facilitate privatization; and
the pluralization of investment channels to include private and foreign actors.
A key mechanism of such diffusion in many developing economies was the
conditional lending approach that the World Bank officially began to mandate beginning
in 1992; loans that were often vital to such economies because of "the inability of the
state sector to finance needed expenditures on new investment".16 The World Bank's
support of ownership and regulatory reform, tied to many of the early loans particularly
in the electric power generation industry in countries such as China, provided both
incentive and some form of coercive and supervisory pressure to implement such
policies. Margaret Pearson, in analyzing whether the rise of a "regulatory state" has
indeed taken place in China, has highlighted how such neo-liberal principles influenced a
variety of formal institutions within China's central state, writing:
"The Chinese government has been made much aware of this [neo-liberal]
model, in large part through its contacts with international organizations such as
the World Bank, the OECD, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Trade
Organization. In form, many of China's reforms are consistent with, and
informed by, key tenets of the global wave of regulatory reform: releasing some
economic functions from direct government management; establishing regulators
as market "referees"; and increasing the capacity and efficiency of the economic
bureaucracy."' 7
In fact, some recent scholarship analyzing China's growth during the modem
reform period suggests that the economic boom of the 1980s and early 1990s was even
closer to neo-liberal ideals than previously believed. Yasheng Huang illustrates how
China's early growth in the rural areas exhibited what he terms "directional liberalism",
even in state-dominated sectors similar to energy, such as finance. He argues: "The
successes of the Chinese economy are a function of conventional sources - private-sector
development, financial liberalization, and property rights security."" 8 An important
foundation of this argument is the assertion that the vast majority of Township and
16 RW Bacon and J. Besant-Jones, "Global electric power reform, privatization and liberalization of the
electric power industry in developing countries", Annual Reviews: Energi & the Environment, 26 (2001),
p. 1
17 Margaret Pearson, "Regulation and Regulatory Politics in China's Tiered Economy," Draft paper
prepared for conference on "Capitalism With Chinese Characteristics: China's Political Economy in
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Indiana University, May 19-20, 2006, p. 6-7 .
18 Huang (2008), p. 3 0 . Italics added.
Village Enterprises (TVEs) were in fact private firms and not public firms truly owned by
local government. Huang points out that this category of finn was officially created in
1984 and such firms were defined as "enterprises sponsored by townships and villages,
the alliance enterprises formed by peasants, other alliance enterprises and individual
enterprises".19 Of the 12.5 million TVEs registered in 1985, 10.5 million were private,
and by 1987 32 percent of the TVE sector's gross output value was accounted for by
private firms.2 TVEs are a critical productive result of China's economic liberalization
and played a major role in the growth in China's coal industry.
The rapid rise of TVEs in coal production and of foreign- and local state-owned
firms in electric power production that fueled China's energy boom highlight the
importance of investment and ownership liberalization in China's energy sector. As
Huang argues, many of these firms are private or semi-private and were able to access
investment and become legal entities through major reforms that lowered barriers to
entry. According to official figures, TVEs (collective, private, and "other" mines)
accounted for a mere 14 percent of total coal production in 1978 and rose to a dramatic
52 percent in 1996.2 1 However, as Huang himself notes, it is striking that these dynamic
local firms did not greatly reduce and supersede the share of central state-owned firms
over the 25 years since that 1984 reform. 2 2 Had such reforms been allowed to continue,
central state ownership of assets would necessarily have declined. However, in the case
of the coal industry, the TVE share of production fell to 25 percent in 2001 and despite a
resurgence to 44 percent by 2006, central state-owned firmns still supplied more coal (48
19 Ibid., p.75.
20 Ibid., p.80.
21 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), China Energy Databook, 2008.
22 Discussion with author, March 13, 2009.
percent). In electric power, while over 50 percent of installed capacity was produced by
local state-owned, foreign and private firms, over 45 percent of capacity was still
produced by central state-owned firmnns in 2007. Aspects of neo-liberalism were certainly
at work in the energy production boom China has experienced, but the neo-liberal
approach clearly does not explain the evolution of China's coal and electric power
generation industry structures. The state continues to play a role and to determine
outcomes in a way that is not captured by such a theory of development.
Self-reproducing Authoritarianism
The second approach views changes in China's energy sector as variations on a
theme of "self-reproducing authoritarianism". 23 Unlike analyses of the private or quasi-
private sector in China, which frequently frame state involvement as a largely "helping
hand" model of development 24, analysis of the energy sector often characterizes the
central state as an interventionist actor pursuing regressive pricing and finance policies.2
As discussed in Chapter Two, these perspectives see barriers to market entry for non-
incumbent firms as high, incentives to support protectionism by incumbent firms are
23 Timothy Oakes, "Building a Southern Dynamo: Guizhou and State Power," China Quartervly 178 (2004):
467-487; Darrin Magee, "Powershed Politics: Yunnan Hydropower under Great Western Development,"
China Quarterl 185 (2006): 23-41. Darrin Magee discusses similar energy projects in the "Develop the
West" campaign and finds little evidence of what he terms "central-state-strengthening".
24 Timothy Frye and Andrei Shleifer, The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand (Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996); Andrew Walder, "Zouping in Perspective", in Andrew G.
Walder (ed.), Zouping in Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1998, 16-23); Andrew Walder, "Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An
Organizational Analysis of China's Transitional Economy," American Journal ofSociology, 101, no. 2
(1995); Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (University of
California Press, 1999. For an overview of varying approaches to the role of the local state in economic
development see Tony Saich, "The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analyzing the Local State in China," in
Luigi Tomba (Ed.), On the Roots of Growth and Crisis: Capitalism, State and Society in East Asia, (Annale
Feltinelli, 2002), pp. 75-99.
25 For example Amy Jaffe et. al., "Beijing's oil diplomacy," Survival 44, no. 1 (2002): 115-134; Robert
Ebel, "China's Energy Future: The Middle Kingdom Seeks Its Place in the Sun" (Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 2005); Linda Jakobson and Daojiong Zha, "China and the Worldwide Search for Oil
Security," Asia-Pacific Review 13, no. 2 (2006): 60-73.
many, financial resources for non-central state actors are limited, and political pressure to
subsidize prices dominates the political economy landscape. The energy sector is
portrayed as effectively closed to private and foreign investment, concentrated in
structure, and suffering in competitive termns because of the direct role of the central state
as an actor in the market.
These views of a consolidated sector managed by a consistently interventionist
central state result from a bias in the literature towards analysis of the oil and natural gas
industry in China. Particularly evident after China became a net oil product importer in
1993, these studies proliferated as the overseas investment activities of Chinese oil and
gas firms grew during the late 1990s and early 2000s.26 This attention has reinforced the
view that China's energy sector is heavily concentrated and dominated by a handful of
large incumbent firms, financed largely by the central government, and therefore resistant
to major change, institutional or otherwise. However, these views are also evident in
studies of the electric power industry as well. The central government, in this view,
"controls virtually all aspects of [power plant] operation, including the amount and
timing of the plants' scheduled output, setting and adjusting tariffs, performance of
26 For recent examples see: Richard J. Ellings, "'Going Out': China's Pursuit of Natural Resources and
Implications for the PRC's Grand Strategy," NBR Analysis, vol. 17, no. 3, Sep. 2006; Ian Taylor, "China's
Oil Diplomacy in Africa," International Aff/airs, vol. 82, no. 5, 2006, pp. 937-959; Amy Myers Jaffe and
Steven W. Lewis, "Beijing's Oil Diplomacy," Survival, vol. 44, no. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 115-134; Kenneth
Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg, "China's Search for Energy Security: Implications for US Policy"
(National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006); Daojiong Zha, "China's energy security: Domestic and
international issues," Survival 48, no. 1 (2006): 179-190. Exceptions include Shaofeng Chen, "Motivations
behind China's Foreign Oil Quest: A Perspective from the Chinese Government and the Oil Companies,"
Journal of Chinese Political Science 13, no. 1 (2008): 79-104; Erica Downs, "The fact and fiction of Sino-
African energy relations" (Brookings Institution, 2007).
scheduled overhaul and maintenance procedures and compliance with grid control
procedures".27
Other authors argue that China's central state is unable to remove itself as a direct
owner, investor, and direct actor in the energy market because of its active suppression of
alternative institutional mechanisms of market coordination such as legal dispute
resolution through an independent judicial system, etc. The nature of the central state's
early involvement in the sector conditions future attempts at systemic reform. An
interventionist state mediates conflicting interests in the economic and social
relationships between major actors. Should the state remove itself from such direct
involvement, such action can be "both economically disruptive and politically dangerous.
Since groups do not emerge fully grown the moment the government decides to withdraw
from its economic role, a regulatory substitute for direct state involvement must be found
if relatively stable agreements are to be forged between groups with conflicting interests.
These substitutes include alternative institutional mechanisms for resolving conflicts and
the revitalization, creation, or legalization of corporate groups in civil society."28
As the main findings of this study suggest, China's central state has indeed
maintained the ability to enforce a narrow but powerful range of regulatory functions that
have had a great impact on the structure of the national energy sector. For the purposes
of this study, the relevant functions include market access (project approval), contract
price parameters, and personnel management. The central state institutions governing
such functions have, despite reforms, been led by long-serving leaders and remained
27 Peter Nolan and Wang Xiaoqiang, "Harbin Power Equipment Company: The Battle for the Chinese
Market," Competition and Change 3 (1998), p. 42 5 .
28 Kiren Chaudhry, "Economic liberalization and the lineages of the rentier state," Comparative Politics
(1994), p. 7 .
fairly stable. The State Planning Commission (SPC) that authorized project approvals
and price parameters absorbed a potentially competitive State Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC) in 2003 and was renamed the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC). Many of the personnel and regulatory authorities remained
constant. Personnel management for central state officials and senior provincial officials
remained throughout periods of reform in the hands of the Central Organization
Department (COD) of the Party. Such stability among a limited number of central state
entities has enabled the state's portfolio approach to coal and electric power management
that serves as the thesis of this study.
However, as the industry level data presented in Chapter Two illustrate, this
portfolio approach explains the cyclic periods during which central state reforms
aggressively lowered barriers to investment and ownership entry in the market,
suspended for all intents and purposes project approval of major mines and power plants,
liberalized contract prices ranges (particularly in coal), and established regulatory
authorities with degrees of independence. This dissertation's two case studies detail the
manner in which provincial and sub-provincial governments have proven to be vital to
the successful provision of energy supply by serving as coordinating and mediating
mechanisms at the local level between various actors, as well as between the central and
local state. In addition, as the recent work of Andrew Mertha has shown, civil society
actors have an increasing influence over the fate of major energy projects. 29 A range of
state and non-state actors are able to provide such coordinating functions when the
central state reduces its involvement in such aspects of energy supply provision.
29 Andrew Mertha, China's Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2008).
Elite Politics and "Political-Business Cycles " (PBCs)
The final approach privileges the role of elite politics in explaining the evolution
of China's energy industry structure. Elite politics undoubtedly play an important role in
the development of a nation's energy sector, certainly in China. 30 Key political figures
were central to the building of specific energy industries. Li Peng, China's acting
premier beginning in 1987, is often credited as the father of the nation's modern
electricity industry. During the final years of China's civil war, he went to work as a
technician for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Power Company, going on to graduate studies in
electric power engineering at the Moscow Power Institute in the Soviet Union. He then
moved to Jilin province to work in the Fengman Hydroelectric Power Plant and
eventually became Chairman of the National Power Administration during the Cultural
Revolution then Minister of the Electric Power Industry between 1979 and 1983. This
thorough academic and professional training in hydroelectric power largely guided his
support of the Sanxia (Three Gorges) dam project during the 1980s and 1990s. The Li
family has continued to shape the nation's electricity industry, as Li's son until 2008
served as the chief executive of the nation's largest electric power generating firm and his
daughter remains the chief executive of its fifth largest firm.31 The historical "petroleum
faction", that included senior leaders of the 12th Central Committee such as Yu Qiuli,
Kang Shien and Tang Ke, is another example of the direct link between the political
fortunes of individuals and the nation's energy sector.
30 See William Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle", Review of Economic Studies 42 (1975); pp. 169-
89; Edward Tufte, "Political Control of the Econonm (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Hu
Angang, "Zhongguo zhengce zhouqi yu jingji zhouqi", Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly 8 (1994); pp.85-
100.
31 Significantly, Li's son has since entered formal government to become the vice governor of Shanxi
province, the nation's largest coal producing province.
Most importantly, at the factional level, critical shifts in elite politics empowering
liberal reform-minded leaders often coincided with rapid economic growth. Such growth
necessitated the liberalization of the energy sector to fuel economic demand. In this
indirect manner, it can be argued that only a certain subset of elite shifts were able to
influence energy policy and the structure of the energy sector more broadly. To have
such an impact, elite shifts must have fulfilled the following criteria: i) led to liberal
economic policy promulgation; ii) successfully strengthened economic growth; and also
iii) required major energy supply increases. Conversely, lasting elite shifts that
strengthened conservative leaders who in turn promulgated economic retrenchment
policies that then led to economic stagnation and energy surplus could be credited with
energy policies that consolidated institutions at the central level and consolidated energy
industry structure.
However, during the critical early period of energy sector development in the
1980s, some of the clearest changes in elite politics did not result in similar changes in
economic policy and energy outcomes. Clear moments of strengthening conservative
factions did not often result in the consolidation of energy institutions at the central state
level or the consolidation of central state ownership in the structure of the national energy
industry. By mid-1986, in the first critical conservative shift in elite personnel that
decade, opposition to the liberal reform group "was coalescing and the issue of political
reform and the student demonstrations of 1986 enabled opponents to maneuver to remove
reformist party secretary Hu Yaobang." 32
Despite the hardening of elite voices in Beijing and the rise of the conservative
faction, liberalizing policy changes that same year (discussed in Chapter Two) allowed
32 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (Palgrave New York, 2001), p. 60 .
the entrance of new investors upstream into coal, electric power and oil production.
Provincial, municipal, and local governments, as well as private domestic and foreign
firmnns were encouraged to invest in coal mines, power plants, and a range of oil refining
and production activities. In order to strengthen this step-change in energy production,
energy assets were also corporatized and the ministries of Petroleum, Water Conservancy
and Power, and Coal Industries were eventually abolished. Many of the ministerial
regulatory responsibilities were transferred to the new corporations. High economic
growth rates well over 10 percent in 1987 reinforced this institutional and industrial
structure diversification continued despite such conservative shifts in elite politics.
It was not until economic growth rates began to plummet in mid-1988 that a
central Ministry of Energy was created. However, as Tony Saich has argued, the broader
economic policies pushed by then-powerful conservative forces in the central government
were rapidly weakened, despite the lack of an obvious liberal political resurgence. By
May of 1990, less than a year after the June 1989 dismissal of liberal reformer Zhao
Ziyang as General Secretary of the CCP during the fourth plenum of the 13 th Central
Committee, "there were clear signs that the orthodox attack was being blunted...Shaken
by the economic downturn, and fearing social dislocation, measures were quietly
introduced to ease the austerity program despite resistance by fiscal conservatives at the
center." 33 In short, despite a clear shift in elite politics that signaled the curtailment of
liberal economic reforms and the return of policy retrenchment, "by stealth, the program
of economic retrenchment was gradually being rolled back." 34
33 Ibid., p.68.
34 Ibid.
Other scholars, such as Joe Fewsmith, have argued that the continued role of
informal networks greatly undermined the formal authority of critical "tier-two" leaders
such as Zhao Ziyang, rendering the impact of elite politics on industry structure even
more difficult to measure. As a result, the influence on economic and industrial policy of
change in formal institutional roles was often greatly reduced. Fewsmith writes:
"Because Zhao was a second-echelon leader and senior appointments were controlled at a
higher level than his own, he could never control the most important bureaucratic
elements of the State Council, particularly the State Planning Commission... [he] could
pressure, cajole, and compromise with the [SPC], but he could not command it and he
could not have its leaders changed."35 The SPC, as Chapter Two details, played a central
role in the promulgation of major policies that affected the industrial structure of the
national energy sector.
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Recent academic studies have contributed much to our understanding of the broad
link between elite politics and national investment cycles in China, and have revealed that
the relationship is at times inverted, at times synchronized, and at other times completely
de-synchronized. As Lowell Dittmer and Yu-Shan Wu have documented, the relationship
between business and political reform cycles is complex and the very nature of this
relationship changes considerably between periods of political leadership.36 Often these
fundamental differences are driven by changes in the general policy goals of the political
elite during certain historical periods.
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) the relationship between elite political
cycles and business (economic) cycles was inverse, as sporadic attempts at liberal
reforms resulted in political entrenchment and consolidation. During the Deng Xiaoping
period (1979-1995/6) business and reform cycles were synchronized, with liberal policy
introduction often resulting in economic growth and the diversification of economic
actors. However, this link between political and economic cycles changed again with the
Jiang Zemin period (1995/6-2003), a period in which Dittmer and Wu argue that the two
were fully desynchronized. Relatedly, the authors point out that the focus of
disagreement among factions relating to paramount goals of reform also changed
dramatically during these periods. Security dominated elite factional battles during the
Cultural Revolution, conservatism vs. economic growth dominated during the Deng
period, and the equitable distribution of resources vs. continued rapid economic progress
concerned the vying factions of the Jiang period.37 Dittmer and Wu illustrate this
36 Dittmer and Wu, pp.49-80.
" Ibid., p.74.
considerable variance in the goals of elite debate, relation between business and reform
cycles, and other aspects of elite reform with an effective chart, adapted below.
It is therefore difficult for an explanation resting solely on elite politics to explain
the pattern of outcomes in energy industry structure and state institutions. This
dissertation study spans two of these periods and continues through to a third leadership
period under current president Hu Jintao, and therefore includes data from periods in
which this political and economic cycle relationship was both synchronized and de-
synchronized. Moreover, it is unclear how to characterize the Hu period in these terms,
only complicating matters further. Even during the "synchronized" Deng period, major
shifts in elite factional struggles did not directly result in similar shifts in policy,
institutional, and energy outcomes.
The Argument - A Portfolio Strategy
This study builds in part on the approaches just discussed to offer a framework for
analyzing the evolution of investment and ownership in China's coal and electric power
over the past three decades. This approach, as discussed previously, suggests that
China's central state manages the nation's coal and electric power firmnns as a portfolio of
assets. A portfolio is a managed collection of differentiated entities that is designed to
mitigate risk.38 Portfolios are frequently employed, whether in the relationships between
individual and firm, between firms themselves, or between firm and state. Such an
approach diversifies the channels through which risk is borne, thus reducing exposure to
38 For one of the clearest and earliest treatments of portfolio management, please see Harry Markowitz,
"Portfolio selection," Journal of Finance (1952): 77-91. A modified foundational analysis was later
authored by William Sharpe, "A simplified model for portfolio analysis," Management Science (1963):
277-293; and expanded upon by Kenneth Arrow, Aspects of the theory of risk-bearing (Helsinki, 1965).
high levels of any one specific risk. The portfolio concept has been applied to a range of
topics and to a range of relationships.
Individual investors often design a portfolio of investments in a diverse range of
finns that allows the management of volatile equity price risk that is inherent in any
single investment. As Marshall Blume writes, a portfolio strategy enables the evaluation
of complex risk as a whole rather than as a set of separate risks in discrete activities.
Blume explains in a simple example: "Consider two assets, each of which by itself is
extremely risky. If, however, it is always the case that when one of the assets has a high
return, the other has a low return, the return on a combination of these two assets in a
portfolio may be constant. Thus, the return on the portfolio may be risk-free whereas
each of the assets has a highly uncertain return." 39
Firms themselves often use a portfolio approach to manage the price risk inherent
in supplier transactions. For example, a firm may choose to design a portfolio of
contracts in which 60 percent of supplier contracts are long-term, 25 percent are options
contracts that allow purchasing within pre-negotiated bands of prices, and 15 percent are
spot purchase contracts. 40 The aggregation is termed a "portfolio contract" and is a
combination of these types of contracts. 41 A firm manages and rebalances the portfolio
given changing economic conditions, new supplier information, etc. In the energy sector,
because electric power producers sign a significant portion of long-term contracts for
fuels that contain price adjustment clauses, "the companies must estimate the factors that
might cause the prices of these fuels to go up or down. This situation brings an
39 Marshall Blume, "On the assessment of risk," The Journal of Finance (1971), p.2 .40 R. F. Olsen and L. M. Ellram, "A portfolio approach to supplier relationships," Industrial Marketing
Management 26, no. 2 (1997): 101-113.
41 Victor Martinez-de-Albeniz and David Simchi-Levi, "A portfolio approach to procurement contracts,"
Production and Operations Management 14, no. 1 (2005): 90-114.
uncertainty factor to the decision making process of buying fuels and is analogous to the
problem of selecting risky securities. In buying risky securities the problem is one of
estimating the returns, risks, and correlations of the securities, where the risk is defined as
the standard deviation of the expected return on the portfolio, and the goal is to maximize
the return of the portfolio for a given risk."4 2
States may also use a portfolio strategy to mitigate risk; a strategy particularly
relevant in the management of technology and supply risk in the energy sector.43 As the
US Department of Energy (DOE) has consistently argued, the US pursues a portfolio
approach to the diversification of national energy supply. 44 At times certain fuels in that
portfolio are encouraged 6 r discouraged through legislation such as the 1978 Power Plant
and Industrial Fuels Act (PPIFA), part of the sweeping National Energy Conservation
Policy Act of the early Carter administration, which prohibited the use of oil and natural
gas as fuel for base-load electricity generation. Similarly, the US argues for the use of a
portfolio approach to mitigate technology risk in climate change mitigation, choosing to
invest research and development (R+D) funds into a shifting range of short-term and
long-term solutions that carry varying degrees of such risk. China's central government,
historically through the State Atomic Energy Agency45, has characterized its engagement
in technology acquisition of nuclear electric power generation equipment as one of
42 Dan Bar-Lev and Steven Katz, "A Portfolio Approach to Fossil Fuel Procurement in the Electric Utility
Industry," Journal of Finance 31, no. 3 (June 1976), p. 933.
43 For a systematic analysis of the role of government in managing risk, please see David Moss, When all
else fails: government as the ultimate risk manager (Harvard University Press, 2002).
44 For an example, see US Department of Energy, Comprehensive National Energy Strategy (Washington,
DC: Department of Energy, 1998).
45 The SAEA is under the State Council's Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National
Defense (COSTIND). Technology selection in particular is currently executed by the State Nuclear Power
Technology Corporation.
supply strategy through portfolio management. 46 This has been achieved largely through
the continual adoption of several concurrent competing technologies from various
countries, rather than convergence on one particular advanced technology.
As stated previously, portfolio approaches to investment relationships, contracts,
technologies and many other aspects of control seek to manage risk. Risk can be
economic or political in nature. Economic risk ranges from the general, such as the
stability of interest rates for a given nation or the deviation of return-on-investment (ROI)
for a range of investment assets, to the specific, such as the risk that a particular project's
output will not generate sufficient revenues to cover operating costs and to repay debt
obligations. Political risk can be similarly broad in nature, from the general, such as
levels of political administration stability, to the specific, such as the probability of a
project's assets being expropriated and nationalized by the state. Other risks may be a
combination of both political and economic factors, such as the probability of energy
supply or inventory disruption. Portfolios allow an investor to re-adjust the composition
of risk that the total investment is exposed to, according to circumstance and new
information. Should re-adjustment not take place, risky components of the portfolio that
grow rapidly in one period may begin to outweigh the less risky components that have
been unable to generate high returns. In the long term such imbalance may prove
disastrous once these risky investments encounter an economic downturn and the
majority of the portfolio is lost.
The Role of Functionalism and Ideational Frames
46 See Dazhong Wang and Yingyun Lu, "Roles and prospect of nuclear power in China's energy supply
strategy," Nuclear Engineering and Design 218 (November 2003), 3-12; also Sheng Zhou and Xiliang
Zhang, "Nuclear energy development in China: A study of opportunities and challenges", Energy
(IN PRESS 2009).
As stated previously, the Chinese central state's portfolio approach to the
management of its national coal and electricity industries serves as a method for
mitigating the considerable risk inherent in the energy sector. The sector's long
investment cycles, the capital intensity of electricity production, the natural monopolies
of electricity transmission, and other aspects of the energy value chain all present
considerable financial, regulatory, and security of supply risks to the state. These critical
aspects of the energy sector create functional necessities for large capital agglomeration,
long-term management of supply and demand, the creation and enforcement of safety
standards, technological upgrading, and other needs. These functions are particularly
under strain during periods of high economic growth. For example, long-term supply
investments in such periods do not match short-term demand change, and capital
agglomeration is therefore pressured to deploy such investments more rapidly. These
functional necessities are universal to energy provision. As a result, there is a range of
policy responses that seek to provide such functions.
Yet states react differently to such risks and to which actors carry out which
functions. Perception is critical in assessing the nature, scale, and priority of different
forms of risk. Such perception is clearly influenced by ideational frames often motivated
by historical, cultural, ideological and other influences. As a result, ideas matter greatly
in how risk is measured. The following section clearly separates the functionalist aspects
of the portfolio approach from the ideational aspects, and explains how the functionalist
aspects shape the range of policies adopted by the state while the ideational aspects shape
the state's assessment of risk. Ultimately, these two aspects are necessary to
understanding the portfolio approach itself and the cycles of consolidation and
diversification in ownership and investment evident in China's coal and electric power
industries. This section will first outline functionalist analysis, then highlight several
important criticisms of functionalism.
Understood in its most abstract and minimal form, a functionalist argument
suggests that a given system is governed by self-preservation. The goal of successful
self-preservation and system stability require the fulfillment of key functions through
certain mechanisms. As Robert Merton has written: "Functions are those observed
consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system". 47 A.
James Gregor offered an early biological analogy to explain functionalist arguments.
Gregor wrote that: "the human body maintains its temperature in a fairly constant
[thermal] state as a consequence of the operation of the thyroid gland, the dilation and the
contraction of blood vessels carrying blood and radiating heat through the skin...all
adaptive or compensatory variations made in response to primary thermal variations in
the external environment."4 8 Both a competitive market economy and a human body
attempt to maintain stability through cyclic adjustments based on system needs: either the
need to have marginal demand equal marginal supply or the need to maintain the body's
normal thermal state between 97.3 and 99.1 degrees Fahrenheit. Carl Hempel notes that:
"Embedded in every functionalist analysis is some conception, tacit or expressed, of the
functional requirements of the system under observation".4 9 It is the often tacit nature of
functional assumptions that weaken the functionalist approach, as the underlying
mechanisms of change are left under-specified.
47 Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1957), p. 5 1.
48 A. James Gregor, "Political science and the uses of functional analysis," The American Political Science
Review (1968), p. 4 3 3 .
49 Carl Hempel, "The logic of functional analysis," Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (1959),
p.365.
There are two primary criticisms leveled at functionalist arguments that are most
relevant to this study. First, scholars such as Hempel have argued that much of this work
suffers from "inadequate specification of scope". 50 According to functionalist
explanations, systems have certain limits of tolerance that must be explicitly stated. In
the biological example, the human body must maintain a certain thermal range in order to
avoid expiration. Should no minimum and maximum value for such a range be specified,
it is difficult to falsify functionalist claims. Hempel therefore argues that functionalism
requires an argument based on "self-regulation with respect to the range 'R' of the
permissible values within which the requisites can vary and the system be self-
regulating. ' 5 ' These requisites must be established in order to test the validity of such an
argument empirically.
Second, other scholars, such as Robert Holt, demand further precision from
functionalist approaches, arguing that the focus on self-regulating stability in a system
precludes discussion of evolutionary change and therefore unnecessarily privileges stasis
in the system." Early functionalists, such as Merton, certainly recognized the importance
of adaptive responses, as they are central to functionalist analysis. System stability is
clearly difficult to maintain at all times, as functional deficiencies emerge that threaten
the economy or organism in question. Under such circumstances Merton argues that:
"the functional deficiencies of the official structure generate an alternative (unofficial)
50 Ibid., p.364.
51 Jerone Stephens, "The Logic of Functional and Systems Analyses in Political Science," Midwest Journal
of Political Science (1969), p. 3 73 .52 See Robert Holt, "A Proposed Structural-Functional Framework for Political Science," in D. Martindale
(ed.) Functionalism in the Social Sciences: The Strength and Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology,
Economics, Political Science, and Sociology (Philadelphia, PA: American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 1965).
structure to fulfill existing needs somewhat more efficiently." 53 In other words, when
disequilibrium threatens stability, the system allows the creation of "shock absorbers",
often unofficial in nature, to meet the needs of the system. Critics argue that such logic
must be explicitly extended to its conclusion - that these adaptive, more efficient new
structures that are fulfilling existing needs then replace old structures that are failing such
needs. Functionalism, it is argued, is again tacit in its assumptions and therefore does not
afford adequate analytical weight to how adaptations may change the nature of the
system itself. This modification of functionalism posits that while the overall
characteristics of the system may remain through time, it is important to note the
important shifts at the micro-level.
In summary, functionalist analysis is founded upon a claim that a given system is
continually seeking to maintain its stability and ensure self-preservation. During periods
of disequilibrium and instability produced by functional inefficiencies, "unofficial"
alternative structures are established to address system needs that are not being fulfilled.
Critics have rightfully claimed that many arguments based on functionalist analysis have
left under-specified the range of conditions in which a system can be described as stable
and in equilibrium, and outside of which would be described as unstable and lacking
equilibrium. Other scholars have argued that the majority of functional analysis does not
adequately capture and address how evolutionary adaptation and change can occur in
such systems.
This study explicitly addresses the first criticism, relating to under-specified
range, by linking the rise of alternative mechanisms (in China's case, locally owned coal
mines and power plants) to policy periods with specific values of economic growth
53 Merton, in Hempel, p.364.
(above nine percent) and resulting values of national electricity balance (when deficit
occurs). This is accomplished through industry level data analysis and firm level analysis
in the case studies. The study also addresses the second criticism, relating to
evolutionary change, by contrasting the persistence of the firm in Chapter Three to the
effective nationalization of the firm in Chapter Four. The Jinyuan Group case in Chapter
Three illustrates that central state-owned firns of the present, created through acquisition
of these local firms born as alternative structures during periods of high growth, are not
organized in the same manner as traditional central state-owned firmnns.
However, despite the study's more precise use of functional analysis to explain
the relative rise of locally-owned and invested mines and plants, functionalism alone is
insufficient to describe the relative fall of such firms. Were the functionalist goal of
ensuring adequate national electric power supply the only goal of the central state
(particularly after the reforms announced during the Third Plenum of the 11 th Chinese
Communist Party Congress in December 1978), then the level of central state ownership
and investment in these industries would deteriorate over time, much as they have in
other sectors of the economy.54 In periods of high economic growth that demanded
increased energy supply, local state and non-state owned finns would indeed be created
as the "shock absorbers" predicted by functional analysis. These firms would provide the
flexibility and resources necessary to fulfill such need over time, as their efficiency levels
greatly exceeded those of central state plants and mines that were failing to meet demand.
According to strict functionalist analysis, as excess energy demand begins to ease,
the closing of firms would proceed according to each firmnn's ability to fulfill the system's
needs. Those firms that were inefficient (mostly central state-owned) would be closed
54 Barry Naughton 1995.
down, as they were less likely to fulfill the function of meeting demand. During the next
period of rapidly increasing demand, more local state and non-state firms would be
introduced, and central state ownership would thus incrementally be reduced to the
margin.
Empirically, as discussed earlier, levels of central state ownership and investment
in China do not decline continuously in these industries. If the sole goal were ensuring
adequate national energy supply, it would not result in the identified cycles of
consolidation and diversification apparent in the ownership and investment structure of
China's coal and electric power supply industries. Electricity deficit leads to the relative
growth of local non-state coal mines and locally owned (state and hybrid) power plants.
Electricity surplus leads to the relative decline of these local mines and plants, either
through outright nationalization, closure, or indirect acquisitions by incumbent firms. It
is in explaining the periodic relative decline of these local firms that the role of ideational
factors is critical to the portfolio argument.
The maintenance of public ownership has long been featured prominently in
academic and policy discussions of economic development in China. The rationale
linking public ownership and China's ideology of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought
rests on what can be termed both "fundamental" and "instrumental" principles. 55 In
fundamental terms, public ownership erases the distinction between owner of capital and
worker, thus advancing society to a stage that is increasingly classless and nearer the
utopian ideal (however vaguely Marx envisioned such an endpoint).56 In instrumental
55 Feng Chen, Economic transition and political legitimacy in post-Mao China. ideology and reform (State
University of New York Press, 1995), p. 23 .
56 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: selected works in one volume
(International Publishers, 1968).
terms, public ownership enabled the comprehensive economic planning sought by leaders
such as Mao during the early years of the PRC. Consolidation of economic actors
through collectivization and other forms of state ownership enabled an under-
institutionalized and immature governing apparatus to begin directing resources to
priority (urban) areas of the economy and to particular industries.
Both fundamental and instrumental arguments for the support of public ownership
are particularly apparent and influential in the case of China's energy sector. Energy in
China, as in most economies, is strategic in nature, largely because of its central
importance to sustaining economic growth and the link between such growth and political
legitimacy.57 As a result, the CCP has historically characterized energy industries,
including the coal and electric power industries, as "backbone" (gugan) or "lifeline"
(mingmai) activities critical to the nation. While industrialization requires strong and
healthy energy firms to provide the resources necessary for growth, the central state
maintains a significant distrust of independent sources of power - economic, political, or
otherwise. As Saich argues: "Most writers agree that the leaders of the post-1949 state
not only inherited China's traditional statist disposition but also that they sought far
greater control over and penetration of society than their Imperial and Nationalist
predecessors"." The state's need for the creation of efficient and productive firms,
particularly during periods of rapid economic growth, is therefore in frequent tension
57 For more on this specific link between growth and legitimacy in this context, see Kenneth Lieberthal and
Michel Oksenberg, Policy making in China. leaders, structures, and processes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1988), Vaclav Smil, Energy in China's Modernization: Advances and Limitations (ME
Sharpe, 1988), Elspeth Thomson, The Chinese Coal Industry: An Economic History (Routledge, 2003), Yi-
chong Xu, Electricity ref'orm in China, India and Russia: the World Bank template and the politics of
power (Edward Elgar, 2004), and Emily Yeh and Joanna Lewis, "State power and the logic of reform in
China's electricity sector," Pacific- Affairs (2004): 437-465.
58 Saich, p. 195.
with the desire to control the activities of such actors in order to limit their potential
political impact. 59
This tension is reflected in the accommodative tone that modem reforms have at
times adopted in this sector. Communist ideology regarding ownership of enterprises in
these industries has historically emphasized the primacy of public ownership, however
since the late 1970s and the beginning of the reform period additional forms have been
tolerated and even encouraged. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, economic
development replaced the maintenance of public ownership as the primary goal of the
state. As Naughton has highlighted: "economic development was adopted as the primary
goal of the Communist Party at the 3 rd plenum".60 Public ownership continued to be
officially supported, however alternative forms of ownership were also supported
according to basic principles that have remained fairly constant in the past three decades.
First, economic development, it was argued, should be achieved "with public ownership
as the base, together with diversified ownership forms" (gongyouzhi wei zhuti, duozhong
suoyouzhijingii gongtongfazhan dejibenjingi zhidu). Second, economic development
required "uniting government guidance and market adjustment" (zhengfu yindao he
shichang tiaojie xiangiiehe).61
In any economy, the state may influence the activities of energy actors by
occupying a range of positions or directly fulfilling a range of functions. The state may
59 It is instructive to note that the first several years after the PRC's founding witnessed the state's tolerance
and limited support of maintaining multiple forms of ownership (state-owned, cooperative, private, and
joint state-private) in the energy sector, as the state was seeking to support and maintain early growth of an
economy undone by decades of war. Chen, p.27
60 Barry Naughton, "Market Economy, Hierarchy, and Single Party Rule: How Does the Transition Path in
China Shape the Emerging Market Economy?" draft paper presented to the International Economic
Association, Hong Kong, January 14-15, 2004.
61 "Guanyu tuijin guoyou ziben tiaozheng he guoyou qiye chongzu de zhidao yijian". Available at:
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/gzjg/xcgz/200612180138.htm.
act as owner (through equity), as creditor (through debt), as direct supplier (through
monopoly), as direct buyer (through monopsony), and/or as regulator (through oversight
of competition/market power and other issues relating to economic regulation, as well as
social regulation relating to market failure concerns). As the chart below suggests, and
Chapter Two analyzes in detail, China's central state has formally relinquished its role in
the energy sector as direct owner and provider of equity, as direct creditor, and as direct
sole supplier and buyer of energy resources. Many of these rights have been granted to
corporations. This process of corporatization, while certainly not comprehensive in its
execution, sought to sever the link between state ownership and state management of
such resources. As a result, as others have highlighted and the subsequent case studies
illustrate in detail, these firms have indeed grown economically powerful and developed
significant autonomy in management and financial decision-making.62
Figure 3. Range of State Functions in the Market
Function Actor
Govt Firm
Central Prov. Domestic Domestic Domestic J.V. Firm
Govt Govt Firm (Govt Firm Firm (Foreign +
owned) (Hybrid - (Private) Domestic)
Pub./Priv.)
Owner (Equity) XX XX XXXXXX XXXXXX XX X
Creditor (Debt) XXXXXX XXXXXX XX XX
Regulator
Personnel Mgmt XXXXX XX
Project Approval XXXX XXX
Merger +Acq. Approval XXXXX XX
Environ. Assessment XX XX
Supplier (Monopolist) XXXXX XXXXX X X
Buyer (Monopsonist) XXXXX
N.B.: Number of Xs indicates stronger functional capacity by a given set of actors.
To regulate this new landscape of economic actors, regulatory institutions at the
62 Philip Andrews-Speed, Energy policy and regulation in the People's Republic of China, International
energy and resources law and policy series, 19 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International Press, 2004).
central level have also reformed, reflecting the wave of economic liberalization that first
began in economies such as the US and the UK, as discussed in the first section of this
chapter. As Margaret Pearson argues, China's creation of formally independent
regulatory agencies "in form, is consistent with, and informed by, key tenets of the global
wave of regulatory reform: releasing some economic functions from direct government
management; establishing regulators as market 'referees'; and increasing the capacity and
efficiency of the economic bureaucracy." 63
However, it is important to note that while formal regulatory institutions in China
have to some degree modeled themselves after the "regulatory state", the CCP has
retained key aspects of control at the central level - namely personnel management and
the majority of project approval powers. This concentration of influence is critical, and
illustrates the longstanding importance to the central state of maintaining the ability to
influence corporate decision-making. Central state ownership, and the formal right of
personnel management that such ownership legitimates, effectively complements the
project approval and other regulatory rights that the state has retained despite
liberalization reforms. As Margaret Pearson again argues: "It is important to emphasize
that it is not, as often characterized, bureaucratic inertia and vested interest that keeps the
state-owned sector alive. Rather, it reflects a conscious effort by the Chinese government
to concentrate and consolidate this top tier as a key part of China's development
strategy." 64 While vested interest (for example, in the form of the State-owned Asset
Supervision and Administration Commission - SASAC) undoubtedly plays a role in the
periodic rise of central state ownership and investment, Pearson's larger point is worth
63 Pearson, p.7.
64 Ibid., p. 14.
highlighting.
Despite considerable economic liberalization, energy industries historically have
been identified as areas in which central state ownership and management should be
"pushed" or "furthered" (tui jin) to ensure an absolute controlling (juedui kongzhi)
shareholder stake."5  This has not been the case in many other industries, as Barry
Naughton and other scholars have well documented. 66 Even two years after the widely-
referenced and critical 15th Party Congress Report, in which China's President Jiang
Zemin provided ideological rationalization for the inclusion of entrepreneurs in the
Communist Party and Party support of private capital, the Fourth Plenum made clear that
"natural monopoly" industries such as energy and other "lifeline" industries required
control through the state-owned economy "guoyoujingji xuyao kongzhi".6 7
Such special treatment has continued to the present day. Specifically, national
defense, electric power, petroleum and petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil
aviation, and shipping industries were again identified by the State-owned Supervision
and Administration Commission (SASAC) as recently as 2009 as requiring the
strengthening of central state ownership and management.66 In recent years these
65 "China names key industries for absolute state control" China Daily, December 19, 2006. See also Dahe
Daily, "Qi da hangve bixu you guozi kongzhi, qi da hangve baokuo.jungong, dianwang dianli, shivou
shihua, dianxin, meitan, minhang, hangvun" December 19, 2006.
http://epaper.dahe.cn/dhb/htm2006/t20061219 774304.htm
66 For one of the more recent treatments of the central state's attempt to reduce state ownership in broader
industries, see Barry Naughton, "Selling Down the State Share: Contested Policy, New Rules", China
Leadership Monitor, No.1, Part 2, March 2002. His excellent analysis of the drive to increase state shares
in strategic sectors such as energy have focused on the rise of SASAC; see for example Barry Naughton,
"SASAC Rising", China Leadership Monitor, No.14 Spring 2005; and Barry Naughton "Top-Down
Control: SASAC and the Persistence of State Ownership in China", draft conference paper, June 26, 2006.
CCP Central Committee Circular, "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu guoyou qiye gaige he fazhan ruogan
zhongda wenti de jueding", Fourth Plenum of 15th Chinese Communist Party Congress, September 22,
1999, in SASAC, Zhongguo guovou zichan jiandu guanli nianjian 2007, (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji
Chubanshe, 2007).
68 Kang Yi, Liu Weixun, "List of key Chinese subsidiaries 'Not For Sale' being drafted" Economic
Observer (January 19, 2009). http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/lndustry/2009/0 1/22/128015.shtml.
industries were enumerated in a December 5, 2006 SASAC promulgation entitled:
"Guidelines and Opinions Regarding the Furthering of State-owned Capital Adjustment
and the Reorganization State-owned Enterprises". 69
Methodology
Single Country Studies
All academic studies seek some balance between levels of analytic breadth and
analytic depth. The findings offered by studies that capture variation among multiple
industries, countries, and time periods leverage such breadth and are often applicable to
many scenarios and sets of circumstances. Underlying mechanisms of change in such
studies often require more micro-level research and are therefore lost. In contrast,
narrower studies that do reveal the nature of such mechanisms are often criticized for
findings that are unable to be applied to other circumstances. John Gerring has described
this constant analysis of trade-offs, writing: "Research designs invariably face a choice
between knowing more about less and knowing less about more." 70 This study explicitly
privileges analytic depth over breadth in an effort to capture the variation that single
country studies can provide. The study varies: i) sub-nationally (between provinces of
China); ii) temporally (through three decades of reform); iii) between industries (coal and
electric power generation); and iv) between firms (through two firm-level case studies).
As Pepper Culpepper argues: "Sub-national variation among administrative
units...has the great virtue of holding many other potentially causal variables constant."7 1
69 "Guanyu tuijin guoyou ziben tiaozheng he guoyou qiye chongzu de zhidao yijian". Available at:
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/gzjg/xcgz/200612180138.htm.
70 John Gerring, "What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?," American Political Science Review 98,
no. 02 (2004), p. 34 8 .
71 Pepper Culpepper, "Single Country Studies and Comparative Politics", Italian Politics & Societ, No. 6
(Spring 2005), p. 2 .
This study of the changing structure of China's electric power generation and coal
industries is able to test with rigor the relationship between national policies and industry
structure because it omits many of the cultural and other intervening variables that are
introduced in multi-country studies. Temporal variation is also critical, as "many
contemporary debates in political science are concerned with issues of sequencing and
contingency in causal analysis". 72 Variation over time is central to this study, revealing
the cycles of consolidation and diversification of industry structure in China's energy
sector throughout the modern reform period. Finally, inter-firm variation is vital,
especially in a treatment of the effects of national policies on industry structure. Such
variation allows the researcher to understand the manner in which state policies interact
with different firms in a given industry, lending internal validity to conclusions reached
and reinforcing trends identified through initial analysis of industry level data.
Case Studies
This study primarily employs the case study method, supported with industry
level energy data and select results of a unique electric power generation industry survey
designed and executed together with MIT Profs. Edward Steinfeld and Richard Lester,
along with the Horizon Group.7 3 In methodological terms, case studies, particularly
when selected from the same country, strengthen the internal validity of an argument by
controlling for numerous variables, and enable the study to identify the causal
mechanisms critical to the argument. Cases also, by the more open-ended nature of the
72 Ibid., p.2. See also Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2004) and William Sewell, "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful
Sociology." In Terrence McDonald (ed.), The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 245-280.
73 The Horizon Group is a private professional research and consultancy firm in China founded by Victor
(Yue) Yuan.
process of data discovery, are suited well to "explanatory" or "theory-building" efforts.
Finally, in practical terms, case studies also allow for granularity of analysis that is
rendered impossible in cases of unsystematic time series data, as is the case in China's
electric power generation industry, and illuminate the range of actors not captured in
broad data categories.
First, case studies from the same country allow for increased internal validity, as
the cases are comparable along many variables of culture and formal administration and
can be varied explicitly along other variables, such as levels of economic development. It
is important to note that the strengthened internal validity of single country studies entails
a corresponding weakness in external validity, as the representativeness of the argument
as applied to other countries is undermined. Second, as Clayton Roberts argues, case
studies allow us to "peer into the box of causality" (often only imputed in quantitative
measures of causal effects), through "the minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to
the point where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws
correspondingly more certain". 7 4 Case studies unearth and hold in relief the causal
mechanisms that drive broader theoretical arguments and empirical outcomes.
Third, case studies are well suited to what Gerring categorizes as "exploratory"
studies (and what Eckstein termed "theory-building" efforts).75 Gerring argues that "the
very 'subjectivity' of case study research allows for the generation of a great number of
hypotheses, insights that might not be apparent to the cross-unit researcher who works
74 Clayton Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1996), p.66 . See also Gerring, p. 348, and George and Bennett 2004. Alexander George and Andrew
Bennett, Case studies and theolr development in the social sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
75 See Harry Eckstein, "Case studies and theory in political science." in Handbook ofpolitical Science, v.ii:
Political Science; Scope and Theory, ed. F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1975), pp. 79-133 and Gerring 2004.
with a thinner set of empirical data across a large number of units and with a more
determinate (fixed) definition of cases, variables, and outcomes."7 6 While often arduous
in task and initially bewildering in complexity, case studies offer the opportunity to
reorganize and redefine a hierarchy of variables in repeated attempts to understand
empirical outcomes. Rather than looking under the proverbial "lamppost" that
illuminates through progress in quantitative tools based upon previous attempts at data
collection, a researcher analyzing a case study of the French Revolution, for example,
is able to conceptualize the case "as a study of revolution, of social revolution, of revolt,
of political violence, and so forth. Each of these topics entails a different population and
a different set of causal factors."77
Finally, in practical terms, specific industry time series data can often be
unsystematic. This is particularly prevalent in the case of developing economies
undergoing periodic overhauls in the institutions and identities (firm, government, NGO,
or otherwise) responsible for data collection. Because of redefinitions and gaps in data
collection, time series data are often distilled to overly vague and broad categories that
conceal more than they reveal. In China's case, despite institutional consolidation and
diversification, ownership and investment data for the coal industry has remained fairly
consistent. In contrast, ownership and investment data for China's electric power
generation industry is more sporadic in nature. This study seeks to utilize the inherent
advantages of both strengthened internal validity and of a focus on causal mechanisms
that case studies lend to the theory-building enterprise, and to combine this approach with
76 Gerring 2004, p. 350.
77 Ibid.
industry-level data and survey data that reinforce this study's argument - namely that the
state is actively managing a portfolio of firms.
Case Selection and Variation
The cases for this study are selected from China's electricity generating industry.
Within this industry, two firms are selected from the category of finns that represents the
majority of electricity generating assets in China: "local state-owned". This expansive
category accounted for 51 percent of China's installed electric generating capacity in
2007, and is an amalgamation of many different sub-sets of ownership types. There are
two sets of rationale for the selection of this energy sub-sector and two sets of rationale
for the selection of the specific finnrms.
China's coal industry is discussed at length in this study, however the in-depth
cases are selected from the electric power generation industry. The reasons behind this
decision are fairly straightforward. First, over two-thirds of China's coal is transformed
into electricity. As a result, changes in the electricity market's balance of supply and
demand have significant consequences for the demands placed on the coal industry.
Second, as stated previously, in contrast to the coal data, much of the time-series data
relating to ownership and investment levels in China's electric power generation industry
have proven to be unsystematic and therefore understudied. Case studies enable the data
that does exist to be linked to firm and state decisions that further illuminate the
distinctions between firms that are not captured in such datasets.
Firm selection also follows two sets of rationale. First, as noted previously, the
firmnns were chosen from the largest category of electric power firms in China: local state-
owned. These firms are responsible for over one-half of China's installed capacity.
Second, these firms are "hard" cases. The study argues that the central state seeks to
manage ownership and investment levels relating to coal and power firms through a
portfolio approach to risk. These local firms are highly independent from the central
government, able to raise private capital and create diversified local ownership
strengthened by local government protectionism. Such firms therefore provide
convincing "hard" cases to document the manner in which the central state may exercise
levers of influence over time. In contrast, a study that is based upon cases of finns that
comprise the former state electric power monopoly (and are owned by the central state)
may bias the results in favor of the argument.
Finally, the two cases vary according to geography and levels of economic
development. The Jinyuan Group case describes the rise of a firm from Guizhou - an
interior province located in China's southwestern region. The Luneng Group case
describes the rise of a firm from Shandong - a province located in China's eastern coastal
region. Such variation is important, as geography can often be a proxy for political
relations with the central state leadership, either through the quirks of historical postings
of leaders in power at a given time or through strengthened historical institutional
networks that privileged coastal regions. For example, the current President and General
Secretary of China once served as Party Secretary of the province in which one case is
located (Guizhou), but never served in the government of the province from which the
second case is selected (Shandong). Interestingly, after several attempts of asset
nationalization by various central actors, the firm located in Guizhou maintains more
independence and corporate integrity than the firm located in Shandong.
These cases also provide considerable variation in economic terms. Guizhou is
the poorest of China's provinces in per-capita terms while Shandong enjoys the second
highest GDP, after Guangdong. Variation in levels of economic development is
important as it allows variation in levels of non-state economic resources available to
local firms. For example, cases selected exclusively from coastal provinces could bias
results by analyzing only those firms with significant financial independence from central
state transfers and state bank debt financing.
Dissertation Outline
The following chapter first outlines the relationship between China's electric
power balance and changes in central state policy towards the coal and electric power
industries, changes evident not only in policy pronouncements but also fluctuations in the
consolidation and diversification of central level regulatory institutions. The chapter then
analyzes the impact of such policy change on central state, local state, local non-state and
foreign ownership and investment levels in the coal and electric power industries through
time. Chapters Three and Four shift the analytic focus to the firm level to document the
ways in which these shifts in central state policy were negotiated between the firm and
central and local government actors and the impact of such policies. Chapter Three
tracks the rise of Jinyuan Group, an initially private electric power generation firm that is
partially nationalized through a forced merger but retains much of its corporate integrity.
Chapter Four tracks the rise of Luneng Group, a hybrid public/private electric power
generation firm that is fully nationalized only months before Jinyuan's merger. Chapter
Five returns to the portfolio approach to reflect on its utility in understanding China's
current challenge: its ability to fulfill national goals for the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions, which are very much linked to national energy supply - in particular, the coal
and electric power generation industries.
CHAPTER TWO
Economic Growth and Industrial Organization:
The State in China's Coal and Electric Power Industries
Introduction
This chapter illustrates empirically how China's central state has successfully met
national energy demand for electricity through the periodic dilution and consolidation of
investment and ownership in its electric power and coal markets. As previously
discussed, China's model is distinctly not one of incremental liberalization of investment
and ownership, pursued in an effort to achieve a discrete goal of a market-oriented energy
sector. Nor is it the rapid implementation of a package of far-reaching market reforms.
The central government has instead pursued measured sets of liberal policies during times
of high economic growth78 and energy shortage, then often revisited these policies when
high economic growth rates decline and shortages subside. As a result, key reforms of
liberalization have produced rapid growth in national energy supply largely through the
development of assets owned and invested by local government and private (and even at
times foreign) firms. These firms often enjoy higher productivity and profit rates than
their central state firm counterparts and respond quickly to rapid increases in energy
demand.
However, despite these advantages and the critical role that such firms have played
in times of economic boom, the rise of these firms has not incrementally replaced firms
owned by the central government in the long-term. In such a way, the central
government's ability to deliver directly energy supply varies over time, yet its control
over the mechanisms that determine the type and number of market players (barriers to
78 Growth rate of approximately nine percent and above.
entry), the rate of projects (project approval), and type of investment and retail pricing
remains largely intact through reform.
Cycles of Growth, Cycles of Ownership
The alternating dilution and consolidation of ownership and investment rights
corresponds to stresses on China's energy system created by major shifts in economic
growth. Historically, soaring economic growth rates, particularly when above nine
percent, create energy shortages that elicit purposive central policy actions to devolve
energy investment and ownership to local governments and firms. However, these means
of a liberal market economy state (the pluralization of ownership and investment) serve
goals that are associated with a developmental state (rapid capital agglomeration and
industrialization). These policies mobilize diffuse capital, increase energy supply, and
diversify sources of investment while also attempting to mitigate high rates of inflation
driven by bank lending.
Figure 4. GDP Growth, Electric Power Balance, and the Centralization of
Regulatory Institutions
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However, this diversification of actors also creates powerful local government
interest in insulating newfound local ownership in upstream coal and electric power
assets from incumbent, central government-owned state-owned enterprise (SOE)
acquisitions and consolidation. Under these conditions, political energy decisions based
on local cross-shareholding between local government and firm actors strengthen. High
economic growth rates tend to render resulting inefficiencies invisible to the central
government, as energy shortage creates a seller's market and all energy is purchased
regardless of the seller's identity.
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When energy demand slackens however, the vested interests created by fragmented
local energy structures are exposed. These local energy industries are then subsequently
targeted for consolidation by central government entities, themselves often re-centralizing
institutionally during such periods of retrenchment. The central state attempts to
invigorate slowing economic growth through major central state-led energy projects and
raised bank lending. Writing in particular about the electric power generation industry,
Chi Zhang and Thomas Heller noted this pattern, arguing that "[D]uring the period of
surplus supply, political controversies sprang up over which plants would be dispatched;
the central government used these controversies to reassert authority and also to initiate
planning for further organization reform." 79 Incumbent SOEs are then supported in their
drive to consolidate the industry through direct acquisition or more indirectly through
central government renegotiation of contracts, delay of approvals, tariff policy changes,
or the enforcement of long-standing safety regulations or environmental standards.
Renewed high economic growth creates pressures for new rounds of fragmentation to
address resulting energy shortages.
At the national level of analysis, the resulting character of China's energy
governance apparatus over time is one of periodic fragmentation. This fragmentation is
also reflected at the industry level of analysis, in the market structure of China's largest
energy industries: coal and electric power generation. Many have rightfully criticized
this structure of both state and market in the energy sector, citing it to explain China's
poor environmental governance, less than ideal utilization of capital, and other legitimate
79 Chi Zhang and Thomas Heller, "Reform of Chinese electric power market: economics and institutions,"
in David Victor and Thomas Heller (ed.), The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform: The Experiences
of Five Major Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007), p. 77.
challenges the sector faces." However, such criticism neglects to recognize a more
central fact: it is precisely this periodic fragmentation at the levels of government and
industry that have enabled China to meet the majority of its energy needs. Moreover,
such periodic fragmentation provides evidence of a central state able to exit and to enter
this sector over time despite significant liberalization measures that seemingly
strengthened the market, and despite the creation of major local government and
corporate interests supporting continued fragmentation of this market.
Central policymakers reacted to major swings in economic growth with familiar
cycles of diversification and consolidation that are evident in the industrial structure of
China's energy industries. The approach recognized the limitations of central governance
administrative and financial capacity - the capacity to deliver directly infrastructure
goods through central state-owned finns - in periods of rapid economic growth and
ceded these functions to sub-central governments and the corporate actors created by
reform. However, the central government's capacity to determine which players would
participate in the market, which contract terms would be re-negotiable, and the relative
pricing between segments of the supply chain remained in place through time.
Fluctuations of this cycle are evident in all industries of the energy sector, and while
devolution proved to be fitful in the concentrated oil and gas sector, it is evident for
longer periods in the industries that provide the majority of China's energy supply: coal
and electricity generation.
80 For persuasive examples see: Philip Andrews-Speed 2004; Erica Downs, "Energy Security Series:
China," The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies (2006); Joanna Lewis, "China's Strategic Priorities in
International Climate Change Negotiations," Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (December 1, 2007): 155-
174.
Meeting Demand
In 2005 China replaced the US as the world's largest primary energy producer, a
position the US had enjoyed for nearly a century.81 In that same year, China managed to
provide over 94 percent of its primary energy demand domestically, ranking it among the
world's most energy self-sufficient economies. As Figure Five illustrates, this ratio is
high in comparison to the US (at 71 percent), to large developing countries in the region
(such as India at 72 percent), and to large developed countries in the region (such as
Japan at 18 percent). This level of self-sufficiency is also remarkable, given the Chinese
state's historical lack of capital, splintered government institutions, and rapid economic
growth during the past three decades of reform.
Figure 5. Comparative Primary Energy Self-Sufficiency Ratios
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81 These figures have been normalized, and measured in million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe). See The
Economist, Pocket in World Figures 2009 (London: Profile Books, 2009), p.5 6 .
The growth of China's energy system has depended primarily on major capacity
increases in coal and electric power production. In 2006 the coal sector accounted for
over 75 percent of China's primary energy production, and over 80 percent of electric
power production.' Such an increase in turn depended on the granting of investment and
ownership rights to firms and authorities at the provincial and local levels. 83 This process
occurred in both of these key industries during periods of high economic growth and
relative energy shortage. In the case of the coal industry, collectively owned mines at the
township and village level served as a form of "shock absorber" when rapid economic
growth led to stress on national energy supplies. These mines grew from providing nine
percent of the 354 million tons of coal produced in 1970 to 46 percent of the 1.30 billion
tons produced in 1995 and then declined to 31 percent of the 1.42 billion tons produced
in 2002. 84 By 2006 the production of local collective mines equaled about three-quarters
of total US production that year.
In electricity generation, power plants owned and financed by provincial and
municipal governments, foreign firms, and private domestic firms served a similar
purpose. These plants grew from providing zero percent of the 23.8 GW of generating
capacity in 1970 to 57 percent of the 718.9 GW capacity in 2007. Such size is
considerable, both in domestic and international comparative terms. This capacity is
equal to about three times the national generating capacity of India or four times that of
82 LBNL, China Energy Databook 2008. Percentages calculated based on normalized million tons of coal
equivalent (Mtce) figures.
83 For more on devolution and delegation as the foundation of decentralization reforms, see G. Shabbir
Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, From Government Decentralization to Decentralized Governance
(Washington: Brooking Institution, 2007); Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis, and G. Shabbir Cheema,
"Decentralization in Developing Countries A Review of Recent Experience" World Bank Staff Working
Papers, No. 581, Management and Development Series (Washington: World bank, 1983); and James
Manor, "The Political Economy of Decentralization" World Bank Draft Paper, August 1, 1997.
84 LBNL, China Energy Databook 2008. These figures have not been adjusted to account for unreported
coal production.
the United Kingdom in that year. It was also equal to the size of China's entire national
generating capacity in 2003, only four years earlier. As discussed later in this chapter,
foreign invested power plants were first utilized as "shock absorbers" analogous to the
role of local non-state mines in coal. Foreign investment rose rapidly in the early 1990s
with economic growth rates between nine and 10 percent, then was systematically
eliminated through term renegotiations later in the decade once energy shortages eased.
Local electric power firms have also experienced such consolidation, as discussed in
detail through the two case studies. As Figure Six illustrates, despite intermittent coal
and electric power bottlenecks over the years, China has successfully met the majority of
its domestic needs for electric power and has served as a major net exporter of coal in the
past. Levels of domestic primary energy production have largely met levels of domestic
primary consumption over time, as seen in Figure Five, in contrast to the experience of
the US or India.
The pluralization of finance, ownership, and delegation of responsibilities to build
energy production capacity in part solved immediate fiscal challenges for the central
government that first emerged in the post-Mao period during the early 1980s, when
economic growth began to accelerate. 8" These local firms in coal and (local and foreign
firms) in electric power also served as a source of system flexibility when energy demand
later fluctuated, such as in the late 1980s and early 1990s following Tiananmen. During
such periods these firms were either shuttered, despite their competitive cost structure, or,
as was frequently the case, allowed to be acquired by eager incumbent central state-
85 See Victor Shih, Factions and finance in China. elite conflict and inflation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
owned SOEs. 86 Understanding such structural change in China's coal and electric power
industries and the related capacity of the central government in shaping such structure
requires an understanding of cycles of institutional change within the central
government's energy-related entities over time.
Figure 6. Net Trade in Petroleum, Coal, and Electricity
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86 Philip Andrews-Speed et al., "A Framework for policy formulation for small-scale mines: the case of
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Figure 7. Primary Energy Production and Consumption
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The Wizard, Revealed - Who is Regulating?
This chapter begins with an institutional review of energy governance in China
that illustrates the cyclical relationship between economic growth rates and the structure
of China's energy governance over time. The discussion then turns to the ways in which
the industrial organization of the electric power and coal industries evolved as a result of
such interaction.
Repeated A ttempts at Administrative Centralization (1953-1982)
The 2008 creation of a National Energy Commission is the latest in a long line of
institutional centralization efforts in the history of China's energy governance, and
precedent suggests that the lifetime of such an institution may be quite short. China's
regulatory entities have been and continue to be characterized by overlapping
jurisdictions and waves of centralization and decentralization. 87 Tellingly, Beijing's first
attempt to centralize energy oversight proved short-lived. Between 1953 and 1955, the
newly founded central government created the Ministry of Fossil Fuels (MFF) to
combine the coal, electricity and petroleum industries into one entity for energy
policymaking, allocation, planning and development. By 1955 the need for management
specialization and heightened annual growth of energy demand from six percent to over
15 percent quickly led to the abolishment of the MFF and the formation of separate
ministries for coal and petroleum.
A second administrative consolidation trend emerged in 1960, when the disastrous
results of the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet advisers led to economic
growth plummeting from slightly under nine percent the previous year to negative 0.3
percent. Coordination was strengthened among the Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP),
Ministry of Coal Industry (MCI) and Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI) while
reduced demand required the shuttering of many plants and refineries. This consolidation
then moderated with the decentralization trends unleashed by the Cultural Revolution
mid-decade. The markedly lower growth rates of 1971-1972, when the economy grew at
a mere four percent, coincided with a partial re-consolidation effort whereby the MOEP
and the Ministry of Water Resources Utilization were combined to form the Ministry of
Water Resources and Electric Power, and the Ministry of Petroleum Industry merged
with the Coal and Chemical ministries to form the Ministry of Fuels and Chemicals.
87 This section is a more detailed treatment of a summarized argument in Edward Cunningham, "China's
Energy Governance: Perception and Reality", MIT Center for International Studies Audit of the
Conventional Wisdom, (March 2007). For a more detailed early institutional review of electric power
reform, please refer to E. J. W. van Sambeek, "Institutional Framework of the Chinese Power Sector", ECN
Policy Studies, October 2001.
By the middle of 1980 the economy's growth rate began to drop again, leading to
five percent growth the following year, and the central government launched a third wave
of attempted administrative centralization that led to the creation of the State Energy
Commission (SEC), which, however, never received dedicated staff, an independent base
of operations, or funding, and whose creation qualified 'as one of the major non-events of
1980'. 8 Previously existing agencies continued to operate as before, and the commission
dissolved two years later amid nine to 10 percent economic growth rates and a proven
inability to raise the capital necessary to support sufficient power generation for the
burgeoning national economy. As Victor Shih has noted: "The planners' tight grip on the
economy was first loosened when growth far exceeded the plan in 1982 and in 1983.
Deng responded by sending a series of political signals to members of his factions in the
provinces to increase investment and to take their own initiatives".89 Shih also argues
that in early 1984 the economic figures from 1983 revealed "continual economic vigor
and a thirst for capital from the grassroots level...[and] in late April 1984...the Meeting
for Some Coastal Cities...had a strong agenda to devolve investment and lending power
to the localities." 90 The growth of the early 1980s provided an opportunity for the new,
reform-oriented leadership to begin the process of removing government from
commercial enterprise work and the business of controlling energy production.
Decentralization 1: Rise of Corporations (1982-1998)
The need for capital and technology acquisition, most immediately for the electric
power generation necessary to the industrial growth that China's reformers were
"8 Thomas Fingar, "Implementing Energy Policy: The Rise and Demise of the State Energy Commission",
in David Lampton (ed.) Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press),
1987, p. 2 0 7 .
'9 Shih, p. 110.
90 Ibid., p. 114-5.
encouraging, led to 1986 policy changes that allowed the entrance of new investors
upstream into coal, electric power and oil production. Provincial, municipal, and local
governments, as well as private domestic and foreign firmnns were encouraged to invest in
coal mines, power plants, and a range of oil refining and production activities. In order to
facilitate this step-change in energy production, energy assets were also corporatized.
During this decade major energy firmnns were established such as China National
Petroleum (Group) Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical (Group) Corporation
(Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in the oil industry as
well as Huaneng Group in electricity generation. In 1988 the ministries of Petroleum,
Water Conservancy and Power, and Coal Industries were abolished, and many of their
regulatory responsibilities were transferred to the new corporations. This devolution of
power occurred despite the strengthening of conservative factions at the elite level,
leading to the ouster of reform-oriented leader Hu Yaobang as general secretary in 1987.
A Three-Year Austerity Program (1988-1991) was introduced in the fall of 1988 "in
an effort to cool the nation's overheated economy". 9 1 As James Dorian has written,
"soaring inflation, corruption, and a general economic slowdown" resulted in the
formulation of the Program, which "outlined tough measures to revive state controls,
curtail spending, and reduce imports of consumer goods." 92 The plan "urged
recentralization of control over trade and producing enterprises in China as a means of
enhancing the state's role in guiding the economy". 93 While this recentralization was
partly supported by shifts in elite politics that undermined pro-reform leaders such as Hu
91 James Dorian, Minerals, Energy, and Economic Development in China (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), p. 8 0 .
92 Ibid., p.75.
93 Ibid.
Yaobang, these changes in 1987-1988, as Joe Fewsmith writes, did "not fit into the
category of a struggle to win all or lose all", and are therefore best classified as "struggles
in which a political leader loses power but which do not result in a major change of
political direction". 94
As economic growth began to drop, dipping to four percent and below by the
following year, the Ministry of Energy (MOE) was launched in June of 1988, and was
designed as a fourth attempt to provide central oversight over the newly complex set of
actors in the energy sector. The ministry was the result of a consolidation of the former
ministries of coal, petroleum and nuclear industries, as well as the electric power assets of
the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. As Dorian argues, the ministry was
designed to provide oversight over two sets of actors: the seven core newly emerged
corporations providing energy products to the market, and the administrative departments
managing functional areas such as technology transfer, investment, financing, and
personnel management. 95 However, the MOE never integrated well with the much more
powerful State Planning Commission (SPC). This gap in coordination was perhaps best
illustrated in the major disparity between energy demand estimates that the SPC and
MOE calculated for the Eighth Five-year Plan. The 1991 SPC estimate for total required
electric power build-out for the 1991-1995 period equalled 83.6 GW, only 70 percent of
the 121.7 GW estimate of the MOE. 96 This new 'supra-ministry' of energy soon
followed in the footsteps of its predecessors, however, suffering from internal
competition and dissension, and was disbanded less than five years later, in March 1993.
As one scholar wrote: "Unfortunately, the MOE was little more than a collection of the
94 Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China, (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2001), pp.xxvi, xxvii
95 Dorian, p. 114.
96 Xiaoqian Zhou (ed.) Zhongguo dianli gongye guihua, (Beijing: Water Power Publishing, 2007), p. 1 17
same vested interests within one umbrella organization, the same personnel, the same
allegiance, and the same entrenched interests...the MOE was never able to function as a
cohesive group." 97
The creation of energy corporations in the mid-1980s marked an important break
from past governance patterns, and represented a new model of both interacting with the
rapidly evolving global energy market outside China's borders and also attracting the
financing and technology necessary to harness the energy potential within the country.
This dual need was articulated in numerous official documents, including a September
10, 1993 MOEP instruction:
"...foreign investment in the nation's electric power industry not only
supplements inadequate domestic construction funds and ability to manufacture
power generating equipment, moreover the technology and management
experiences that foreign investment will bring, as well as the economic efficiency
created, will be good...in the past 10 years alone foreign investment constitutes
11 percent of electric power construction investment."98
By the early 1990s annual domestic production capacity was estimated to be
between 9 and 12.5 GW while annual expansion goals equalled 14.6-23.5 GW.99 A 1994
MOEP plan reiterates this need: "China can fulfil about three-quarters of the new
business [which includes rehabilitation programs for existing plants] internally, leaving
$25 billion for foreign suppliers; such help will be welcomed, provided it is accompanied
by foreign finance".1oo The emergence of corporations also marked a critical step in the
97 Daniel Chow, "An Analysis of the Political Economy of China's Enterprise Conglomerates: A
Study of the Reform of the Electric Power Industry in China." Law and Policy in International
Business 28(2) (1997), p. 406.
98 MOEP document no. 341, "Expanding the Scale and Use of Foreign Investment to Accelerate Electric
Power Development", September 10, 1993. In Xiaoqian Zhou (ed.) Zhongguo dianli gongye guihua,
(Beijing: Shuidian chubanshe, 2007), p. 8 26 .
99 Allen Blackman and Xun Wu, "Foreign direct investment in China's power sector: trends, benefits and
barriers," Energy Policy 27, no. 12 (1999), p. 699.
100 Pei-Yee Woo, "China's Electric Power Market: The Rise and Fall of IPPs", (PESD Working Paper
No.45), August 16, 2005. p. 1 1.
'marketization' of China's infrastructure. As one scholar has noted, corporate
involvement "fundamentally changed expectations about electricity - power was now
regarded as a commodity to be bought and sold on the market, rather than allocated by
government". 01
In addition, the corporation emerged in part as a means of organizing productive
assets and property rights. The proliferating government entities discussed above claimed
ownership over financial stakes in SOEs that overlapped and that were often illegitimate
and at odds with one another. The logic of corporatization' 0 2 stemmed from "its ability to
specify ownership rights and to legally separate enterprise from state administration".10 3
The "Company Law", which was passed on December 29, 1993, served as the primary
legal framework to identify claims over liabilities and assets of the rapidly diversifying
economy, and to regulate formal decision-making powers at the firm level in an effort to
insulate firms from political influence. Articles 3 and 4 clearly state that the liability and
rights of shareholders of a firm are in proportion to their capital contribution to the firm.
Moreover, article 7 explicitly states that SOEs under reorganization to corporation status
must "identify and verify" the firm's assets and "determine the respective owners of the
property rights therein, and settle its creditor's rights and liabilities". 10 4 The law therefore
provided an opportunity both to re-evaluate the nest of outstanding claims against many
101 Yi-Chong Xu, Powering China: Reforming the Electric power Industry in China, (Aldershot: Ashgate)
2002. p. 126.
102 Corporatization is defined as the diversification of ownership structure, and in this chapter particular
attention is afforded the introduction of sub-central state and of nonstate parties as shareholders "to make
SOEs operate as if they were private firms facing a competitive market or, if monopolies, efficient
regulation". (Mary Shirley, "Bureaucrats in business: the roles of privatization versus corporatization in
state-owned enterprise reform," World Development 27, no. 1 (1999), p. 115). See also Colin Xu, Tian
Zhu, and Yi-min Lin, "Politician control, agency problems and ownership reform: Evidence from China,"
Economics of Transition 13, no. 1 (2005): 1-24.
103 Xu 2002, p. 10 0 .
104 See <www.cclaw.net/download/companylaw.asp>.
SOEs in the energy sector and at least to begin the process of removing party political
actors from the daily management of firms.
By the mid-1990s and the return of rapid economic growth, averaging 13.1 percent
between 1992 and 1995, the central administration of the energy sector was again
performed by disparate entities, many of which had been reinstated, as well as the rising
energy corporations that were increasingly straddling commercial and regulatory
functions. This array of government actors included, but was not limited to, the State
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), the State Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC), the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the Ministry of Geology and
Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Electric Power, the Ministry of Land and Natural
Resources, and the Ministry of Coal Industry. In 1998, as part of a government-wide
restructuring of industrial policy in the 'pillar industries' of energy, transportation, and
telecommunications, the Ministry of Coal Industry and Ministry of Electric Power
Industry (MEPI) were abolished and the State Administration of Coal Industry (SACI)
was formed under the SETC, granting provincial governments operational management
over coal mining enterprises and larger scale electric power projects. Much of the
operational authority for the electricity industry was transferred to the newly established
State Power Corporation of China (SPCC).
Decentralization 11: Rise of Multiple Agencies (1998-2008)
By 1998 rapid corporatization and slowing growth by late 1997 and into 1998 (in
part due to the Asian Financial Crisis), led to a major set of industrial and institutional
reforms that sought to consolidate central government capacity in the form of personnel,
dedicated funding and institutional structure. Quarterly export growth rates, year-on-year,
declined from above eight percent in the first quarter of 1997 to near zero percent in the
first quarter of 1999. Corresponding figures for electric power generation match this
movement, declining from five percent in the first quarter of 1997 to near zero percent by
the second quarter of 1998.'05 Despite the mobilization of corporate resources, the central
state did not initially redeploy its resources to guide energy investments at the firm level.
Philip Andrews-Speed captures this process well, observing:
'[i]n the past, the leaders of the major state-owned energy companies were able
to play a major role in determining the policies and plans for their individual
industries. Progressive corporatization of these companies has reduced the power
of these executives to influence national policy to a great extent, but the capacity
of government to lead has not been enhanced in a commensurate way. Indeed,
with more players in the sector, the government's ability to manage the energy
sector has actually diminished.' 106
Barry Naughton has also recognizes the migration of energy decisions to the firm level,
writing:
'Particularly following the revival of state sector profitability, some of these
organizations are extremely rich and powerful. The state companies under central
SASAC's [State-owned Asset and Supervision and Administration Commission]
purview include, for example, the State Electricity Grid and the big electric
power-generation companies... This middle layer of the state economy is the
least transparent...in between the fully corporatized and often listed companies,
and the national government."'' 1 7
In March of 1998 the NPC approved a wide-ranging plan to consolidate the central
government apparatus and state-owned industry structure. The 40 ministries overseeing
China's growth were reduced to 29, with many employees transferred to SOEs, research
institutes, quasi-private firms, or simply laid off. The reforms affected over 33,000
central government personnel and within two years had laid off more than 4 million
105 NBS, China Economic Yearbook, multiple years; Pei-Yee Woo, "China's Electric Power Market: The
Rise and Fall of IPPs", (PESD Working Paper No.45), August 16, 2005. p.6 .
106 Philip Andrews-Speed, "China's energy woes: running on empty", Far Eastern Economic Review, June
2005, p.17 .
107 Barry Naughton, "Claiming profit for the State: SASAC and the capital management budget", China
Leadership Monitor, vol. 18, Spring 2006, p.4. www.media.hoover.org/documents/clm l8bn.pdf.
government employees.'08 In the energy sector, power struggles between the SDPC and
the SETC ensued, and by February 2001 the SACI and coal, power, and other
administrations under the SETC were closed, as were most of their provincial,
prefectural, and county counterparts. In March 2003, the SETC itself was abolished and
the majority of its functions transferred to the SDPC, subsequently renamed the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Immediately prior to this major
realignment, the nation's first independent regulator for the power industry was
established: the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). The emergence of this
unprecedented, arm's-length body heralded what many scholars have termed a new era of
the 'regulatory state' in energy.109 Others, such as Margaret Pearson, argue that such
restructuring is another attempt to strengthen state control but continues to be plagued by
historical institutional fragmentation. She writes: "the most recent round of bureaucratic
restructuring in March 2003 strengthened the state's efforts to maintain authority over
strategic assets". 10
The migration of significant financial decision-making authority to energy firms was
part of an economy-wide breakup and reconsolidation of the central state's existing
institutions during this period of slowed economic growth. However, while some degree
of consolidation under the NDRC did take place by the early 2000s, a range of new
108 Luo Gan, "Explanation of Plan for Institutional Restructuring of the State Council", Ta Kung Pao,
March 7, 1998 (in FBIS, DR/CHI, March 10, 1998, 98-068); Cheng Li, "China in 1999: Seeking Common
Ground at a Time of Tension and Conflict", Asian Survey, 40:1 (2000), p. 122. For related WTO accession
issues please see Joseph Fewsmith, "China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the Agreement," National
Bureau of Research (NBR) Analysis 10:5, Essay 2 (November 1999).
109 For representative work supporting this perspective, see Dali Yang, Remaking the Chinese leviathan:
Market transition and the politics of governance in China (Stanford University Press, 2005).
110 Margaret Pearson "The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the
Emerging Regulatory State", World Politics, vol.57 (January 2005), p. 304-5. See also Margaret Pearson,
"Governing the Chinese Economy: Regulatory Reform in the Service of the State," Public Administration
Review 67, no. 4 (2007): 718-730.
entities, like SERC, began to proliferate and link regulatory activities to the energy
sector. At the central level, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC), established in 2003, claims nominal ownership rights over, and
bears responsibility for, the management and disposal of certain state-owned assets
(including merger and acquisition approval and other energy asset restructuring). The
commission also has input into personnel movements concerning individuals of vice-
ministerial rank and below. The State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) was
raised to ministerial rank to become the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP),
and enforces environmental standards and compliance by energy firms, while resource
extraction rights, operation management, and conflict resolution responsibilities are
largely shared by the Ministry of Land and Resources (MOLAR), the Ministry of Water
Resources (MWR), and the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS). The
interests of these entities, of course, do not always align. SERC and the pricing bureau of
the NDRC seek to strengthen competition by maintaining higher numbers of energy firms
in industries such as power generation. In contrast, other central agencies, such as
SASAC, aim to maximize returns on assets by encouraging the consolidation of existing
firms.
While the shape of China's institutional landscape in the energy sector was certainly
influenced by the larger top-down transformation of central government and the
pluralization of regulatory actors in the national economy, energy investment and project
approval authority remained centralized. The State Economic Commission, in charge of
annual energy production and consumption management, was dismantled in 1988, yet its
short-term project approval and investment approval authorities were transferred to the
Production Office under the State Council. This office was then enlarged in 1992 to
become the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), eventually headed by future
premier Zhu Rongji, to oversee the short-term macroeconomic management of national
economy and trade developments. Construction and investment approval for major
projects (in most cases above $10 million) and long-term projects throughout this period
remained under the purview of the NDRC. The SETC was charged with annual
industrial policy, enterprise management and the development of large corporations, and
its 20 offices and 10 administrations included energy-specific entities, namely the
Department of Investment and Planning, Department of Electric Power, State
Administration of Coal Industry, and the State Administration of Petroleum and
Chemical Industries. By March 2003 the SETC was folded into the NDRC,
consolidating short-term and long-term investment and construction approval into one
central government entity.
China's Energy Structure
The following section will address the market structure of China's oil and gas, coal,
and electric power industries in an effort to illustrate the significant differences between
the concentrated oil and gas industry on the one hand and fragmented coal and electric
power industries on the other. While much of the relevant literature is concerned with
reforms in the Chinese oil and gas industry and the rise of such firms, the vast bulk of
national energy production relies on coal and electric power - markets frequently as
fragmented as the authorities attempting to regulate them.
Oil and Gas
Scholarly and political analyses of China's energy system often focus primarily on
the oil and gas industry, motivated by: i) the perceived strategic nature of these
hydrocarbons; ii) China's relatively recent emergence as a net oil product importer and
net crude oil importer in 1993 and 1996 respectively; and iii) the increasingly global
investment activities of Chinese oil and gas firms beginning in the late 1990s."' This
attention has reinforced the view that China's energy sector is heavily concentrated and
dominated by a handful of large incumbent firms, financed largely by the central
government, and therefore resistant to major change, institutional or otherwise.' 12 Unlike
analyses of the private or quasi-private sector in China, which frame state involvement as
a largely "helping hand" model of development' 13, analysis of the energy sector often
characterizes Beijing as an interventionist state actor pursuing regressive pricing and
finance policies.114 These perspectives argue that barriers to market entry for non-
I David Zweig and Jianhai Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005);
Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg, "China's Search for Energy Security: Implications for US Policy"
(National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006); Daojiong Zha, "China's energy security: Domestic and
international issues," Survival 48, no. 1 (2006): 179-190. Notable recent exceptions include Peter Nolan
and Huaichuan Rui, "Industrial Policy and Global Big Business Revolution: the Case of the Chinese Coal
Industry," Journal of Chinese Economic & Business Studies 2, no. 2 (May 2004): 97-113; the many
writings of Philip Andrews-Speed; and Elspeth Thomson, The Chinese Coal Industry: An Economic
History (Routledge, 2003).
I " Peter Nolan and J. Zhang, "Globalization Challenge for Large Firms from Developing Countries:
China's Oil and Aerospace Industries," European Management Journal 21, no. 3 (2003): 285-299.
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National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996); Andrew Walder, "Zouping in Perspective", in Andrew G.
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Ebel, China's Energy Future. The Middle Kingdom Seeks Its Place in the Sun (Center for Strategic &
incumbent firms are high, incentives to support protectionism by incumbent firms are
many, financial resources for non-central state actors are limited, and political pressure to
subsidize prices dominates the political economy landscape.
This analytical framework is influential and its implications significant, because it
implies that forces for change - in regulation, finance, or ownership - are greatly
weakened in China's energy sector. Indeed, much of the data culled from sub-sectors
that are most exposed to international markets (and therefore most "visible" to
international observers) support this characterization. The oil and natural gas industries
have remained cartelized in structure despite the introduction of significant institutional
reforms in the late 1990s and various reforms related to WTO compliance in the early
2000s. China's three major oil and gas firms traditionally functioned as separate
segments of the supply chain. CNPC was created in 1988 to manage China's oil and gas
exploration and production onshore, both domestically and internationally. Sinopec was
established in 1983 to build and operate China's refining capacity downstream and
petrochemical production. CNOOC was created in 1982 to specialize in the exploration,
development, and production of oil and gas in China's territorial waters (with a depth
over five meters).
However, this corporate separation of upstream exploration and production of crude
from downstream refining of product proved difficult to maintain once upstream price
reforms were designed to stimulate production. Partial liberalization of crude oil prices
by the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s rendered CNPC's onshore exploration and
production activities upstream increasingly profitable. Such liberalization did not occur
International Studies, 2005); L. Jakobson and Daojiong Zha, "China and the Worldwide Search for Oil
Security," Asia-Pacific Review 13, no. 2 (2006): 60-73.
downstream in the oil product market. Heavily regulated downstream retail prices for oil
products such as diesel and gasoline increased losses for the refining activities of
Sinopec. For example, in 1983 the central government introduced a three track pricing
system. A fixed annual quota of output was determined, and over two-thirds of that
output was sold at a first, low price of RMB100/ton ($5.60/ton), while over one-quarter
was sold at a second, higher price of RMB555/ton ($31.00/ton). Above-quota production
(six percent of total production that year) could be sold at a negotiated price on the
market. The low price was abolished by 1993, at which time over two-thirds of crude oil
was sold at negotiated prices. In refining, foreign companies had begun to enter oil
storage, product importation, and third-party processing, as well as provincial and local
companies. 5
Rising imports in 1993 (leading to China's switch to net importer status of oil
product) led to a focus on managing oil consumption and by 1994 the oil pricing market
was dismantled. All crude and product prices returned to being fixed by the central
government. In April all import rights were abolished. As Andrews-Speed writes:
"Thus, having introduced an oil-pricing system which was evolving rapidly towards
being an open market, the government has made a rapid retreat. Prices are now tightly
controlled and respond only sluggishly to the international markets...In one step the
government reversed ten years of reform."' 16
The wide-ranging industrial and governmental reforms introduced during the
economic slowdown in 1998 sought to improve the competitiveness of these three firms
15 Philip Andrews-Speed, "Reform of China's Energy Sector: Slow Progress to an Uncertain Goal", in
Sarah Cook, J. Zhuang, and S. Yao (ed.), The Chinese Economy Under Transition (Macmillan, 2000),
p.l113.
1l6 Ibid., p.114, 117.
by vertically integrating them, with particular focus on the two largest (CNPC and
Sinopec). After the reforms, Sinopec held both upstream and downstream assets in
China's southern and eastern regions while CNPC held upstream and downstream assets
in the north and western regions. To deepen commercial reforms and separate regulatory
function and corporate management, all three firms listed portions of their assets on
foreign exchanges through newly established subsidiary firms.
Yet, despite these considerable attempts to reform the structure of the oil and gas
market, much remained the same. Peter Nolan captures this stagnation well, and
highlights remaining unresolved questions relating to the continuing influence of the
central government in retail pricing, as well as limited competition between firms. He
argues that upstream and downstream barriers to entry have remained quite strong, and
writes that: "The relationship between the floated company and the parent remains
unresolved. While the floated 'children' [subsidiary firms listed on international stock
markets], may wish for prosperous independence from their 'parents', the 'parents'
(CNPC and Sinopec) have responsibility for a total of 1.5 million employees and several
million family members."" 7 Nolan concludes that the "Chinese oil and petrochemical
industry is still highly protected.""
"- Peter Nolan, "China and the Global Business Revolution," Camb. J. Econ. 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2002),
p. 125. See also Fereidun Fesharaki and Kang Wu, "Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry Through
Reorganization: Will It Work?," Oil & Gas Journal 96, no. 32 (1998).
1s Ibid., p. 126.
Figure 8. Market Concentration of Energy Sub-Sectors, Post-1998 Reform
Top Firm Share of Production in Respective Industry
1998 2003 2005
CNPC (Crude Oil) 67.32% 64.50% 58.3%
CNPC (Natural Gas) 70.8% 72.9% 73.5%
Huaneng (Electricity) 2.4% 9.7% 10.4%
Shenhua (Coal) 0.6% 5.1% 8.7% (2006)
Source.: NBS China Energy Yearbook, various years; NBS China Electricity Yearbook, various
years; China Economic Reporting and Monitoring Center (ed.) Zhongguo chanve ditu - nengyuan
2004-5, (Beiijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006) p.49, 134; INNET, China's Energy
Outlook 2004, p. 11; LBNL, China Energy Databook 2008; Author's estimates.
Indeed, a review of oil and gas production figures since the 1998 reforms reveals
little significant change in ownership structure. Barriers to significant market entry
between upstream and downstream activities have remained high. As Figure Eight
illustrates, one firm - CNPC - accounts for over one-half of China's crude oil production
and nearly three-quarters of its natural gas supply. CNPC has actually consolidated its
dominance in gas over time and the lack of significant change in the domestic market
structure of crude oil is also apparent. Andrews-Speed highlights the continuing obstacles
to competition in the industry, arguing: "The issue which does not seem to have been
addressed is whether one oil company may invest and conduct exploration, production,
refining or distribution in the other's territory...The longer the period of [regulatory]
ambiguity, the stronger the position of the companies. One glaring deficiency in the legal
framework is the absence of a petroleum law." '19 In the US, the five super-majors and a
range of smaller firms with revenues above $20 billion produce slightly more than double
119 Philip Andrews-Speed, Stephen Dow, and Z. Gao, "The ongoing reforms to China's government and
state sector: the case of the energy industry" Journal of Contemporaly China (2000), p. 15.
the oil China produces and nearly eight times as much natural gas as China. 120 It
therefore remains unclear to what extent China's oil market should liberalize to include a
higher number of integrated operators to compete with its own three national firms. The
more important point is that, given the reform challenges present in China's oil and gas
industry, it is understandable how analysis of China's energy market, particularly when
viewed through this prism, would support a bias privileging a more monolithic status
quo.
Coal and Electric Power
Despite the concentration of actors in China's oil and gas industry, it is important to
note that the term "fragmented authoritarianism", which accurately and persuasively
framed the political economy of a reform-era China, emerged first from a study of
China's electric power system."12  Returning to Figure Eight, the coal and electricity
statistics reveal these markets to be considerably less concentrated in structure than their
crude oil and natural gas counterparts. Shenhua Group, China's leading coal supplier,
has only recently topped eight percent of national production. In contrast its American
counterpart, Peabody Energy, commands over 20 percent of the US coal market. In 2005
China's top four coal firms produced 16.5 percent of China's coal and the top eight firms
produced 24.4 percent. Comparable US figures are 44.8 percent and 59.8 percent.122
Huaneng Group, the largest power producer in China and until recently led by former
Premier Li Peng's son Li Xiaopeng, produces 10.0 percent of national generation.
120 Robert Pirog, Congressional Research Services, "Oil Industry Profit Review 2007", CRS Report
RL34437, April 4, 2008, p.2.
2 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, "Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Energy Development"
(US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 1986); Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel
Oksenberg 1988).
122 China Economic Reporting and Monitoring Center (ed.) Zhongguo chanve dimt - nengyuan 2004-5,
(Beiijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe), 2006, p. 10 2 .
Figure 9. Dominance of Coal: Primary Energy Production
1976 1986 1996 2006
Coal 68.8% 72.4 % 74.9% 75.7%
Oil and Gas 27.5% 23.3% 18.9% 15.3%
Other 3.7% 4.3% 6.2% 9.0%
Source: LBNL, China Energy Databook 2008. Data normalized (EJ) and percentages calculated.
Perhaps most importantly, oil and gas combined contribute only 15 percent of
China's national primary energy production. As Figure Nine illustrates, the nation's coal
industry forms the backbone of the sector, consistently accounting for three-quarters of
China's national primary energy production. However, in contrast to the oil and gas
markets, the structure of the coal and electricity industries, upon which China's economic
growth is based, have been anything but static.
Ownership and Price Reforms
Coal Industry
Unlike the situation in the oil and gas industries, twin processes of ownership and
investment diversification have penetrated extensively upstream, in the coal market.
Coal fuels over two-thirds of primary energy consumption in China and dominates the
electric power industry, contributing 81.1 percent of total electricity production in
2008.123 This most vital foundation of China's energy supply has relied significantly on
mines owned and operated by firms at the local level, particularly during periods of rapid
economic growth. At the outset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, approximately 80
percent of China's coal was produced by Central State (CS) mines owned and operated
by the central government. In the beginning of the reform period in 1978 this ratio had
123 China Electricity Council, "2008 nian quanguo dianli gongie tongji kuaibao yilanbiao", 2009.
been reduced to slightly above 55 percent. By 1995 these central state mines contributed
37 percent of output.
Figure 10. China's Coal Output by Firm Category 24
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Source. LBNL, China Energy Databook, 2008.
Much of this variation in ownership over time is the result of limited central state
capacity to increase supply through mines administered by the central and local
governments during periods of rapid economic growth and resulting energy shortage.
This early shortage led to the promulgation of policies that encouraged Local Non-State
(LNS) mines to grow to fill the gap in production. Philip Andrews-Speed has noted such
disparity, writing:
"Due to the disbanding of the communes beginning in the late 1970s. and the
encouragement given to people in rural areas to mine coal, production at LS
124 Data from 1998-2002 accounts for estimated unreported coal production from LNSM. See Kevin Tu,
"Statistical Distortion and Value Chain of the Chinese Coal Industry", presentation to PESD, Stanford
University, February 11, 2009; Jonathan Sinton and David Fridley, "Hot Air and Cold Water: The
unexpected fall in China's energy use", China Environment Series, Issue 4, 2001; David Fridley, Jonathan
Sinton, and Joanna Lewis, "Working out the Kinks: Understanding the Fall and Rise of Energy Use in
China", Oxford Energy Forum, May 2003.
[Local State] and LNS [Local Non-State] mines had continued to rise sharply in
the early 1980s, to the extent that in 1986 Shanxi's total output far outstripped
the ability of the railways to ship it out of the province to where it was needed.
Many of the state mines had to operate well below capacity..."5
This cycle is evident in Figures 11 and 12, which illustrate the greater volatility of
LNS mine output growth in comparison to mines owned by the central and local state.
The figures also illustrate the greater time sensitivity of LNS mine production rates.
These local non-state mines were able to stop and start production in a much more timely
fashion according to economic growth and resulting electric power surplus and deficit. In
contrast, during China's major economic growth period between 1992 and 1998, growth
rates of state-owned mines at the central and local level significantly lag economic
growth. More importantly, LNS mine output growth rates are higher than their state-
owned counterparts during periods of higher economic growth, and equal to or lower than
state-owned mines during periods of lower economic growth.
By December 1981 the State Council supported productive local mines, approving
four forms of financial incentives, including subsidies of local mines running deficits,
increasing the retention of depreciation funds, increasing investment for capital
construction and technical transformation, and reduction of or exemption from industrial
and commercial taxes. 26 In April 1983 the State Council approved the "Report on Eight
Measures for Accelerating the Development of Small-scale Coal Mines", which included
the pooling of funds from the "masses" (non-state sources) and operating firms
themselves, pricing on the basis of quality for within-plan coal, and pricing based on
negotiation for above-plan coal. 127
125 Philip Andrews-Speed 2004, p. 14 2 .126 Elspeth Thomson, The Chinese Coal Industry: An Economic Histor, (Routledge, 2003), p. 117.
27 Ibid., p. 1 18.
Responding to the high economic growth and power deficits of 1982-85, LNS mine
output grew at rates that were at times multiples of the state-owned mines, and well
higher than GDP growth rates. The disparity in productivity between Local State (LS)
mines and LNS mines became apparent in coal policy promulgated in the middle of the
1982-88 economic boom, during which average annual growth equalled 11.5 percent.
Mine opening and expansion costs between different categories of ownership were
significant. CS mines in Shanxi cost RMB108 per ton to open during this period, in
comparison to RMB40 for LS mines and RMB16 for LNS mines. Moreover, operation
costs were often 50 to 80 percent lower for LNS mines.12
As the electric power deficit seemed to be ending by 1985, in March 1986 the
Ministry of Coal Industry (MCI) announced measures to begin reducing the rapid growth
of LNS mine output, stating that: i) mines producing without a plan or are exceeding plan
goals "would not be supplied raw materials, loaned funds, or assigned marketing and
transport targets"; and ii) "on the basis of criterion included in provincial regulations
pertaining to resource use and safety management, production at privately run mines
would be curtailed". 129 LNS mine output growth had averaged 22.5 percent during 1982-
85. By 1987 almost 75 percent of CS mines and over 50 percent of LS mines were
operating in deficit. Subsequently, during the economic slowdown of the late 1980s and
the power surplus of 1988-1991, the growth of LNS mine output dropped precipitously to
rates equal to or lower than the central state mines. LNS mine output growth returned
and again well outpaced CS and LS mines during the economic boom and power deficits
of 1992-95, averaging 13.8 percent in comparison to a meagre 0.1 percent for CS mines
28 Ibid., p. 117.
129 Philip Andrews-Speed 2004, p. 14 2 .
and 1.2 percent for LS mines. By the end of 1997 power surplus returned and peaked in
1998, and the combination of a slowing economy and central government rhetoric
regarding the enforcement of regulation closing down LNS mines led to significant
declines in LNS mine output growth. 30 Major power deficits then returned with the
economic growth beginning in 2001 and LNS mine output exceeded state-owned
counterparts once again, only to fall once power capacity began to outpace consumption.
The overall pattern is clear: during high economic growth LNS mine growth rates far
exceed CS and LS mine growth rates; during moderate economic growth, LNS mine
growth rates fall dramatically (often below CS and LS mine rates).
Figure 11. Electric Power Balance and Mine Growth by Ownership
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130 While the growth rate did decline, the severity of the drop in LNS mine output growth rates during the
period 1998-2002 is considered by most to be suspect due to significant underreporting. Figure 6 data
between 1998 and 2002 accounts for aspects of this distortion by including estimates of unreported coal
production. See Kevin Tu, "Statistical Distortion and Value Chain of the Chinese Coal Industry",
presentation to PESD, Stanford University, February 11, 2009.
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Figure 12. GDP Growth and Mine Growth by Ownership
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Source for Figures 11 and 12: LBNL, China Energy Databook, 2008.
As a result of such growth patterns, the overall share of output contributed by LNS
mines increased from 14.1 percent in 1978 to 38.3 percent in 2006. By 2006 more than
half (52.0 percent) of China's coal was produced by firms owned by actors outside of the
central government. As Elspeth Thomson has documented:
"By the late 1970s the government had recognized that the fastest output growth
was being achieved by the LNS mines and that their continued existence was
vital to the economy. It therefore adopted a policy of spending the limited capital
resources available on a few key large mines and infrastructure projects too large
and capital-intensive for the peasants to undertake. Operators of local mines were
encouraged to open mines using whatever resources they could find."' 3 '
131 Elspeth also points out the additional attractions of local mines: "Besides mitigating the shortage
problem, relieving the critical lack of railway capacity on the north-south lines, and costing half as much to
build and operate, LNS mines also contribute to other Chinese government objectives. They become
operational much sooner, add to the wealth of peasants, help reduce rural unemployment, stem rural-urban
migration, stimulate the development of rural industry and help halt the ecological damage resulting from
the scavenging for firewood." Elspeth Thomson, "Reforming China's coal industry," China Quarterly
(1996): 729.
Even during the most recent period of high economic growth since 2002, during
which CS mines did begin to increase output rapidly, LNS mine output growth rates
again exceeded that of both central and local state-owned mines. Financial data for LS
and LNS coal firms highlight both their economic importance and their ownership
diversity. Recent sales income figures, which distinguish between private, joint
shareholding, collective and foreign invested firms, reveal the range of non-state actors
that is obscured by aggregate national statistics. As seen in Figure 13, 48.5 percent of
total sales income for the coal industry in 2005 was earned by firms without controlling
stakes owned by the central or local government.
Figure 13. Breakdown of Total Sales Income by Firm Type, 2005
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Source: China Economic Reporting and Monitoring Center (ed.) Zhongguo chanye ditu
nengyuan 2004-5, (Beiijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006), p.2 0 3 .
Much of this decentralization of ownership and investment resulted from the gradual
liberalization of coal pricing that began formally in 1984, as a result of economic growth
doubling from 5.1 percent in 1981 to 10.9 percent in 1983. Coal prices were therefore
partially liberalized in 1984, immediately preceding the 1986 regulation allowing sub-
central government actors and firms to invest in electric power generation, discussed at
length below. 132 In particular, prices were reformed to account for coal quality
differences in the early 1980s and in 1984 a dual track system of prices was introduced,
as it had been earlier in agriculture, to create incentives for increased production.133 Each
production unit produced a fixed quota amount of coal at a state-set price to be
distributed by state channels to demand industries such as metallurgy, steel, and chemical
production.134 Above-quota coal could either be sold back to the state at 50 percent
higher prices (and eventually 70 percent higher prices) or on the emerging free (largely
illegal "black") market.13 5 Coal exchanges, that were established in five cities in 1992 to
reduce the extortion occurring through middlemen, had little effect and the black market
continued. By June 1993 the central government allowed central state-owned mines
(SCMs) to sell 80 percent of their coal production at market prices, and by 1994 decreed
all coal freed from quota prices.136 There was considerable backsliding, as many
government officials had profited from arbitrage between market and state prices for
coal. Also, thermal coal prices for power plants continued to be subsidized, yet by June
of 2004 Guizhou was technically the last province to abolish state subsidized thermal
coal pricing for power plants on July 1, 2006.137
132 See State Council Notice document no. 86, April 17, 1986: 'Provisional Regulation on the
Encouragement of Fundraising for Power Construction Investment and Implementation of the Multi-Rate
Power Tariff.
133 Barry Naughton 1995.
134 Bin Wang, "An imbalanced development of coal and electricity industries in China," Energy Policy 35,
no. 10 (2007): 4959-4968.
35 Elspeth Thomson 1996, p. 74 5 .
136 Ibid.
137 For detailed analysis of this process, please see Elspeth Thomson 2003.
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Source: Newcastle data from Reuters. Qinhuangdao data from China Coal Transport and Distribution
Association (CCTD), converted with daily exchange rate data from NY Fed and calorific value (QHD:
5800 kcal/kg, NWC: 6700 kcal/kg). This graph profited greatly from discussions with He Gang and others
at PESD, Stanford University.
In addition to price liberalization, reforms in the 1990s allowed progressive
marketization through the organization of annual bargaining conferences (termed
"dinghuohui") between the major mines, power plants and Ministry of Railways (MOR).
The role of the NDRC as an active player in these sessions has gradually declined,
transfonnrming instead to a mediator role. The state-led conference was formally abolished
in 2004 but the negotiation meeting continues in an evolved form named the Coal
Production, Transportation and Demand Linking Session ("meitan chanyunxu
xianjiehui"), as all coal contracts still must be accompanied by signed documentation
from the MOR indicating that sufficient rail capacity has been reserved to transport the
Qinhuangdao
Newcastle
coal under contract.138 Thermal coal prices on the spot market rose 25-30 percent year-
on-year by mid-2004, while contract prices in China had increased by less than 10
percent. Due to this disparity, power plant managers interviewed all observed that since
2003 mines have continually renegotiated their prices and failed to deliver coal to the
plant at the contract price. The domestic media has also reported openly about the extent
of the problem.139 These liberalization policies eroded coal subsidies considerably and
by 2002 the spot price of Qinhuangdao coal (QHD), China's widely referenced thermal
coal benchmark, had aligned closely with rising international prices. As Figure 14
illustrates, prices of Qinhuangdao coal in China and Newcastle coal in Australia tracked
well through the most recent volatility caused by rapid demand shocks in the region.
Electric Power Industry
Processes of ownership and investment diversification have also penetrated
upstream in the electricity generation industry, the result of far-ranging reforms in
electric power generation.140 As occurred in the coal industry, the financial and
administrative resources of the central government proved inadequate to meet power
generation demand; a shortage that by the boom years of the early 1980s became acute.
Resulting reforms pursued by the central government sought to: i) diversify sources of
finance and augment state-directed capital by allowing, for the first time, non-central
government entities to invest in and build power plants; ii) raise electricity tariffs by
abolishing command era pricing that only covered operating, transmission and
138 In late 2005 the NDRC promulgated "Guanvu zuohao 2006 nian quanguo zhongdian meitan chanvunxu
xianjiehui gongzuo de tongzhi ", which made clear that the NDRC had abolished the "temporary
interference" of the central government in coal pricing for electricity generation and encouraged the signing
of long-term contracts between coal and electricity firms.
139 "Favorable coal prices to be abolished" China Daily, 23 July 2004.
140 For an excellent review of reforms in China's electricity sector see Chi Zhang and Thomas Heller 2007.
distribution costs and introducing "cost-plus" or "rate of return regulation" that
accelerated capital repayment and guaranteed 12-15 percent returns; and iii) levy a series
of national fees to create specialized funds for capital investment.
Figure 15. GDP vs. Installed Electric Power Capacity Growth Rates
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Source: LBNL, China Energy Databook, 2008. (To compensate conservatively for the
average two years needed for a plant to come online in China, data corresponding to
electric power growth rates has been moved back two years to allow appropriate
comparison.)
A constellation of local and regional government actors that resulted from such
reforms now extends deep into the power generation sector, including provincial
government investment funds, local government SOEs, grid and grid-subsidiary groups,
and nuclear power firms. This complexity has only recently been noted by a few studies.
Chi Zhang and Thomas Heller observe that: "During long periods of shortage, Chinese
reforms focus on getting new power on line as quickly as possible, and delegate much of
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the task of adding capacity to provincial and local authorities."' 41 In the six years since
the dissolution of the State Power Corporation of China (SPCC), which once vertically
integrated regional electric grids and electric power generation and the assets of which
were transferred to the "Big Five" listed generating companies, it is notable that these
five firms command less than half of China's electricity generation market.
Figure 16. Ownership of Power Generation Capacity, 2007
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Source: Figures are compiled according to "controllable capacity" by each firm. China Electricity
Council, 2008; Arthur Kroeber, "Enigma Variations: Unwrapping the Riddle of China's
Electricity Industry", GaveKal Dragonomics China Insight, August 26, 2008; Author's estimates.
The energy corporation initially served as a vehicle to resolve increasingly blurred
rights and claims between central and local control over energy assets produced by such a
constellation of ownership cross-shareholding between multiple levels of government.
Corporatization also served to attract foreign technology and financing to develop
domestic resources under tight credit market conditions and poor fiscal capacity. Initial
141 Chi Zhang and Thomas Heller 2007 p. 77.
reforms were rather successful. For example, in 1975 China suffered from a shortage of
approximately 5 GW, or 12 percent of national generating capacity; this grew to 15 GW,
or 16 percent, by 1986.14 2 The early 1980s witnessed the importation of electric power
and the rise of power plant utilization rates (annual hours operated) as capacity continued
to be squeezed. As Figures 17 and 18 illustrate below, rapid increases in electricity
capacity began in the late 1980s to respond both to these historical shortages as well as
the fast-growing demand resulting from the expansionary economic reforms of the early
1980s. The impact of the initial entrance of investment from local government, private
and limited foreign sources beginning in the mid-1980s is evident in the lowering of
utilization rates beginning in 1986 in Figure 18, but its limitations are also suggested by
the continued import of electric power those years in Figure 17. The entrance of these
non-central players was particularly rapid during the economic boom of the early to mid-
1990s, resulting in supply increases that became evident in the ability to export power
and rapidly dropping utilization rates. By the late 1980s annual capacity increases
averaged a respectable 15GW, continuing through the boom of the 1990s. By 1994
power exports exceeded imports for the first time.
142 See State Council Notice "Speeding up the development of the electricity industry", document no. 114,
July 25, 1975; Chi Zhang and Thomas Heller, 2007, p. 93.
Figure 17. Electricity Imports and Exports
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Source: LBNL, China Energy Databook, 2008.
Figure 18. Annual Thermal Utilization Hours
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Figure 19. China's Installed Electric Power Capacity Reform 3
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Source: LBNL, China Energy Databook, 2008; China Electricity Council, 2009.
Renewed high rates of economic growth, averaging 11.7 percent between 1982-84,
spurred financial reform of the electric power industry with the passing of legislation that
transformed direct state funding of power plant construction into loans from state
banks. 143 The deflation of prices in 1982 strengthened support for such loans and the
period 1984 to 1988 produced among the highest loan growth rates of the reform period.
Price reform deepened in 1986, and was highlighted by the promulgation of the
143 See Ministry of Electric Power Notice "Provisional measure transforming all budgetary infrastructure
fund allocations into loans", document no. 84, December 27, 1984. This was followed months later by the
MOEP Notice "Central government and State Council leaders' memo on questions relating to the
utilization of foreign financing to speed the building of electric power", document no. 54, February 26,
1985.
'Provisional Regulations on Encouraging Fund Raising for Power Construction and
Introducing Multi-Rate Power Tariff'.144
Figure 20. Bank Lending and CPI Growth
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This battery of reforms increased wholesale prices and diversified sources of finance
by permitting sub-national government, private, and eventually foreign-invested entities
to invest, in an effort to encourage investment through three main mechanisms. To
attract new investors, the reforms raised the wholesale tariffs paid to the power producers
and introduced a pool purchase price (PPP) to a 'cost plus' formula that guaranteed a 12-
15 percent rate of return for newly invested plants. In addition, an RMBO.02 fee was
added to the end-user retail prices nationwide to raise capital for the newly established
electricity construction fund. Lastly, a wide range of special fees and charges, such as the
'fuel and transportation surcharge', were also allowed by 1986. These fees were
144 See State Council Notice document no. 86, April 17, 1986.
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collected by the central and local governments to finance various projects such as the
Three Gorges dam project and the "coal for oil substitution" project and a portion was
also disbursed to local projects.145 Such reforms diversified ownership, diluting the
central government's share of generation assets, and also introduced sufficient sub-
national funding to increase generation capacity and largely solve the major power
shortages of the 1980s and early 1990s. 14 6
Firms such as the Huaneng Group proved effective at building partnerships with
foreign financial institutions and creating the foundation for rapid expansion. The
prominence of electricity firms in this crucial stage of policy and economic reform is
reflected in the fact that six of the original 22 SOEs approved by the State Council to
issue shares in overseas stock markets hailed from the electric power industry.147
Huaneng Power International, Incorporated (HPI) was established in June 1994 and in
October of the same year listed on the New York Stock Exchange, issuing $1.25 billion
in American Depositary Receipts. 48 By 1995 over 40 power investment companies had
begun operation, forming what has been characterized by some scholars as 'a group of
independent power producers (IPPs)'. 149 In late 1995 the China Power Investment
Corporation had been established to support and channel foreign capital investment into
the industry. By January 1998, HPI was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and in
145 Zhang Chi, "Reform of Chinese electric power market: economics and institutions", PESD draft paper,
Stanford University, 31 January, 2003. p. 9 .146 Intermittent short-term shortages always existed, as is the case in most developing (and, occasionally
developed) nations.
147 The six firms are Huaneng International Joint Stock Company, Shandong Huaneng Electricity Joint
Stock Company, Shandong International Power Development Company, China Harbin Power Plant
Equipment Group, Northeast Electric Transmission and Transformation Equipment Corp, Datang Power
Company. The listings occurred in 1994.
148 Investor Communication company document, 'In pursuit of world class corporate governance and IR';
see < www.fa 1 00index.com/images/PDF/huanengpower.pdf>.
149 Xu 2002, p,127.
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November 2001 the firm successfully issued A-shares in the domestic market. By March
1997, another power firm - Beijing Datang Power Generation Corporation - became the
first Chinese firm to list on the London Stock Exchange. In December 1996 the State
Power Corporation of China (SPCC) had been established and within a few months the
MOEP had been transformed into the Department of Electric Power within the SETC,
with a staff reduced to fewer than 20 people. This reorganization served to separate
production, including both generation and distribution, from regulatory functions.
The great expansion of power that began in the mid-1980s through the reforms
discussed above also heralded the relative decline of central funding for such expansion.
For example, between 1980 and 1994, "the annual growth rates of both power generation
and installed capacity averaged more than 8 percent, while between 1980 and 1992, the
share of central government investment in total power sector investment decreased from
91 percent to 30 percent". 150 In cumulative terms, the central government provided
nearly half of power industry investment during 1985-90. In the following five years,
however, between 1991 and 1995, only one-third of investment funds flowed from the
central government. Financial levers of influence have clearly narrowed. In the same
period, local sources accounted for 42.9 percent of the total. The third largest category of
investment was foreign, equalling 9.9 percent. Moreover, the variation across regions was
considerable, from provinces such as Tibet that were dominated by central state funds, at
98.7 percent, to powerhouse Guangdong market, in which only 3.5 percent of funding
was from the central state. 151 Statistics for the Southern Grid reveal both the progressive
efforts of local government to meet rising power demands and the necessary freedom
150 Binsheng Li and James Dorian (1995) 'Change in China's Power Sector', Energy Policy, 23 (7): 619-
626. p.6 2 5.
151 Xu 2002, p.172.
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from central guidance that the region enjoyed in order to succeed. Foreign investment
shares were highest in Guangdong and Hainan (23.2 percent and 21.7 percent
respectively), as were local government investments (54.1 percent and 41.7 percent). 52
Rise of Foreign Investment - An ear/v "Shock Absorber" in Electric Power
While local government and domestic private investment played a major role in
resolving shortages in electric power supply, foreign investment also provided critical
capital and higher efficiency equipment when high levels of economic growth were
sustained beginning in 1992. The role of foreign investment was not only important for
energy growth, but the evolution of foreign involvement provides a clear example of how
non-central firms were encouraged by the central government in times of shortage then
constrained once energy supply was increased. This approach was evident in the coal
industry as well, whereby policies were pursued to discourage Local Non-State mines
through institutional means.
Foreign firms were courted by the central government to contribute to the growth in
electric power generation through investment and the import of high efficiency
equipment. By 1995, MOEP estimates calculated that a total of 18 GW of capacity
would require foreign funding in the period 1996-2000, at a cost of $11-14 billion. An
influential 1994 report addressing energy efficiency targets prepared by the MOEP called
for average thermal efficiency of power generation to rise from under 28 percent in 1993
to 33 percent by 2000 and eventually to 35 percent by 2010 through the restriction of
small plant construction and the use of advanced combustion technology.' 53
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As Blackman and Wu have detailed, between 1978 and 1993 overseas sources
invested $14.3 billion in the electric power sector, or 10 percent of total investment.154
Nearly 85 percent of such funds were sourced from governments or multilateral lending
institutions such as the World Bank, which entailed protracted planning and approval
processes. As the foreign capital required in the five-year period between 1996 and 2000
was at least as great as the total amount of capital received from public sector sources
from 1978 to 1993: "the short time horizon envisioned by Chinese planners was not
compatible... thus, foreign direct investment was seen to be needed to cover expected
financing shortfalls."1 55
The year 1996 resulted in a raft of new laws that brought legal, if not regulatory,
clarity to the power industry. The Electricity Law was passed and allowed non-state
entities to participate in the generating sector, while also furthering the separation of
regulatory and ownership functions of power producers. Between 1998 and 2002
subsequent legislation revised and clarified regulatory changes designed to separate
generation and transmission assets formally, split generation and transmission pricing,
launch small-scale market power pooling trials and elaborate future reform objectives. 156
These objectives included (a) the formal separation of generation from transmission in
terms of ownership and regulation; (b) the establishment of new pricing mechanisms to
internalize environmental costs more effectively; (c) the creation of competitive regional
markets for the dispatching of generators; and (d) the development of market-oriented
pricing mechanisms throughout the power value chain, from generation to transmission,
154 Li and Dorian, p.623.
'55 Blackman and Wu, p.700.
156 Prominent examples of such legislation were State Council Documents 146, 5 and 2704 of 2002; and
later 2 of 2003 and 432 of 2005.
103
distribution, and retail pricing.' 57 Cross-subsidization through price discrimination still
plagued the sector however. For example, in 2002 the average rural price for electricity
was RMB0.66/kWh, compared to an urban average of RMB0.44/kWh. The largest
differential between regions reached RMB0.264/kWh. 51
The combination of policies designed to attract foreign investment was largely
successful (see Figures 21 and 22). Between 1996 and 2000, $13.26 billion of greenfield
investment was sourced from foreign sources - a number at the high end of the $11-14
billion range of investment need estimated in 1995. Of the 18 GW target, an estimated
13.9 GW were built through FDI invested plants.' 59 By 2002, 13 percent of total
investment in the Chinese power industry was foreign - double the percentage of foreign
investment in capital construction in all sectors that year. 60 As Figure 21 illustrates, it is
noteworthy that at the height of foreign investment in this sector, the central government
moved to establish in its portfolio of firms a major state-owned alternative vehicle for
managing electric power assets: the State Power Corporation of China (SPCC).
157 Edward Steinfeld, "Energy Policy: Charting a Path for China's Future", World Bank China Note, June
2004.
58 State Council Office of Economic Restructuring, 'Zhongguo dianli jianguan jigou jianshe yanjiu
baogao', November 2004, p. 150.
159 Blackman and Wu, p. 710.
160 Woo, p.l 1.
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Figure 21. Private (Foreign) Investment in Electricity Generation
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Source: World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database.
Figure 22. Capital Construction in Electric Power (1995-2000)
Source Amount (RMB billion) Share
Central Government (Bank 256.47 44.4%
Loans, Transfers, Funds)
Local Government 103.82 17.0%
Enterprise Internal Funds 76.46 13.2%
Foreign Investment 101.54 17.5%
Bonds (Central and Local) 6.27 1.1%
Other 32.8 5.7%
(Total Non-Central Sources) (320.89) (55.2%)
Source: SPCC, Dianli gongyejiuwu zongli (Beijing: Zhongguo dianli chubanshe, 2001), p.2 7 1.
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Fall of Foreign Investment
Figure 21 illustrates both how foreign investment rapidly entered China's electric
generation industry during the economic boom of the 1990s, and also how precipitously
both the number of projects and value of such projects dropped between 1998 and 1999
and remained low despite subsequent high economic growth beginning in 2002. Foreign
investment, having been attracted in times of energy shortage, was systematically
discouraged by the State Planning Commission (SPC) of the central government through
several institutional means once power shortage had been resolved. This discouragement
primarily took the form of renegotiated tariffs, renegotiated post-tax rates of return on
equity, delayed approval of projects, and redefined regulations regarding "priority"
projects.
As economic growth rates dropped from above 14 and 13 percent in 1993 and
1994, to under eight percent in 1998, electric power capacity rates recovered.16' As seen
in Figure 17, by 1996-1997 electric power imports had dropped to zero and power
exports had begun to grow. In the context of slowing growth the SPC began to alter the
institutional rules governing investment in the industry. First, priority was given to FDI
projects that: (i) employed domestic equipment; (ii) employed domestic contractors and
managers; (iii) were located in less-developed Central and Western regions; (iv) were
low-cost; and (v) were environmentally friendly and involved advanced technology.
Second, exemptions from import tariffs and duties for foreign firms were eliminated. In
161 Many Chinese economists consider the 1998 GDP growth rate of 7.8 percent to be an overestimate by
several percentage points - see Lowell Dittmer and Yu-Shan Wu, "Leadership Coalitions and Economic
Transformation in Reform China: Revisiting the Political Business Cycle", in Lowell Dittmer and Guoli
Liu (eds.), Domestic Politics in Transition: China's Deep Reform (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield,
2006), pp.6 1 .
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April 1996, foreign investor's exemptions from tariffs and duties on imported generating
equipment smaller than 350 MW were canceled. These import tariffs were substantial,
equaling 38% on generating equipment smaller than 350 MW (in comparison to 6% for
larger units).' 62 Third, the post-tax internal rate of return on equity that had ranged from
15 to 17 percent in the early to mid-1990s was reduced to 10 percent by the late 1990s
and eventually downgraded to an unspecified status in power purchasing agreements.1 6 3
By 2003 a report in the International Finance News stated: "Those foreign direct
investors which have built plants before 1994 and signed power purchasing agreements,
as well as investments with guaranteed power price or investment return approved by the
State Council after 1994 ... will have to renegotiate the contracts and should participate
in power pooling and bidding."' 16 4
The removal of these guarantees greatly reduced the expected returns that foreign
firms required to accept the high risk of participating in China's infrastructure build-out.
Such risk increased when the economic slowdown beginning in 1997 revealed how past
reforms to attract investment had created differentials in power tariff (price) paid to new
and to old power generating units. The dual track pricing introduced in the 1980s to spur
investment detenrmined tariff rates according to the date a generating unit came online.
Units that were built before 1985 - and therefore before the major 1986 reform that
pluralized investment' 65, discussed above - had been allocated capital through the central
government and therefore were paid a low tariff from the grid that covered operating
162 A. Gruettner, "Regulations Irk Suppliers," China Business Review 30 (1997).
163 Li and Dorian, p. 621. Woo, p.25.
164 Eric Ng, "China Power Reform to Hit Foreign Firms", South China Morning Post, Jan. 18, 2003.
165 See State Council Notice document no. 86, April 17, 1986: 'Provisional Regulation on the
Encouragement of Fundraising for Power Construction Investment and Implementation of the Multi-Rate
Power Tariff.
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costs. In contrast, units built after the reform were financed from multiple sources.
Tariffs for these units were calculated according to a cost-plus model in which capital and
variable costs were repaid, as well as a certain level of return.' 66 This rendered the
investment attractive to foreign investors, who were receiving a price premium from the
power grid of anywhere from 20-30 percent. A 2001 industry research report cited the
tariff received for units built before 1985 to equal RMB 24/MWh while units built after
1985 received a tariff of 33/MWh. The national average tariff equaled RMB 29/MWh. 67
During periods of energy shortage the grid was required to purchase all generated power,
rendering such differences immaterial. Once shortages subsided older plants built before
1985, with lower tariffs and assets nearly fully appreciated, became more attractive to the
dispatch centers of the regional grids - many of which owned the domestic generation
firms.
As Figure 21 depicts, the renegotiation of contract terms, tariffs, rate of return
guarantees, and the often low capacity at which foreign invested plants were run due to
dispatch manipulation, combined to wipe out foreign investment nearly as quickly as
favorable policies had welcomed such investment. As seen in Figure 23, results of a
March 1998 survey of international developers, consultants, lawyers, lenders and
investors operating in China reinforce the importance of these risks to power projects,
listing "tariff adjustment", "dispatch constraint" and "change in law" as three of the top
four "extremely critical" risks.
166 Sarah Wee and Kenneth Wee, "Foreign Projects in China's Power Industry: Tariff Reductions and
Renegotiations," The Electricity Journal 16, no. 6 (2003), p.59.
167 Boon-Siew Yeoh and Rajesh Rajaraman, "Electricity in China: The latest reforms," The Electricity
Journal 17, no. 3 (2004), p.6 6 .
108
Figure 23. Survey of Risk in Chinese BOT Power Projects
% of Respondents Who Answered
Unique or Extremely Very Fairly Not Not Mean
Critical Risk Critical Critical Critical Critical Critical Applicable Score Ranking
Tariff Adj utment 2H' ,  3 " 3" 4.50 1
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Source: Shouqing Wang, Robert Tiong, SK Ting, D. Ashley, "Risk management framework for
BOT power projects in China," Journal of Project Finance 4, no. 4 (1999), p. 6 0 .
Rise and Fall of State Power Corporation of China
The experience of foreign investors is important for two primary reasons. First,
this evolution of investment serves as an important precedent of the ways in which
necessary investment outside the central government's coffers was successfully utilized
to supplement the rapid building of an energy system and then effectively constrained.
This pattern is evident in the ownership data of coal over time, as discussed above, and is
also evident in the treatment of private and semi-private Chinese investment in the
electric power industry more recently. Many of these investors sought to profit from the
major energy reforms in China, believing that while foreign investment could be easily
manipulated by central and local government, similar measures of central authority would
be adequately countered by local protectionism. As the two case studies detail in the
chapters that follow, results did vary.
Second, foreign investment was constrained through a combination of specific
policy changes and an underlying systematic local protectionism exposed by slowing
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economic growth. The degree of local protectionism proved to be so great that it
motivated in large measure the centralization of power generation and distribution in the
hands of one actor - a national firmn named the State Power Corporation of China
(SPCC). The firm, founded in 1997 and dismantled in 2002, sought to wrest ownership
of generating assets from regional local grids in an attempt to resolve preferential
dispatching problems and integrate the grid's management nationally. The firm was
founded as an attempt at corporate centralization following the great surge in electric
power supply of the early to mid-1990s and the resulting bottoming of utilization rates
(see Figure 18). The timing of its creation is revealing, illustrating again the importance
of national energy balance in the launch of centralization efforts, and also the costs of
devolution in the eyes of central government policymakers.
However, the troubles experienced by the SPCC itself soon provided evidence
that ownership of generation and grid assets under one roof invited further manipulation
of dispatch and that complete separation between these assets was necessary. In some
provinces, regional subsidiaries of the SPCC were dispatching plants owned by the firm
and not plants owned by the provincial and local government or foreign investors. In
other provinces, provincial and local governments manipulated local dispatch centers to
dispatch locally owned plants. Many employees in these dispatch centers, originally
employees of the provincial power bureau and only recently (and technically) employees
of the SPCC, had invested their personal funds into vast swathes of the provincial or local
government owned electric generation capacity, thus dispatching to local firms for their
own financial gain. While diversification of ownership and investment had spurred rapid
supply growth, it also generated significant complexity in the industry's governance.
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In 1998, despite controlling over 49 percent of national electric power generating
capacity, the SPCC had earned a mere RMB7.01 billion in profits, based on sales revenue
of RMB260.64 billion.'68 Economic growth rates had dropped from over nine percent in
1997 to seven percent in 1998. Slowing growth, the poor financial performance of the
SPPC, and the "Ertan Incident" (described below) led to the December 2002 breakup of
the national firm into two grid companies, five generation companies (termed the "Big
Five"), and several service and ancillary companies. Additionally, 6.47GW of installed
capacity was allowed to remain under the authority of the State Power Grid Company for
eventual sale in an effort to finance power grid development, and 9.2GW was assigned to
a separate firm to cover non-core business expenses. 169 The evolution of the SPCC is
illustrated below in Figure 24.
168 Matthew Miller (2000) 'Beijing's power sector feels wind of change', South China Morning Post, 13
January. p. 10.
169 Woo, p.9.
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Figure 24 (a,b,c). Recent Evolution of Electric Power Sector Assets
(Operational Control)
A. Mid- to Late-1990s*
Central Government
- Generation: 46%
- Trans. + Distr: 87%
Ministry of
Electric
Power
(Pre-1998)
Sub-Central Actors
- Generation: 54%
- Trans. + Distr: 13%
Provincial
Governments
Local Non-Government
Governments Firms
Provincial I ,Transmission
Bureau of . . ............... i ..........
Ministry
I I
Transmission , Distribution
Distribution
I
End-User
End-User
* Adapted from Zhang and Heller, p. 94. Solid lines note generating capacity trusted to the provincial
bureau of the Ministry for operation (then placed under SPCC subsidiaries after 1997), while dashed lines
note generating capacity that sells into the grid by other entities. The terms "Generating Capacity" and
"Trans. + Distr." under the charts represent shares of generating capacity and electricity distributed,
respectively. Figures are estimates for 1997, 2002, and 2007. See also
http://www.buyusa.gov/china/en/power.html.
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B. 1997-2002
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Ertan Incident - The Costs of Devolution
The dissolution of the SPCC was motivated in large part by the recognition that
simply stripping grid and power generation assets from local governments and
centralizing such assets in the form of a national firm did not resolve the political
manipulation of the energy market. Regional grids, although the majority were owned by
the SPCC beginning in 1998, were granting privileged dispatch to the generation plants
they owned. In periods of energy shortage, this proved to be a minor problem, as all or
nearly all supply was needed. The economic slowdown in 1998 exposed such
manipulation, most powerfully in the case of the Sichuan Ertan hydropower plant, and
renewed central government focus on the need to enforce the separation of ownership
between generation and grid ("changwangfenkai").
The Ertan hydroelectric power plant began construction in 1991 and, at an
installed capacity of 3.3 GW, was the largest of its kind in Asia. A product of the
investment and ownership devolution trends discussed in this chapter, Ertan was jointly
financed by the central government-owned State Development Investment Company,
Sichuan Provincial Power Investment Company and Sichuan Provincial Power Company,
with equity contributions of 48 percent, 48 percent and 4 percent respectively. The dam's
plant was designed to generate 17 billion KWh of electricity annually - equivalent to
about one-third of Sichuan province's annual power supply. The majority of the dam's
output was to be delivered via high-voltage transmission lines to Chengdu, the capital of
Sichuan province, and burgeoning Chongqing, at the time a major Sichuan municipality
of 30 million people at the upper end of the Three Gorges dam reservoir. Nine additional
provinces would receive the remainder. According to the power purchase agreements
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between Sichuan Provincial Power Company and Chongqing Municipal Power
Company, signed in 1998, the contracted offtake amount in 1998, 1999 and 2000
equalled 0.98 TWh, 6.63 TWh and 9.31 TWh respectively.
The actual quantity of power purchased in 1998 and 1999 fell far below the
contracted amount, registering at 0.75 TWh and 4.984 TWh respectively. 170 Between
1998 and 2000 the dam was producing at 41 percent capacity, resulting in a loss of
RMB1 billion in 1999, and surpassing that figure in 2000. According to economist Hu
Angang's calculations, the dam lost RMB3.51 billion to RMB6.83 billion in potential
revenue.'17 By 2003, the plant was unable to service its debt, and the $2.2 billion project
was subsequently forced to turn to the Sichuan branch of the Bank of China for a $396
million loan to repay a portion of World Bank debt and commercial investors.
By the time that Ertan began generating power in 1998, two important variables
had changed since the start of construction in 1991. On the political side of the equation,
Chongqing had, during Ertan's construction, been elevated to provincial status in 1997.
This shift not only enabled Chongqing to refuse political pressure from the Sichuan
provincial government to purchase power from Ertan, but also allowed the city to
increase utilization of its own plants - and therefore its own revenue sources.
Dispatching conflicts between the two provincial level entities were frequent. 172
Relatedly, on the economic side, the chronic power shortages of the 1980s and
early to mid-1990s were attenuated in some regions in 1998 with the onset of the Asian
financial crisis and a slowdown of Chinese economic growth from over nine percent to
170 See http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/TgP/print.cfm?ContentlD= 1331.
171 Angang Hu, "Ertan shuidian xiangmu yanzhong kuisun de yanjiu baogao", Zhongguo guoqing fenxi
yanjiu baogao, vol 27, 2000.
172 Interviews CD- 1, CD-6.
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approximately seven percent. As previously stated, quarterly export growth rates, year-
on-year, declined from above eight percent in the first quarter of 1997 to near zero
percent in the first quarter of 1999. Corresponding figures for electric power generation
match this movement, declining from five percent in the first quarter of 1997 to near zero
percent by the second quarter of 1998.173 Power generation utilization rates had also
bottomed out from above 5,000 hours in 1994 to below 4,500 hours by 1998. More
importantly, local investment and ownership growth in power generation had begun to
supply local demand. Chongqing, the largest planned customer for Ertan's power, had
agreed to purchase 32 per cent of the output, yet by 1998 was less desperate for power.1 74
The municipality was experiencing reduced economic demand, like many other
contracted Ertan customers, but also had begun constructing municipally-owned and
municipal power employee-invested power plants within the city. In addition, within
Sichuan itself, the SPCC's regional subsidiary was privileging the dispatch of plants that
were fully owned by the provincial government rather than Ertan, which was a joint
investment between the central and provincial government financed together with the
World Bank.' 7 5 Ertan's power was cheaper than these local sources, at RMB 0.18 per
kWh, yet contracts were not honored. 176
The "Ertan Incident" powerfully illustrates how the successful diversification of
energy investment and ownership to include the local level can also produce significant
local protectionism and major conflicts in interest between investors at varying levels of
government, particularly once economic growth rates moderate and major energy
173 NBS, China Economic Yearbook, multiple years; Woo, p.6.
174 James Kynge, "New Doubts over Chinese Plant", Financial Times, March 10, 2000.
'75 Ci Zhang and Thomas Heller, "Reform of Chinese electric power market: economics and institutions,"
PESD Working Paper #3, January 2004, p. 3 6 .176 "Shocking Times in PRC Power", Business China, Sep 24, 2002.
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shortages subside. The deterioration of electric power demand in 1998 exposed the
inefficiencies created by the political channelling of energy resources along ownership
lines. The resulting scale of Ertan's economic losses revealed the dysfunction of such an
approach to central government regulators within the State Council - in particular
Premier Zhu Rongji - leading to the launch of an investigation into the SPCC and market
distortions in the industry.' 77 This investigation was a critical early factor in the eventual
dismantling of the SPCC and the ownership separation of grid and generating assets
beginning in 2003.
The Firm Perspective of State/Firm Interaction. Two Case Studies
This chapter provided a framework for understanding China's industrial
organization of its energy market by linking the interventions of the central government
to cycles of stress on national energy supply. The resulting investment and ownership
structure of China's coal and electric power generation industries over time is cyclicalal.
The liberalization of investment and ownership in these industries, so critical to growth,
did not result in the incremental replacement of firms owned by the central government
by firms owned by private actors or local governments. Recent data reinforce this
conclusion. Economic growth in the post-2002 period has witnessed a resurgence in the
share of Central State Mines (CSMs). Electric power generation assets of the former
SPCC, owned by the central government and reconstituted into the "Big Five" generating
companies, contribute over 40 percent of total installed capacity and have begun to
consolidate local government and private/semi-private firms (as the following case
studies will analyze in detail).
177 Angang Hu, "Ertan shuidian xiangmu yanzhong kuisun de yanjiu baogao ", Zhongguo guoqing fenxi
yanjiu baogao, vol 27, 2000. Interviews B-19, B-33, B-48.
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Now that cyclicalal patterns of governance and industry evolution have been
established, it is important to examine the mechanisms through which state and firm
interact to determine the shape of this evolution. The following two case studies address
such mechanisms through close analysis of the rise of two local electricity generation
firmnns. Both are major, rapidly growing firms initially owned by local government actors
that were financed through a mixture of private and local public investment. Both are
targeted by central actors (sometimes government, sometimes corporate) for
consolidation and are reformed. The first firm persists, managing to maintain its range of
owners and fundamental corporate integrity while the other is fully re-nationalized by the
central government.
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CHAPTER THREE
Case One
The Jinyuan Group: A Local Firm's Persistence
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter on industry, local energy actors were clearly
transformed by reforms. These reforms sought to liberalize financing sources,
corporatize assets in China's energy sector, partially separate government regulatory
functions from corporate functions and management, and ultimately dismantle vertical
corporate structures (in the case of electric power generation). The prior discussion
employed the industry level of analysis to build a framework to identify institutional
cycles of energy governance, patterns of economic and energy growth, and resulting
ownership and investment patterns in China's coal and electric power industries. This
chapter adopts the firm level of analysis to shift the focus away from the state and
industry and toward specific firms to identify the mechanisms by which these policy
changes were executed and the strategies firms utilized to adapt to, and in some cases
shape, such policies.
This first of two case studies is fascinating, as it provides evidence of how a local
firm - the Jinyuan Group - created the opportunity to grow dramatically during one of
the very periods of investment and ownership centralization that had been discussed in
Chapter Two. Jinyuan took advantage of a major drive of central government industrial
policy that began during the slowdown of 1998 and became a pivotal actor in the
execution of that policy. The case study therefore provides compelling evidence of how
goals of the developmental state (capital agglomeration and rapid industrialization) were
achieved through liberalization measures that pluralized investment and ownership. The
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firmn also survived repeated attempts to consolidate its assets with the SPCC and other
attempts to nationalize its assets. While Jinyuan ultimately did accept investment from
one of the "Big Five" central government-owned generating firms through forced
consolidation, the firm's governance structure and original shareholders remained largely
intact. As a result, the case also highlights how many of the major hybrid firms that grow
out of post-centralization consolidation efforts are not carbon copies of the traditional
SOEs that existed pre-liberalization.
A Local Firm 's Rise
One of the most intriguing cases of change in China's energy landscape is the rise
of Jinyuan Group in Guizhou province. Jinyuan began as a small private enterprise in
one of the poorest provinces in China and grew rapidly to coordinate, structure, finance,
and lead the build-out of electric power production for a cornerstone program of the
"Develop the West" campaign - arguably the largest central state-led national
development directive to be issued by Beijing in the past three decades. The case reveals
the new types of firms and firm behavior resulting from such reform - "hybrid firms"
leveraging government and private resources that are producing complex governance
challenges for China's ever emerging regulatory institutions.' 78 Most importantly, the
institutional evolution of Jinyuan as a private and largely independent energy firm for the
majority of its history shaped the manner in which the central state reasserted its authority
in the form of limited investment that preserved much of the firm's original governance,
institutions, and ownership structure. This model of state involvement stands in sharp
178 Firms that are either initially formed through the combination of private and government capital or
partially listed on stock exchanges yet majority government-owned, have been termed "hybrid" or "dual"
firms by recent studies. Please see Victor and Heller, 2007.
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contrast to the effective nationalization of Luneng Group, a case treated in the subsequent
chapter of this study.
The Jinyuan Group began with the creation of a technically private power
generation firm, founded by Xiang Dehong, a 44 year-old president who, significantly,
was also the party secretary of Guizhou's Provincial Power Company (GPPC). Jinyuan
was founded with an initial investment of RMB500 million in non-state equity collected
from what grew to become a group of 28,726 SOE employees. Within a short span of 7
years and after several changes in legal corporate form, by the end of 2008 Jinyuan was
producing over 55 percent of electric power for Guizhou province and enjoying sales
revenues of over RMB10.3 billion, catapulting it to the top tier of electric power firms in
China. 179 To put this in perspective, this revenue figure is over an eighth of Huaneng
Power International's 2006 figure, despite the fact that Huaneng is the largest power
generation company in China, has been operating for well over two decades, and was
carved out from the dismantled national SPCC.l8
Jinyuan has also built a significant installed capacity of power (equaling 8GW,
with rights to another 2GW), manages over 1GW of capacity owned by competitor firms,
produced over 48.5 billion kWh of electric power in 2007, and served as the main
electricity source for the Southern Line of the state-led West to East Power Transmission
Program (WEPTP).'8' The total generating capacity under management surpasses that of
Israel and Singapore, and is approximate in size to the national capacity of Vietnam or
Hong Kong. Total assets as of 2008 equaled over RMB40 billion, about the size of
179 Guo Jianhu, Zhongguo Dianli Xinwen Wang, "Jinyuanjituan shangbannian 200yi dianliang 'xidian
dongsong '", July 18, 2006. http://www.china5e.com/news/power/200607/200607180143.html.
180 Huaneng's operating revenue in 2006 was RMB84.5 billion. Http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/
2008-03/27/content 6568871.htm.
181 J inyuan Group, "Yixin yivi meifazhan, 2008 nianjinyuan jituan gongsi xinnian heci ", January 2008.
Tangshan Iron and Steel, or Li and Fung of Hong Kong.' 8 2 The WEPTP is one of the
central government's largest infrastructure programs during the Tenth Five Year Plan
(FYP) and was designed to secure electricity for Guangdong by encouraging power
generated in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi to be transmitted east. The project is on
schedule to be completed by 2020.183
Jinyuan's central role in the building of the WEPTP is important for two primary
reasons. First, despite the national scale and regional integration of the WEPTP, the
design and execution of the policy implementation were left largely in the hands of
provincial level corporate actors. In the case of Guizhou, a provincial government joined
with an active SOE party secretary who then established a private energy corporation and
played a critical role in initiating, negotiating, and executing the many thermal power
projects supporting the central government's broad development policy. Second, while
limited investment originated through transfers from the central government, much of the
equity financing was raised and deployed by provincial governments and corporations.
Perhaps most improbably in the context of the electric power industry, Jinyuan
Corporation was created through the pooling of private domestic capital. This occurred
despite the opaque regulatory issues related to private capital in the energy sector. In
sum, this major infrastructure drive was designed by Beijing to integrate regional
infrastructure, yet the planning, execution, and financing of key aspects of the energy
production side of the equation were guided by local corporate actors, initiated with local
non-state equity, and strengthened through the strategic use of new legal and regulatory
resources spawned by reform (such as the Company Law, the financing liberalization
182 Caijing, "Buyout Unplugs Another ESOP Power Firm", January 7, 2009.
183 Please see Appendix I for the current, 2008 subsidiary structure of Jinyuan Group and list of plants
owned or under management.
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regulation, and the de-verticalization of the industry structure). Firms such as Jinyuan,
while increasingly powerful, should not be understood as fully independent from the
local and central state and wholly commercial, as some argue, but rather understood as
actors recombining these resources of the central state through national policy directives,
and national legal and regulatory changes, and local state protectionism. Perhaps most
significantly, these finns do so under an opaque regulatory environment, a high risk of
nationalization or state intervention, and the investment of major sums of capital.
Modest Origins
Guizhou province is, in many respects, the last environment in which one would
expect to witness innovation and entrepreneurialism in the state sector, or the rapid
growth of economic activity by non-state or quasi-state firms. The nation's miraculous
growth of the past three decades has largely circumvented the majority of Guizhou's
populace, with a per-capita GDP that ranked lowest in the nation in 2008.184 What little
economic growth has been generated in the past has been the result of large amounts of
state-led investment. As scholar Tim Oakes has rightly pointed out, "[w]ith 84 per cent of
GVIO [gross value of industrial output] coming from state-owned enterprises (nearly
twice the national average), Guizhou's economy continues to be the most state-dominated
of any provincial-level jurisdiction in China." 185
In contrast to its low level of economic wealth, Guizhou was blessed with a
concentration of China's natural resource wealth - particularly hydroelectric potential
and coal reserves. The province ranks fifth in national proven coal reserves, and third in
hydroelectric potential. Theoretical hydroelectric capacity equals approximately 18.57
184 NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2009, through China Data Online, accessed May 21, 2009.
185 Tim Oakes, "Building a Southern Dynamo: Guizhou and State Power", China Quarterly, 2004 p. 470.
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GW, with viable capacity of 16.83GW. While an abundance of physical resources have
long been present in Guizhou, the organizational, financial, institutional and legal
resources to develop such resources were historically absent. The province's energy
sector historically reflected afflictions that plagued coal-rich areas throughout China: a
highly fragmented coal market, a monopoly on the production and distribution of electric
power, low energy prices that stifled investment, and lack of electric power supply that
resulted in intermittent shortages, brownouts, or blackouts that remained despite decades
of policies and investments designed to address such failure.
By the beginning of the 21st Century, much had changed in Guizhou's energy
landscape. With the growth of the electric power industry contributing the largest
quantity of gross industrial value-added in the province (at 26.1 percent in 2006), total
coal production more than doubled from 31.9 million tons in 1999 to 76.6 million tonnes
by 2005.186 Thermal power production nearly tripled from 20,918 billion kWh to 56,957
billion kWh in the same short six year period.'87 In the first four months of 2006, the
power grid reached electricity output of 22.9 billion kilowatt-hours, increasing 33.7
percent year on year - nearly 3 times that of the nation's average growth of 12.6 percent.
Such expansion proved puzzling to many observers, who questioned how a continued
pattern of state owned investment could lead to such a dramatic surge in economic
activity. Moreover, the surge in growth was increasingly reflected in improved local
fiscal conditions. The Guizhou provincial government revenue more than tripled from
RMB7.4 billion in 1999 to RMB22.7 in 2006. The GDP of the province more than
186 Guizhou Statistical Yearbook, 2007; supplementary data available online
http://www.tdctrade.com/mktprof/china/guizhou.htm
187 NBS, China Energy Statistical Yearbook, 1997-1999, p. 445; NBS, China Energy Statistical Yearbook,
2006, p. 221.
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doubled from 91.2 billion in 1999 to an estimated RMB228.2 billion in 2006.188 In sum,
after several decades of fairly low economic growth, Guizhou began to revitalize in the
mid 1990s, largely as a purveyor of value-added energy resources and services to
neighboring centers of dynamism, particularly Guangdong province. Such change
proved difficult to explain at the macro level, as the metrics of state/non state ownership
levels did not evince major shifts during this time and the "heavy hand" of state-led
development seemingly remained in the form of this national directive.
Figure 25. Guizhou GDP by Industrial Category
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An Opportunity from the Center
For a region long dominated by ineffective central state investment, the largest
opportunity for local economic growth in Guizhou ironically came in the form of a
January 2000 central directive to "Develop the West" (xibu dakaifa).'8 9 This national
188 China Data Online, 2008.
189 See David Goodman, "The politics of the West: equality, nation-building and colonization," Provincial
China 7, no. 2 (2002): 127-150, "The Campaign to "Open Up the West": national, provincial-level and
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development drive has been criticized on many grounds, not least of which was the
charge that the infrastructure projects spearheading the policy blocked local actors from
participating in the value-creating activities that resulted. 190 For Guizhou, this rather
vague directive combined with a more specific subset of policies that sought to fuel
coastal energy needs through the utilization of natural resources from the interior
provinces. This second policy, named the "West-East Power Transmission Project"
(xidian dongsong), served as the primary vehicle through which the bulk of the
infrastructure construction was launched at the end of 2000.
The development effort was organized into Northern, Central, and Southern
transmission lines that brought electric power produced in resource-rich, demand-poor
western regions of China to the demand-rich, resource-poor coastal regions. The
Southern line enabled the southwestern provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi to
supply power east to Guangdong. The plan called for power to be produced by planned
thermal plants in Guizhou and Yunnan provinces, as well as hydropower plants built
along Guizhou's Wu river, the Lancang river in Yunnan, as well as the Nanpan, Beipan,
and Hongshui rivers that run through Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi. A total of six
transmission lines were planned to be completed by 2010, with a capacity of 10 GW. By
the end of 2007, over 7GW of capacity had been completed along four lines and the
project was on schedule for a timely completion. Capacity plans for 2020 equaled
approximately 20GW.
local perspectives," The China Quarterl/i 178 (2004): 317-334, and China's regional development
(Routledge, 2008).
190 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 5, 2000. "Economists Urge Prudence in Developing West";
Asia Pulse, April 5, 2000. "Asia Economist Suggests New Ways for Developing the West".
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Figure 26. Three Major Areas of Electric Power Transmission
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"Big Push " Development Goals through Liberalization Means.
Top-Down Slogans, Bottom-Up Execution
It is significant to note that the senior government leaders of Guizhou's energy
sector first learned about the details of the West to East Power Transmission Program not
through mandates and formal government communications from Beijing but through the
fortuitous receipt of a copy of corporate correspondence between the Beijing
headquarters of the State Power Corporation of China (SPCC) and its provincial
subsidiary firm in Guangdong.191 Moreover, the communication was bottom-up in nature
and initiated by the subsidiary firm. The April 2000 report from Wu Xirong, then-
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191 Interviews G-7, G-10, B-19, B-32.
president of Guangdong Provincial Power Company, to Gao Yan, then-president of
SPCC, explained how Guangdong's own estimates calculated a power deficit of 20GW
during the 10t' Five Year Plan (FYP) (2001-2005). While national estimates of energy
needs and infrastructure goals are often based on the aggregation of local data, an
additional 20GW is a large scale of need and expresses the extent to which local
information and action is critical to China's current energy build-out. The report
requested central government support, and argued that Guangdong Provincial Power
Company should build such capacity to meet the projected additional demand. The
Guizhou Provincial Power Company (GPPC) Party Secretary, Xiang Dehong, received a
copy of this report and viewed the neighboring province's deficit as a major opportunity
to catalyze the growth of his own firm, which was also a direct subsidiary of the SPCC. 192
Rather than allow the deficit's solution to be determined through negotiations
between the SPCC, its Guangdong subsidiary, and the central government, Xiang Dehong
drafted a report entitled "Guizhou Sends 3GW of Power to Guangdong during the 1 0 th
FYP" and sent it to the Guizhou Party Committee, the Guizhou provincial government,
and the SPCC headquarters in Beijing. The initial reaction from all parties was silence.
The Guizhou provincial government itself initially viewed such investment as highly
risky, as it depended on a projection of energy demand in a neighboring province that
may decide to produce power locally. Local leaders also remained wary of the low
electric power tariffs yielded by the market at that time. 93 The SPCC also remained
silent. Senior SPCC executives assumed that such a lucrative large scale infrastructure
project would be carried out by Guangdong itself and believed that transmission lines
192 Xiang had joined the company in 1993. Xiang Dehong (ed.), Dakuayue: Guizhou Dianli Jueqi,
(Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe), March 2007, p. 4 7 1.
193 Interviews G-15, G-2, G-6, B-28; Xiang, p.471.
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between Guizhou and Guangdong would require time horizons incompatible with
Guangdong's needs. 194 Xiang persisted, however, and eventually the Guizhou Party
Secretary, Chen Dawei, supported the report and suggested that "urgent" ('jinji") be
added to a subsequent document. The report was then sent to the SPCC corporate
headquarters in Beijing.
The mid-2000 proposal by GPPC was both ambitious and seemingly ill-timed.
GPPC argued in the early drafts of the proposal that it would be able to provide 3GW of
power (and in later drafts 4GW of power) to Guangdong during the 10th FYP. The firm
was committing to do so despite the absence of key political, financial and material
resources as well as the clearly negative investment environment of the electric power
sector at that time. Financially, GPPC lacked the resources necessary either to fund fully
the construction of such capacity itself or to put forward the equity necessary to secure
loans from the major commercial banks. In addition, initial discussions with the China
Development Bank regarding repeated loan requests proved fruitless. Second, GPPC's
parent firm, the SPCC, emphasized repeatedly that it remained unwilling to invest in
power generation because of impending regulatory reforms that would initiate a
separation of generator and grid assets and prohibit power transmission and distribution
firms from owning and operating generation facilities. Third, the investment
environment for power generation remained depressed. As discussed in Chapter Two, by
the year 2000 electric power was still in surplus. On-grid power prices were therefore
quite low and 1998 regulations curtailing the construction of smaller scale power
generation units by Premier Zhu Rongji dissuaded many commercial banks from lending
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194 Interview G-19.
to such projects.'9 5 This environment was reflected by the unwillingness of existing
Guizhou firms to expand capacity themselves. For example, since its establishment in
1990 until 2000, the major firm Wujiang Hydro Corp. had not built one new power plant.
As economic growth in Guangdong clearly began to return during the end of the 1990s,
there was an additional concern that investment in the transmission grid necessary to send
such additional power from Guizhou to Guangdong may not be the most profitable use of
such funds. 19 6 Lastly, the ability of the central government to enforce the shut down of
existing Guangdong based generation facilities - many highly polluting oil-fired plants -
was repeatedly questioned. Given such uncertainty, it remained unclear whether
Guangdong would halt the local build-out of such capacity.
Building energy facilities on any scale, given such a lack of resources, uncertain
policy horizons and the questionable investment environment, would have proven to be a
difficult endeavor. However, the large scale of the proposal was also highly ambitious
for a company with such limited means. The stated goal was to expand total power
generation in Guizhou from 5GW to 11GW in only five years. This additional 6GW of
power was comparable to the size of the national power system of Nigeria or Ireland in
2005, or more than the amount of national capacity that Australia, Germany, Thailand or
Vietnam added in a similar period of time.197 In local terms, such a feat would require
producing more capacity in five years than what had been produced in over 50 years of
economic activity in the province. From the founding of the People's Republic in 1949
195 On August 13 1999, the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) issued the Commercial and
Industrial Investment Sector Catalogue to Halt Redundant Construction, a list of 201 categories of projects
to be banned starting September 1, 1999 and compiled by the SETC's Industrial Policy Department. In
particular, items 118 and 155 specifically banned the construction of any coal-fired power generating units
with capacity of 100MW or less.
196 Interviews G-16, B-9.
197 The time period for this comparative data is 2001-2005. US DOE, Energy Information Agency,
International Energy Outlook 2006.
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through to 1997, total Guizhou investment in coal production equaled RMB4.3 billion.
Yet even one 1.2GW thermal plant required investment of about RMB4.8 billion.' 98
Expansion on multiples of this scale would require total investment of approximately
RMB30 billion. According to national regulations a minimum of 20 percent of the total
investment must be in the form of equity in order to receive bank loans for the remaining
investment needs. The resulting total of approximately RMB6.1 billion of required equity
would therefore be difficult to raise, given the investment climate and limited financial
resources of the province. Undeterred, GPPC and the Wujiang Hydroelectric
Development Corporation did attempt this approach, and were able to raise an
impressive, but insufficient, RMB4 billion.
"Reforms Open Doors, Firms Walk Through"
In response to the projected power needs of Guangdong, the lack of domestic
financial resources, and the depressed investment climate of the time, GPPC pursued four
avenues of financial and administrative innovation to secure the resources and build the
projected capacity. 199 First, Jinyuan took advantage of the dismantling of state financing
controls and the corporatization of energy assets that had begun in 1985. Accordingly,
GPPC first broadened its sources of financing mechanisms by collecting "social funds"
("shehui zijin") that consisted of investments from individuals and employees, to provide
initial equity for the initial loan to create the Jinyuan Company.
Second, the firmnn took advantage of the partially executed second round of reforms
that were occurring at this time, namely the separation of regulatory function from
corporate management. This reform was less a dismantling, which is arguably easier to
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198 Xiang, p. 5 15.
199 Ibid., p.547.
execute, and more an active restructuring to strip the corporate management
responsibilities from the government function responsibilities within these firms. GPPC
took advantage of this delayed and partially enforced reform by utilizing its status as an
SOE with continued responsibility for certain state regulatory functions by improving
enforcement of the collection of the provincial electric power fee - a budget deficit that
totaled an incredible RMB1.8 billion in uncollected fees in 2000 alone. 200 These fees
mostly related to registration, expansion permits, and documentation expenses. Third,
the firm joined several traditional formal competitions for direct central government
funding related to the "Develop the West" campaign. Fourth, given the pluralization of
financial actors now able to participate in the power generation, "outside" investors were
consciously courted, ranging from other electric power generators in other provinces to
firmnns in related industries such as natural resource exploitation or building and
construction.
Overall, the economic opportunity was made apparent to these local actors
through reform proclamations from the central government that signaled over time the
coming of the third round of reform - de-verticalization of the electric power industry's
semi-monopoly structure. The SPCC would divest its generation assets and such assets
would be merged with separate, independently managed power generation corporations.
The arrival of such corporations provided an opportunity for local resources to be
reorganized as such reforms began to take hold.
Provincial SOE as Broker and Negotiator
GPPC (and what became the Jinyuan Group) sought to provide two-thirds of new
provincial power capacity brought online as part of the WEPTP's first phase program,
200 Ibid., p.549.
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entitled "Four Hydro, Four Thermal" ("sishui sihuo"), and second phase program,
entitled "Four Hydro, Eight Thermal" ("sishui bahuo"). During this early period of time
in 2000, Yunnan province was only capable of sending 600MW of power capacity to
Guangdong. Guangdong lacked peaking power only, and the provincial government was
willing to contract power for a relatively inexpensive price of RMB0.157/kWh. While
Yunnan Provincial Power Corporation balked at the low price and sought to raise it
through protracted negotiation, again reflecting the importance of local actors, GPPC
indicated that it was willing to provide the power at the asked price, and moreover would
be able to send 3 GW of capacity initially, 4 GW in the near term, and 8 GW by the
beginning of the 11th FYP (2006-2010). While the generation side of the ledger would be
supplied by Jinyuan, another corporation would have to become involved to expand the
transmission grid as necessary to send the additional power to Guangdong.
SPCC's subsidiary, the China Southern Power United Company (Nanfang Dianli
Lianhe Gongsi, currently a subsidiary of China Southern Grid Company), was a firm that
operated the 500kV transmission line that linked Guizhou to Guangdong and Hong Kong.
Southern Power's president, Yuan Maozhen and Xiang of GPPC met in early 2000 to
discuss the manner in which the grid could be expanded to accommodate Guangdong's
expansion plans. Xiang explained how the initial 4MW of capacity could be sent through
the combined use of four different lines. The first was a 500kV D/C line linking Anshun
to Guangdong; the second and third were two separate 500 kV A/C lines from Qing
Yanjing Guangxi reservoir to Guangdong, and the fourth was the original 500 kV line
linking Tiansheng hydro stations to Guangdong. 20 1 Yuan agreed to the configuration.
201 Ibid., p.474. Sinocast articles 2001, 2002, 2003.
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Several months after this agreement between GPPC and China Southern Power
United Company had been finalized, and as Beijing was announcing initial execution of
WEPTP programs of the "Develop the West" policy, SPCC Vice-Chairman Kuang
Zhongxiong convened a separate parent company plenum to discuss how to resolve the
Guangdong electricity shortage in the 10' h FYP and deliver these initial WEPTP projects.
The SPCC had received reports sent from Guizhou regarding the negotiations and
detailed planning between Guizhou and Guangdong. Kuang offered three "opinions"
regarding next steps that essentially supported the plan as designed by the provincial
actors. First, he argued, Guangdong had no choice but to rely on thermal power plants, as
the Guangxi Longtan and Yunnan hydro stations would not be able to provide enough
power until mid-way through the 1 1 th FYP - this opinion was summed up with the phrase
"Distant water cannot resolve proximate thirst" ("yuanshui jiebuliao jinke"). Second,
building thermal capacity in Guizhou would be preferable to building units in Guangdong
because Guizhou's coal reserves were much richer and GPPC had already begun seeking
financing and coordinating long term plans with the grid. Lastly, building thermal plants
in Guizhou would fulfill both the central government policy goals of transmitting power
west to east through the WEPTP and the transfer of wealth of the east to the west through
the "Develop the West" campaign, thereby reducing regional inequality.202 Such
positioning was important, as it revealed how the interests of various groups of
stakeholders were being met, from the central government agencies supporting the
"Develop the West" policy directive, to the provincial governments in the western
regions needing to provide power, to the companies seeking to implement the projects.
202 Interviews B-29, B-38, G-18, G-3, G-I 1. Xiang, p.474.
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On August 1, 2000 the Guangdong provincial government also approved the
4GW plan for the 10"' FYP, and the detailed plan received central approval from the
SDPC. On August 23 Premier Zhu Rongji convened a State Council meeting to confirm
the full 10GW plan as well as the 4GW Guizhou-related component of the overall
agreement. By the end of the month authorization (renke) had been granted from the
State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), allowing the provincial power
corporations of Guizhou and Guangdong to initial the overall agreement. The SPCC then
approved a regional 10GW transfer plan, with a total of 4GW generated by Guizhou,
3GW generated by the Three Gorges plants, a slightly expanded 1.6GW generated by
Yunnan, a more modest 0.6GW from Hunan's Liyu River hydro plant, and 0.8GW from
Guizhou's Tiansheng stations I and 2 once planned units were brought online. Guizhou
had captured the largest of the capacity contracts and rapidly began the build-out
necessary to meet the rather hurried deadlines to bring the power online.
Round 1 Reforms as Opportunity.
Accessing Financial Capital
Obstacles soon began to accumulate. Despite the SDPC support of the overall
plan, the majority of the GPPC's specific plants were denied approval by the central
government. Nayong plant (4x300MW), Anshun plant (2"d phase, 2x300MW), and Jinsha
plant (2nd phase, 4x300MW) were all deemed "black" (illegal) by the SDPC and
construction was not legally allowed to begin. Building continued, however, as the
Guangdong agreement had been signed and evidence of strengthening demand in the east
began to concern provincial leaders in Guangdong.
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While the plants remained unapproved, they still received considerable praise and
attention from elite central government policymakers who viewed them as critical to the
larger industrial campaign to "Develop the West". During his visit to Guiyang in 2000,
then-Premier Zhu Rongji expressed his belief that Guizhou should contribute greatly to
the nation's development, specifically through the production of electricity. SDPC
Minister Zeng Peiyan visited Guizhou in September 2000, expressing his support for
Guizhou and arguing that the province serve as the core of the West to East project,
stating: "The WEPTP is the symbolic engineering feat of the larger Develop the West
Campaign, and while the two provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou are the key pillars of the
Campaign, Guizhou remains the more important. ' 20 3  Minister Zeng reportedly inquired
as to whether bidding had taken place, was reassured by the provincial government that
this had already occurred, and returned to Beijing.
Yet the problem of financing such projects remained. On August 31, 2000, citing
the 1986 regulation to encourage investment in the power industry, the GPPC submitted a
petition to the Guizhou provincial government, offering three avenues for financing the
initial stages of the WEPTP project.20 4 The three solutions proposed were to: i) expedite
the public listing of Qianyuan Power Corporation on the Shenzhen stock exchange, thus
gaining the financing necessary for construction of some units of the initial 2xl20MW
Nayong plant; ii) expedite cooperation talks with Zhonghua Power of Hong Kong
regarding possible joint investment in the second stage build out of the 2X300MW
203 'Xidian dongsong shi xibu dakaifa de bioazhixing gongcheng, shihi xibu dakaifa gongcheng zhongdian
zai yungui liang sheng, yungui de zhongdian you zai guizhou '. Xiang, p.476.204 Regulation cited was the "Provisional Regulations on the Encouragement of Fundraising for Power
Construction Investment and Implementation of the Multi-Rate Power Tariff'. 1985 regulation entitled:
"Guan V duo qudao chozji guizhou dianlijianshe zi/in de qingshi ", then highlighted and invoked in 2000
at the provincial level through a new regulation entitled "sheng renmin zhengfil guanyujiakuai dianli
fianshe shishi xidian dongsong youguan juti wenti de tongzhi ", no. 45.
http://gb.cri.cn/l 1827/2004/09/07/405 @292474 I.htm/.
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Anshun plant; and iii) collect financing from interested employees of GPPC itself to
invest in several plants simultaneously, including Qianbei, Nayong, and Anshun.
The first solution was eventually rejected, as the listing process for the Shenzhen
exchange could very well have carried into 2004 and critically delay the construction of
the majority of power capacity to be sent to Guangdong. The second solution would only
resolve financing for one aspect of the generation challenge - the second stage of Anshun
plant's total 2x300MW project. While such a stopgap measure was viable, it would not
address the majority of the current need. However, the third solution was viewed as
clearly laden with risk, given the ambiguous ownership regulations relating to "lifeline"
industries such as electric power. On Sep 22, 2000 the Guizhou provincial governor's
office therefore held a comprehensive meeting to review the options, issuing a notice
titled: "Guizhou Provincial Government Notice of Specific Questions Relating to
Expediting WEPTP Power Construction Measures". 205
Weeks before, the provincial labor union met and chairman Wang Duilin agreed
to establish the Guizhou Provincial Power Company Employee Shareholder Group
(guizhousheng dianli gongsi zhigong chiguhui).20 6 Guizhou governor Qian Yunlu also
convened meetings to investigate the regulatory implications of establishing such an
entity, and later joined four vice governors in signing (qianpi) a regulation allowing the
Electric Power Employee Shareholder Group to be created.' 7 In addition, the governor's
commission concluded that, through the 1993 Company Law and its 1996 revision, the
Provincial Power Corporation could explore the status of creating that the law termed a
205 Notice again entitled: "Guizhousheng rennmin zhengfu guanvu jiakuai dianlijianshe shishi 'xidian
dongsong 'you guan juti wenti de tongzhi ".
206 Zhang Shaojing, "Jinyuan zhilu", Zhongguo Dianli Qiye Guanli, May 2005 volume, p.36; Xiang, p.479.
207 Interview G-22, G-31.
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"natural person status shareholding company" (ziranren yidao faqi sheli gufengongsi), or
a firm with a shareholding structure and the legal rights of a natural person.
The vice chairman of GPPC's labor union, Wu Suimo, partially understood the
risks of creating such an entity and of utilizing recent legal and regulatory changes. He
stated in a later interview: "First, we feared it was illegal. Second, we feared that it
carried major risk for the employees and their savings."' 20  The reasoning he then
employed to explain why the decision was made to pursue the new legal form revealed
the perceived advantages of conducting such financing through an SOE. He stated that,
as the labor union was under the leadership of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), and
was therefore a "mass organization" (shetuan zuzhi) of the Party, other Power
Corporation executives and employees believed that such funds could reliably be
invested in an entity that represented their interests.
The funds from employees were collected in two rounds between October 2000
and May 2001. The first round secured RMB500 million, while the second round
resulted in an additional RMB300 million, yielding the requisite RMB800million. 20 9 The
collection was not mandatory or forced. Approximately 73 percent of employees
participated, convinced by GPPC President Xiang Dehong's argument that thermal power
would remain the foundation of the West to East power transfer project. He reasoned that
rising demand for electric power in south China, relative lack of power supply regionally,
and central government policies that support the "Develop the West" campaign combined
208 Jin Longkun, "Wo Kan Jinyuan", Zhongeuo Dianli Qive Guanli, April, 2005 volume, p. 9; Xiang,
p. 4 7 9 .
209 Xiang, p.480.
138
to ensure a projected return on investment no lower than 11 percent. 20 In all, a total of
28,726 people ("natural person investors" termed ziranren touzizhe) invested in Jinyuan.
Second Round Reforms.:
Separating Government Function and Corporate Function - Accessing Political Capital
through Delayed Reforms
On November 6, 2000, immediately following the first round of financing that
had been completed in October 2000, Guizhou Jinyuan Power, Ltd.,21' was established
and approved by the Guizhou Industry and Commerce Bureau.:' One month later, on
December 7, 2000, the firm was renamed Guizhou Jinyuan Power Investment, LLC,2 13 a
legal evolution designed to clarify the purpose of the firm and allow investment for
expanded power activity. Days later, Guizhou Jinyuan Power Investment, LLC invested
the RMB500 million funds collected, along with RMB 100 million from a consortium of
smaller private firms (whose funds would be difficult to track), to establish and then
control 78 percent of West Power Shareholding Ltd.,214 which became the first subsidiary
under Jinyuan Power Investment. West Power was designed specifically for managing
thermal construction investment for Jinyuan's power projects in Guizhou. 2 15 Two days
later the WEPTP was officially launched through a ceremony in Guiyang and West
Power began construction on Jinsha, Xishui, Qianbei and Nayong thermal plants.216
During this transitional period, the top five executives of GPPC, the provincial
SOE firm, held similarly senior positions within Jinyuan, LLC, a private power
generation firm. This clear conflict of interest allowed these individuals to remain in their
210 Interview G6, G3, G15.
211 "guizhoujinvuan dianli youxian zeren gongsi
212 " guizhou gongshangju"
213 "guizhou jinvuan dianli touzi youxian zeren gongsi
214 "xidian gufen youxian gongsi
215 Xiang, p.496.
2 16 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/09/eng20001109_54698.html.
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government positions and operate a vertically integrated grid and generating market,
while also building up the competitive capacity of an independent firmnn that they owned.
Such an arrangement created considerable incentives to have the grid grant preferential
grid access to power generated by Jinyuan through dispatch ordering. The grid
employees at GPPC thus were able to improve the assets that they own (Jinyuan) and in
return gain wealth through ownership.
The Grabbing Hand from Above
2001 brought market changes that served to strengthen the position of firms in the
power generation industry, such as Jinyuan. First of all, electricity shortages began as
economic growth emerged from the stagnation of the Asian Financial Crisis. Second,
major infrastructure supporting projects relating to the "Develop the West", and
subsequently the WEPTP, began in earnest. Third, a shift in Guizhou coal investment
patterns allowed growth of mine mouth plants opening in Guizhou, which began to
reduce considerably plant production and transportation costs. As a result, on July 25,
2001 Guangdong governor Lu Ruihua led a delegation to Guizhou for a conference to
address the issue of "Guizhou Power to Guangdong" ("qiandian songyue"). The
estimates of transmission capacity additions were 1GW by 2002, 2GW by 2003, 3GW by
2004, and 4GW by 2005. An agreement entitled the "Guizhou-Guangdong Power
Purchase Agreement" ("qianyue liangsheng shougou dian hetong") was then signed by
Guangdong Power Group president Wang Yeping, GPPC president Xiang, and SPCC
Southern Company president Yuan Maozhen. 217
As the production capacity and revenue of Jinyuan grew, the State Power
Corporation of China (SPCC), which was the central government-owned parent company
217 Xiang, p.485.
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of GPPC, began to take an increasing interest in the reforms emerging from the Guizhou
electric power market. On April 26, 2001 the first direct conflict arose, in the form of a
directive from the SPCC unilaterally requiring parent company construction approval of
the Qianbei and Nayong plants already under construction. In subsequent discussions
between GPPC and the SPCC, it became clear that the SPCC sought a direct transfer of
30 percent ownership of both plants.2 18 Here it is significant to note that by October of
the following year the President of the SPCC, Gao Yan, had disappeared from China
under charges of corruption and abuse of state assets. In initial deliberations, the
president of GPPC, Xiang Dehong, refused to transfer any degree of ownership of the
plants, yet eventually agreed to cede controlling shares of Nayong Plant #2 and Yafu
plant for a total of 1.2GW capacity to a consortium of the SPCC and its partner Shandong
International Power, Ltd. 21 9 The SPCC reportedly countered that the terms had changed
and demanded a 51% share of all capacity under GPPC.220
By September 19, 2001, SPCC President Gao Yan had sent a corporate directive
to dispatch GPPC President Xiang to Sichuan province in an effort to increase leverage
over its provincial subsidiary, GPPC. A SPCC delegation was sent to Guiyang on
October 10, 2001. In the morning of October 11, Xiang Dehong began to present a report
to the convened group in the GPPC's meeting hall regarding the WEPTP work that had
been completed to date, the manner in which Guizhou was fulfilling the national
"Develop the West" campaign, and other construction progress. He was then interrupted
by the SPCC delegation head, who said this work was well known and that the matter of
218 Interviews G-9, B-27, G-4.
219 "shandong guoji dianyuan kaifa gufen youxian gongsi"
220 Jin Longkun, "Wo Kan Jinyuan", Zhongguo Dianli Qive Guanli, April, 2005 volume, p. 9; Xiang,
p.484.
the illegality of these projects had to be discussed immediately. The individual went
further, arguing that use of employee funds to provide equity for such projects was
irresponsible, as power investments were quite risky. One alternative, he argued, was
clear: an SPCC regional subsidiary, Guodian Power Development, Ltd.22 1 together with
Shandong International, Ltd. would divide controlling shares in both the Nayong and
Qianbei plants, as had been originally proposed by Gao Yan of the SPCC. Xiang Dehong
responded that he appreciated such financial assistance, but that financing had been
secured and no further partnerships were required to complete the plants.22  Despite
private negotiations that continued into the night, terms did not change and no agreement
was reached. Several forms of protracted negotiations continued fruitlessly through
November, 2001.
It is interesting to note that these technically "illegal" plants were continually
lauded by representatives of the central government throughout their construction, and
ribbon cutting ceremonies were often attended by such leaders. Despite lack of clarity
over ownership rights and asset allocation, the SPCC and the SDPC of the central
government sent delegates to the opening ceremonies of four thermal plants (Qianbei,
Nayong, Anshun, and Guiyang) through November, 2001.223 Such support continued,
and once scale began to ramp up quickly, on March 6, 2003 national leader and CCP
General Secretary (and former Guizhou Provincial Secretary) Hu Jintao visited Guiyang,
reinforcing the importance of electric power development in Guizhou. He stated: "For
Guizhou's economy to emerge and take flight, it will have to rely on the electric power
221 "guodian dianlifazhan gufen yoxian gongsi"
Zhang Shaojing, "Jinyuan zhilu", Zhoneguo Dianli Qive Guanli, May 2005 volume, p.38.
223 Jin Longkun, "Wo Kan Jinyuan", Zhongguo Dianli Qiye Guanli, April, 2005 volume, p. 9; Xiang,
p.4 90 .
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industry. Guizhou's electric power firms must grow and connect to related industries." 224
A week later, on March 15, 2003, Hu assumed the office of President of the PRC. Illegal
or not, central government and corporate representatives presided over much of the
expansion activities pursued by Jinyuan.
By November 26, 2001, the second phase of the WEPTP was launched through a
formal opening ceremony presided over by SDPC Vice Chairman Zhang Guobao,
Jinyuan president Xiang, Guizhou Party Secretary Qian Yunlu, Guizhou Governor Shi
Xiushi, and Guizhou Vice Governor Chen Dawei. On January 9, 2002 the director of the
SPCC Personnel Department flew to Guizhou with final papers ordering Xiang to
Sichuan. However, Xiang was still the president and party secretary of GPPC, and
therefore the party secretary of a provincial SOE. The transfer of an individual in such a
position required the parent SOE to consult with the party secretary of the province in
which the firm operates and is registered. In such cases there exists potential for
considerable conflict, as the head of the national level SOE corporate Organization
Department does not outrank the provincial party secretary. This double governance of
cadres (shuangguan ganbu) thus creates difficult problems to resolve between entities of
equal rank. Should disagreement persist, then the case must be reported up to the central
government Central Organization Department, which all parties understood would invite
widespread scrutiny of all transactions. In the case of Xiang Dehong's transfer, the
Guizhou Party Secretary Qian made it clear that Xiang would remain in Guizhou.
Third Round Industry Reform:
De- Verticalization as Threat, Move to Access Human Capital
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224 Xiang, p.549.
Such negotiations were taking place during a period of considerable central level
regulatory reforms, as discussed in part one of the chapter. In particular, talks of the third
round of reforms to de-verticalize the corporate structure of the power industry had
begun. The SPCC was soon to be dismantled (on December 29, 2002), and to lose its
semi-monopoly hold on power generation while reorganizing grid assets into a much
larger northern corporation and a smaller southern grid corporation. The same day that
final papers were handed to Xiang, GPPC's director of the General Office, Yuan
Maolong, received a call from Beijing reporting that Premier Zhu Rongji had convened
the State Council Office Committee 225 to discuss the institutional reform of the electric
power industry and put into effect the deverticalization of the SPCC. The clear indication
was that personnel and asset structures would be affected by this reorganization.
By June of 2002 Jinyuan had established Zhongshui Energy Development, Ltd.226
to manage the construction of smaller hydro plants, as well as the Yemazai and Qianxi
plants. On December 26, 2002 Jinyuan also registered Guizhou West Energy Power
Construction Ltd.227 This decision was motivated by the belief that the separation of
generation and grid assets (changwangfenkai) resulting from the de-verticalization of the
power industry may force GPPC to divest its generation assets to the newly carved out
"Big 5" regional SOEs such as Huaneng Group, and also lose the personnel and expertise
in the GPPC related to power production. For example, Huaneng was a commercial SOE
with regional reach and close ties to Beijing through the son of former premier Li Peng
and would not countenance employees working for local competitors such as Jinyuan.
225 guowuyuan bangonghui"
26 "zhongshui nengyuan fazhan youxian gongsi
227 "gizhou xineng dianli jianshe youxian gongsi
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This loss of knowledge and personnel presented a strategic consideration regarding the
future growth of Jinyuan.
Kuang Zhongxiong, vice president of infrastructure construction, argued that one
of the competitive capabilities of Jinyuan was the collection of human talent and
experience in thermal plant construction embedded in its employees. Kuang argued that
GPPC should pre-empt the third round of reform and register a new specialized limited
liability finn to maintain the employees - and their portfolio of skills - as well as key
finn assets under the roof of one firm. GPPC Office Director Yuan Maolong disagreed,
arguing that if the reforms were to create an infrastructure construction company out of
the assets of the Provincial Power Company, then having any state-owned assets still in
possession of the new company may contradict the legal requirements of the process of
"changing systems" (gaizhi). Yuan's recommendation was to have several non-SOE
firms invest in the creation of a new independent firm to create such a clean break and
allow employees of the Provincial Power Company's infrastructure construction
department to remain together in the new firm.228
Xiang approved of this approach and understood Yuan's fundamental logic. He
then arranged for Jinyuan and five other firms, including Zhongshui, Tianneng, West
Power, Tianda, and Xingneng, to co-invest RMB50 million towards the creation of
Guizhou West Energy Power Construction Ltd.229 As was the case with Jinyuan at its
inception, Xingneng's seven percent investment, or approximately RMB3.5 million, was
contributed directly by Xingneng employees. The new firm was registered through the
provincial government on December 26, 2002. By January, 2003 GPPC's construction
228 Interview G-3, G-11, G-1.
229 "xineng dianlijianshe youxian gongsi
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management department was dissolved and 86 workers (plus 20 retirees), their liabilities
and responsibilities, were transferred to the newly established West Power Company.
West Company became the third subsidiary under Jinyuan.
Jinyuan 's Impact on the Market. Integrating Coal and Power
Michael Eisner has noted the tendency of firms to internalize functions of the
market that are needed and under-supplied in rapidly expanding economies with
decentralized or fragmented governance. Eisner writes about the industrial firms in the
US Progressive Era, observing that firms: "integrated vertically, incorporating suppliers
of raw materials, wholesalers, and retailers and thus internalizing transactions that had
formerly taken place in markets...[i]ncreasingly, large corporations used these skills to
dominate industries and manage expansion and competition, threatening the highly
decentralized, locally based economies that had prevailed in earlier decades', 230 In
addition to revealing the ways in which firms use legal and corporate forms to respond to
national regulatory shifts, Jinyuan's evolution also highlights the important trend of
vertical integration among these newly emerging firms that continues to drive
consolidation of China's electric power market. As a Jinyuan vice president directly
stated, through the vertical integration that Jinyuan achieved during its growth, "the firm
was able to internally model many of the critical management mechanisms provided by a
(normally functioning) market".231
By 2002, Jinyuan's growth in electric power capacity, combined with the national
economic recovery, resulted in heightened demand for local coal in Guizhou. However,
3o Michael Eisner, Regulatolvy Politics in Transition, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press),
2000, p. 29
231 "ba qive neibu nioni shichang wei hexin de guanli tixi vunzuo de xiangdang chengshu ", Xiang, p.529.
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due to a highly fragmented market and the historically small scale of coal producers in
the province, coal supply investments had not kept pace with power investments, and
began to lag in the region, resulting in initial fuel shortages. Many provincial
governments began to remedy the imbalance by instituting a "Big Coal Guarantees Big
Power" (damei bao dadian) policy in an effort to signal to firms that investment was
needed upstream in the power industry. By early 2002, Guizhou lacked about 2 percent
or 1 million tonnes of coal, and forfeited approximately 2 billion kWh of power that
could have been produced. Each kWh earned about RMB5, resulting in over RMB10
billion lost in revenue for generators because of a lack of adequate coal supply.
Eager to resolve the supply chain challenge, Jinyuan established on March 28,
2003 Guizhou Nengfa Power and Fuel Development, Ltd. 232 The new firm had
registered capital of RMB80 million, and Jinyuan became the largest shareholder, with a
35% stake. The companies of West Power, Zhongshui, Xingneng and Tianneng held a
respective 30%, 20% 10% and 5%.233 This amount was later supplied with additional
rounds of equity. China Development Bank provided the loan of RMB8.6 billion, largely
due to Guizhou's pivotal role in the nationally supported WEPTP. The loan was used to
finance the province's major power projects that served this project, including the
Dongfeng Hydropower Station, the Hongjiadu Hydropower Station, the Suofengying
Hydropower Station, the Nayong Power Plant, the Anshun Power Plant and the Panxian
Power Plant. Jinyuan Power received RMB2.2 bln of this loan for its Nayong Power
232 Xiang, p. 5 15. "guizhou nengfa dianli ranliao kaifa youxian gongsi"
233 Interfax China Business News, "Nengfa Power Fuel Development Company Founded in Guizhou",
April 2, 2003.
147
Plant, Qianbei Power Plant, Nayong Second Power Plant, Qianxi Power Plant and
Dafang Power Plant. 234
This integration upstream proved to be particularly useful to Jinyuan, given the
highly fragmented structure of the provincial coal market and the small scale of the firms
that dominated over three quarters of the provincial market.235 Nengfa Power and Fuel
Development Co. was entrusted with the responsibility to acquire controlling stakes in
two companies (Jinhong and Jinyi), as well as the Shenxianpo Coal mine. Meanwhile, the
company was also tasked to acquire stakes in the four coal mines of Qinglong, Fa'er,
Wulunshan and Linhua, as well as in the Guizhou Provincial Coal Resources Prospecting
and Development Company. Here the newly created private firmnn was using its capital to
acquire stakes in state-owned assets, this time in coal resources.
Jinyuan's coal strategy gained clarity and critical momentum through a June 11,
2003 Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) notice entitled "Management Forms of
Rights Relating to Mine Exploration, Use, Bidding and Auctioning". 236 The notice
explained how new regulations regarding the exploration, exploitation, bidding for,
auctioning of, and overall management of coal would take effect in August, 2003.
Executives at Jinyuan understood that coal costs were continuing to rise under combined
conditions of greater demand and the closing of many mines under the strengthening
environmental regulatory regime. It therefore became clear that the firm must identify as
234 Interfax China Business News, "CDB Grants USD 1.04 billion Loan to Fund Guizhou's WEPTP",
March 27, 2003.
235 Guizhou Statistical Yearbook, 2004.
231 MLR [2003] No. 197 (June 11, 2003). "tankuangquan caikuangquan zhaobiao paimai guapai guanli
banfa".
148
many enclosures of coal as possible, obtain provincial SDPC approval on such sources,
and lock in the resources before the regulatory changes took effect. 237
The strategy for a latecomer to the energy market such as Jinyuan was
straightforward. Mines with annual production of 1 million tonnes and above had already
been partitioned and were owned by either the provincial power finn itself or the major
coal producing firms. Mines with annual capacity of 300,000 tonnes and below were
fairly low in number, posed the regulatory risk of being eventually shut down, often
proved difficult to bring to scale, and were owned by a vast array of entities ranging from
fanning individuals, TVEs, SOEs, and other hybrid finns. A third category of mines,
with annual production of 450-600,000 tonnes, had been left fairly untouched. 2 3 The
largest mine operators were unwilling to work them and the smaller mine operators were
unable to do so, lacking the financial resources. The rush to "enclose/partition coal"
(quanmei) resources was only heightened when other firms began to mimic actions
undertaken by Jinyuan in the spring of 2003.
Representatives of Jinyuan traveled to 16 counties in six separate
cities/prefectures between May and July, 2003. In one month one particular executive
traveled 12,000 km in his Audi, averaging about 400km a day visiting prospective mine
acquisitions, and by July had obtained use rights for reserves of over 1 billion tonnes of
coal development. 2 39 By 2004 Nengfa Ltd. had completed applications for 15 mines, with
9 mines under construction and an annual capacity of 37.15 million tonnes under full or
partial ownership. Nengfa also held three rounds of shares expansion to raise necessary
237 By 2003 the SDPC had been renamed the National Development and Reform Commission, or NDRC.
Xiang, p.516.
28 Interviews G-9, G-2, G-16, B-29. Referenced in Xiang, p.516.
239 Xiang, p.517.
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financing for the construction of such facilities, with total registered capital rising to over
RMB510 million by 2005.240
Environmental Regulation as Opportunity: Diversification into FGD Licensing
Provincial level environmental regulations were also beginning to take shape in
June, 2003, particularly in relation to the WEPTP. The Guizhou NDRC issued regulation
No. 9, entitled "Opinions Regarding the Next Step in Expediting Guizhou's WEPTP
Engineering Construction Projects". 241 Specifically, this regulation called for the
"serious implementation of environmental controls" in "top of stack" sulfur reduction and
the use of low sulfur coal in all first-phase WETPT thermal units located outside the
original southern acid rain zone delineated by national environmental regulation in 1996.
In addition, second phase thermal projects (the six thermal or "liu huo" projects), were
mandated to install flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) equipment." 24 2 Faced with tightening
environmental restrictions, Xiang's reaction was to supply this new market by creating a
firm that focused on the manufacture of environmental equipment. The firm, named
Guizhou Xingyun Environmental Engineering Ltd., was established in May, 2004.243
Xiang organized eight affiliate firms to invest a total of RMB50 million in capital. On
March 16, 2005 Jinyuan Group formally invested another RMB30 million to establish a
37.5% controlling share. 244 GPPC's vice Chief Engineer and Director of Planning
became the new company's president.
Before Guizhou Xingyun had been established, there were a handful of FGD
projects in Guizhou. The Anshun plant had installed two units with FGD equipment, the
240 Interviews G-9, G-19, G21.
241 "guanyu jinyibu jiakuai wosheng xidian dongsong gongchengjianshe de yifian"
242 Interviews G-2, G-17, G-14, G-10; Xiang, p.519.
243 "guizhou xingyun huanbao gongcheng youxian gongsi
244 Xiang, p.521,522.
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Yafu plant had four units installed, and the Guiyang plant had two more units installed
for a total of eight in the entire province. However, the first large scale FGD project was
an installation for the Pannan plant (4x600MW) in June 2004. This project was co-
invested by Yuedean Power in Guangdong (55 percent) and Jinyuan's West Power
Company (45 percent). In a second round of major projects the following year, five firms
had bid for the work, including firms from Sichuan province. Xingyun won the bid, and
the six plant project to install FGD at Nayong plant #2 units 1-4, Qianxi plant units 1-4,
Pannan plant units 3-4, Dafang plant units 3-4, and Yemazai plant units 1-3 for a total of
RMB1.8 billion.245 By the end of 2005, there were seven projects under construction,
installing a total 4.65GW of capacity with FGD equipment. 246
Xingyun had, by the end of 2005, invested RMB408 million in FGD projects and
realized profits of over RMB25 million. Estimated 2006 investment was RMB609
million. There were two strategies regarding how to enter the FGD business. Many of
Jinyuan's executives, through their work at GPPC, were aware that developed economies
had began to regulate sulfur dioxide decades before, and that the technology was
therefore quite mature abroad and that costs had lowered significantly. The first option
was naturally to buy whole sets of FGD equipment and import them to China. Each set
would cost about RMB40 million. Each separate unit would cost approximately RMB2-3
million. To purchase eight projects' worth would cost an estimated RMB 100 million.247
The second, ultimately more viable option, was to tender bids for foreign firms to
participate, and pay through a technology licensing agreement.
245 Interviews B-23, G-17, G-10, B-18; Xiang, p.525.
246 Xiang, p.523.
247 Interviews G-18, G-2, B-39, G-8; Xiang, p.524.
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In order to expedite the importation of FGD technology, rather than wait for
World Bank or Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) financing as in the
past, Xingyun decided to tender bids for the FGD work, and nine foreign firms
participated. By December, 2005 Jinyuan had selected the German firm "Steinmuller
Engineering GmbH" for the project and by the spring of 2006 work had begun and
licensing agreements concluded. Lacking extensive knowledge of FGD technology
licensing, Xingyun identified a JV firm, Zhejiang Zhaoxing German Energy
Environmental Equipment Company, 248 and together they founded Zhejiang German
Environmental Innovation and Technology Ltd. 24 9 Xingyun then bought another
provincial state-owned asset, the Guizhou Boiler factory on December 20, 2005 for
RMB18.8 million and began plans to enter the Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP) market to
round out the firm's portfolio of coal fired power plant environmental mitigation assets
and capabilities. 250
Jinyuan would go on to emphasize the diversification of its portfolio throughout
2005. The change in name from "Electric Power Corporation" to "Investment
Corporation" symbolized this shift in strategy and direction. While the generation of
power would remain the core of business activities, investments increasingly diversified
assets under management and in the group's name through subsidiary firms. In sum,
Jinyuan vertically integrated upstream into coal production, downstream into chemicals,
and the production of specialized power production equipment, the licensing of
environmental mitigation equipment, limited forays into medicine and real estate
development, and laterally through the opening of an electric power operations and
248 "zhejiang zhaoxing deneng huanbao jianbei gongsi"
249 Interviews G- 16, G-1, G- 19; Xiang, p.521,526. "Zhejiang dechuang huanbao keji youxian gongsi
250 "guizhou guolu chang"
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management specialization arm. This last firm did not own outright the generation asset,
but was a service finn that operated and maintained the plants of other competitor firms
like Huadian. Jinyuan had already met its 2005 goal of exceeding RMB10billion by
2007 and seeks to double this figure by 2010.
The stated rationale motivating the drive to diversify was the perceived need for
such a variety of services and activities to support Guizhou's comprehensive
development plan. This need was joined by internal firm projections that forecast an
electric power glut by mid-2008 that would adversely affect earnings, and a perceived
international opportunity to license FGD technology to serve the needs of other plants as
Chinese environmental regulations began to be enforced in the near to medium term.
Each subsidiary approached the diversification in a different way. West Power became
involved in the iron industry, Zhongshui became involved in new building materials and
diesel production industries, while Nengfa entered the coal production industry and
Xingyun the environmental mitigation equipment licensing business. Xineng diversified
further afield into real estate through the Guizhou Yuanlong Real Estate Development
Company25' which was 70 percent owned by Xineng, 20 percent owned by Shenghua
Resource Company252 and 10 percent owned by Xingyun. 253
"Cleaning Up " after Reform
Asset Consolidation
Jinyuan combined this diversification strategy with a drive to consolidate the
firm's thermal asset portfolio. On April 19, 2005 Jinyuan Group established Guizhou
Jinyuan Power Operations Ltd., with registered capital of RMB 100 million, later raised to
251 Guizhou Yuanlong Fangdichan Kaifa Youxian Gongsi
252 Shenghua Yuan Gongsi
253 Xiang, p.541.
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180 million.254 Jinyuan Group held a 50% controlling share of the firm. All of the
thermal power assets of Jinyuan Group (Jinyuan Jituan), West Power (Xi Dian), and
Zhongshui were transferred to Guizhou Jinyuan Power Operations (both 100% controlled
assets and partially controlled assets), while Jinyuan Group maintained their Production
and Operations department. 255 Having consolidated thermal assets that had been under
full control of the Jinyuan Group subsidiary firms, Jinyuan then turned to negotiate the
acquisition of the many plants in which Jinyuan had partial ownership. The first critical
target was the Yafu plant (at the time owned 49 percent by West Power and 51 percent by
the "Big 5" SOE Guodian Group). Jinyuan and Guodian Group signed a partnership
agreement in September, 2005, entrusting the Yafu assets to the newly established
Guizhou Jinyuan Power Operations Ltd. Yafu LLC 256 signed the specific trust agreement
with Guizhou Jinyuan Power Operations Ltd., entitled " Yafu fadianchang weituo yunxing
weihuji shengchan guanli hetong".2S 7 The success of this partnership led to other plant
assets being entrusted to Jinyuan by other major power producers, such as the Pannan
plant by Yuedean Power Group in 2006 (45 percent ownership by West Power, 55
percent by Yuedean).
In all, by 2006 a total of eight plants were being managed by Jinyuan Group, even
though not all were directly majority-owned by Jinyuan. Plants online by 2006 totaled a
capacity of 7.74GW, with another 10.14GW under agreement to be managed by
Jinyuan. 258 A vice president of Guizhou Jinyuan Power Operations Ltd. explained that
the creation of the firm aided greatly in the delineation of profits, debt, and property
254 "guizhou jinyvuan fadian yunying youxian gongsi
2 ',invuan jituan gongsi shengchan yunvingbu"256 ')yqfitfadian youxian zeren gongsi"
257 ',afit fadian weituo yunxing weihu ji shengchan guanli hetong"258 Interfax China Business News; Xiang, p.528.
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rights over assets. Liabilities and assets had been confused during the rapid expansion of
Jinyuan Group and its subsidiaries along the power value chain. As a result, the power
operations firm was able both to clarify rights to such assets, and also to improve the
coordination between different segments of the production chain that were now under the
ownership of Jinyuan. While before Jinyuan's vertical integration mines and plants were
continually operating with asymmetric information and large scale gaming through
shortages and delays, Jinyuan was able to mitigate most of this inefficiency through such
integration.
By the time the State Council directive relating to the reorganization of the power
sector had been issued, the implementation of separating grid assets from generation
assets had begun (fadian zichan chongzu fangan).2 59 Eleven new companies had been
created out of the monopoly SPCC. In Guizhou, the reform split the electric power value
chain as well. Grid assets were transferred to the Southern Grid Company, while the
thermal and hydro assets were transferred to two of the newly independent "Big 5" power
generation SOEs - Huadian and Guodian Groups. There was initial confusion, as Jinyuan
by this point was technically classified as a state-owned shareholding corporation.
However, as Jinyuan successfully argued, the firm had by design been established
without state electric power assets before the reform, and was therefore left untouched.
It was still clear to many that Jinyuan's position was not altogether without risk of
regulatory investigation in the future.
Rationalizing Posts and Switching "Red Hats"
As a result, on October 20, 2004 the Guizhou Party Secretary met with Xiang
Dehong to discuss a proposal. The Secretary argued that it would be prudent for Jinyuan
259 "fadian zichan chongzu fangan"
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to accept a capital infusion of approximately RMB40 million directly from the Guizhou
provincial government, for three main reasons. 260 First, the Secretary explained that such
an infusion, equaling two percent of total firm capitalization, would transform Jinyuan's
legal classification. Without state investment, Jinyuan would remain classified as a
"Shareholder Enterprise with Natural Person Investors as the Base".261 With a modicum
of state investment, Jinyuan would transform into a "State Participant Investor (Relative
Controlling) Blended Ownership Enterprise with Diversified Investors as the Base". 262
This change in legal status, the secretary argued, would not only provide some political
capital, should the central government question the presence of a large private firm
operating in a "backbone" industry, but would also legally expedite the planned evolution
into a corporate Group (jituan gongsi). This reclassification occurred six months later on
April 28, 2005, with Jinyuan's name changed to Guizhou Jinyuan Shareholding Group,
Ltd.2 63
Second, the Secretary argued that the senior executives of GPPC should not
simultaneously hold positions in both Jinyuan and the provincial power company. These
individuals were either to remain in the provincial power company or transfer to Jinyuan.
This simultaneous posting had already caused an excess of corruption accusations, media
attention, and inquiries from the central government.
Third, the Secretary reminded Xiang that it was unclear how long the provincial
party secretary would remain in his current position. A limited measure of local state
ownership in the firm would more clearly align the interests of the new Secretary with the
260 Xiang, p.534.
261 
-iranren wei chuzi zhuti de gufenzhi qive
262 guovou cangu (xiangdui konggu) de duovuan touzi zhuti hunhe suoj'ouzhi qive
263 'guizhou jinyuan jituan gufen youxian gongsi"
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firm in institutional terms, and thus allow Jinyuan the independence to operate in the
province. 264
After the discussion, Xiang agreed to the terms. At the time, Xiang was Party
Secretary and President of GPPC, while simultaneously holding the post of Chairman of
Jinyuan. Xiang was therefore concurrently the legal representative of both firms. Kuang
Zhongxiong was a vice president of the provincial power company while also a vice
chairman and the party secretary of Jinyuan. Wang He served as both a vice president of
the provincial power company and a vice party secretary of Jinyuan. Sun Zhaoai served
as the Party Discipline Committee Secretary and the chairman of the labor union of the
provincial power company while also a vice party secretary of Jinyuan. Yuan Maolong
served as the provincial power company's assistant inspector and a vice chairman of
Jinyuan. Xiang considered options for personnel transfer and decided that he, along with
Kuang Zhongxiong and Yuan Maolong, would all move to Jinyuan, thus relinquishing
their posts at the provincial power company. Wang He and Sun Zhaoai would remain at
the provincial power company. Xiang then submitted his plan to the provincial party
secretary.
On November 25, 2004 the provincial government handed down its official reply
(pihui), approving the transfer and the planned provincial government purchase of a stake
in Jinyuan. On November 29 the Jinyuan board of directors convened and voted to take
specific steps according to the conversation between the party secretary and Xiang. First,
Jinyuan would accept the provincial investment in Jinyuan. Importantly, this would
allow the provincial Organization Department to review and inspect (kaocha) the new
Jinyuan senior executive positions, and would require the Shareholder Board and Board
264 Interviews G-17, G-4, G-14, B-29, B-31.
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of Directors to submit the list of names to the provincial organization department.
Second, Jinyuan would also be required to vote in the newly selected leaders, according
to the new name list and the vote of the Shareholder Board and Board of Directors. By
December 2, 2004 Xiang had flown to Guangzhou to inform the Southern Grid of these
decisions. On December 31, 2004 the Guizhou Party Standing Committee approved the
new list of names submitted by the provincial Organization Department. On January 1 1,
2005 Jinyuan shareholder meetings voted in this new list of Jinyuan senior executives. 265
The Guizhou provincial governor participated in the meeting and triumphantly
announced that Jinyuan "responded to the government's call [to develop resources for the
'Develop the West' Campaign]". 266
These developments in Guizhou were occurring while related discussions were
emerging within the central government. Many of Jinyuan's finance and ownership
status aspects were legitimated by regulatory proclamations from the central government.
In February, 2005 the State Council promulgated a new regulation, entitled "Opinions
Concerning the Encouragement, Support, and Guiding of Individually Owned and
Privately Operated Non-state Economic Development". 267 By the spring of 2005, even
China's president Hu Jintao visited Guizhou, stating: "Guizhou is facing a precious
opportunity to build a 'Middle Class' (xiaokang) society and to fully realize the 'Develop
the West' directive - every group must strive to grasp this opportunity and strive to
realize this historically significant economic and social development." 268 On April 20,
265 Xiang, p.536.
266 Xiang, p.548.
267 NDRC [2005] No.3 (February 19, 2005). Zhang Shaojing, "Jinyuan zhilu", Zhongguo Dianli Qive
Guanli, May 2005 volume, p.38. "guanyu guli zhichi he yindao geti saying deng feigongvouzhijingji
fazhan de ruogan yiijian
268 Xiang, p.539.
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2005 Jinyuan had successfully requested to be reclassified as a Shareholding Ltd fimn,
and its subsidiaries had been clearly and legally delineated; included were; West Power,
Zhongshui, Xineng, Nengfa, Fadian Yunying, and Xingyun.
Different Firm Decisions, Different Models of State Assertion
Jinyuan's rapid growth and significant contribution to both the WEPTP and the
development of China's southwestern energy base occurred through a careful and
deliberate series of decisions by the former executives of the provincial power SOE to
strengthen the ownership of a private firm and its operational independence from central
government and central SOE involvement. This considerable feat was accomplished
through clear delineation of initial private capital sources to establish a private firm, a
commitment to building this firm through new physical capital in the form of generating
plants that were not transferred from the provincial SOE, the movement of skilled labor
from the SOE to the new firm, and the blurring of government and enterprise roles
through the early dual role of provincial SOE executives also serving as executives in the
private firm. Throughout this process Jinyuan very much engaged central regulators,
capitalized upon pending and promulgated central and provincial regulation relating to
corporate and energy reform, and profited from guided provincial protectionism. The
firm's legal status evolved according to the evolution of corporate regulation in Beijing.
The firm's investment and ownership decisions evolved in anticipation of energy industry
reforms that were simultaneous with major infrastructure development projects in the
form of the eventual "Develop the West" program. This institutional evolution produced
a firm governed by a diverse shareholding structure that included nearly 30,000 electric
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power employees, the provincial government's SASAC, and the former chairman and
senior executives of the provincial power generating SOE.
On December 28, 2008 much of this independence seemed to have been lost in a
graduated wave of nationalization by the central government. In February, 2008 the
Luneng Group of Shandong province, discussed in the subsequent chapter, had been
effectively nationalized. The private firm's assets had been transferred back to the
provincial electric power SOE that had once been the parent firm of Luneng. Nearly a
year later, Jinyuan appeared to suffer the same fate, in the fonn of a majority purchase of
Luneng shares by a listed "Big 5" SOE - the China Power Investment Corporation (CPI).
However, Beijing's approach to the two private firrns was in reality quite different,
reflecting a nuanced approach by the state that accounted for the critically different
models of corporatization and growth that these two firms represented.
First, Jinyuan and its assets were not transferred back to the provincial electric
power SOE from which it emerged. While Luneng's assets were dismantled and returned
to the ownership and operational control of Shandong Provincial Power Company, in
contrast Jinyuan remained a shareholding finn with its assets intact and none of its assets
or operations transferred to the Guizhou Provincial Power Company. Employee shares
were indeed diluted to approximately 40 percent of the firm, but remained in place.
SASAC itself acknowledged the critical importance of Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOP) in linking SOE employee performance and incentives, citing the success of
Jinyuan in power generation growth and the quality of its assets. 2 69 This proved to be
more than rhetoric, and SASAC matched such words with policy action. By the first half
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269 Interview B-28, B-27.
of 2006 over 80 percent (152 of SASAC's 187 firmns) of China's central state owned
SOEs had either began or completed non-tradable share reform similar to the path
adopted by Jinyuan, with the ultimate aim to list shares on both mainland stock
markets. 270 Within this period, profits for these firms rose by 16 percent and sales
revenue 21 percent year-on-year.
Second, the level of ownership concentration within Jinyuan remained lower than
that of Luneng. While over 95 percent of Luneng had been sold back to the provincial
power company and affiliated entities, and eventually the Huaneng Group itself, only 60
percent of Jinyuan was sold, thus allowing considerable voice and voting rights to remain
with the SOE employees who were original owners of the firm. Much of the original cast
of stakeholders remained, including the Guizhou provincial government, firm employees,
and several competing firms whose plants Jinyuan had been operating under service
agreements in trust. Major decisions of asset management and disposal, employee
compensation, merger and acquisition execution, will continue to be discussed at
shareholder board meetings and these meetings continue to include a diverse set of
institutional and corporate interests rather than the interests of one listed "Big 5" SOE.
Third, it is important to note the nature of the process by which a subset of
Jinyuan shares were purchased. The firm's senior executives had begun in 2007,
immediately following the much-publicized purchase of Luneng by Huaneng Group and
the transfer to SPPC, to search for potential partners among larger power producers
operating in southern China. On September 27, 2008 Jinyuan shareholders approved a
framework agreement that outlined how China Resources Power, a Hong Kong listed
270 China Daily, "SOEs to get stock incentive plan", August 16, 2006, p. 9 .
lttp://wwi vt.ciin ailv.cn/bizchina/2006-08/16content 665865.htn
energy firm, would purchase a majority stake in Jinyuan. Jinyuan by this point
understood that ESOPs with very low levels of government ownership or other SOE
ownership were being reexamined by the central state. As the business magazine Caijing
has reported, the execution of these negotiations delayed considerably when Jinyuan
executives argued that China Resources should finance the construction of a railway link
between Guangzhou and Guiyang as part of their purchase agreement. As a result of this
discussion, negotiations stalled. CPI executives stated that they had been jockeying for
Jinyuan's assets since 2007, competing against other major SOE power producers such as
Datang and Huadian.27' Jinyuan entered into talks with CPI only after the breakdown of
the framework agreement with China Resources Power, eventually agreeing to a
negotiated purchasing price and level of shares that was then approved by Jinyuan
shareholders on December 27, 2008.
The 60 percent purchase of Jinyuan was the result of pressure exerted by the
central government, perhaps most importantly through formal channels in the
promulgation of a joint temporary "opinion" by SASAC, NDRC, Ministry of Finance
(MOF), and State Electricity Reform Commission (SERC) in March of 2008 that outlined
official concern specifically regarding electricity assets owned by electricity
employees. 272 However, the pressure remained indirect and the purchase of Jinyuan
assets preserved the productive assets of the firm, enabled the continued separation of the
firm from the provincial SOE also producing power, and maintained the overall corporate
governance structure, which continues to include a diverse set of stakeholders. Jinyuan
271 Caijing, "Buyout Unplugs Another ESOP Power Firm", January 7, 2009.
272 Joint Opinion No. 37, SASAC, NDRC, MOF, SERC, "Guanvu guifan dianli xitong zhigong touziJfidian
qiye de yijian", March 19, 2008.
162
was viewed by the central state as a new type of hybrid firm produced by reform that
proved invaluable to economic growth in one of China's poorest provinces, the critical
source of electricity for an expanding and energy-starved Guangdong province, and the
major actor negotiating and planning long term infrastructure needs and execution of the
WEPTP. The assets of the firm had been expanded without direct physical asset
stripping from the provincial SOE historically generating the bulk of electric power in the
province. The demand for environmental mitigation equipment (primarily FGD) among
power producers, mandated by central state regulation, was also being served by the firm.
Finally, aspects of the employee shareholding reform model were being adopted by
SASAC itself among the over 150 firms under its authority, in an effort to improve
performance and incentives among executives.
China's corporate landscape in the traditionally state dominated energy sector has
been transformed by over two decades of corporate and industry reform. Power
generation assets have been corporatized according to a range of models, and blistering
growth in output was accomplished through a piecemeal regulatory approach that
allowed significant dispersion of capital investment and ownership to sub-central and
non-state entities. As the industry chapter of this study illustrated, the result is a power
supply in which the "Big Five" SOE firms produced by the breakup of the state
monopoly still produce under 50 percent of national installed capacity. The current
economic downturn and short-term relief of pressure on energy demand are providing an
opportunity for the central state to attempt consolidation in the industry. However, the
central state has recognized the variation in China's energy landscape and has chosen to
treat consolidation on a firm-by-firm basis, producing a variety of approaches. As the
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subsequent chapter illustrates, Luneng Group corporatized according to a model that
stripped physical assets and therefore produced a rather different result once
nationalization was attempted.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Case Two
The Luneng Group: A Local Firm's Nationalization
Introduction
This study's first case analyzed how the Jinyuan Group successfully grew by
executing one of China's largest industrial policy drives in the reform era and how it
negotiated central-level corporate efforts and central-level government efforts to
nationalize its assets, emerging reformed but with much of its assets, personnel and
corporate ownership structure intact. The case provided a firm-level of analysis to
illustrate how local firms responded over time to waves of consolidation and regulatory
change at the national level, and how firm strategies created opportunities for
independent growth. Jinyuan's executives were able to establish a SOE employee-owned
firm with private capital and local government support that rose to become the largest
power provider involved in the West to East Transmission Project and in Guizhou itself,
providing over 55 percent of the province's electricity by 2007.
In Case Two of this study, the firm-level of analysis is again employed to
illustrate how the same national trends and regulatory changes were negotiated by a
similarly large local firm in the electric power generation industry, with results that
differed in important respects. The Luneng Group's executives also established a SOE
employee-owned firm that included private capital that rose to become the 12th largest
power firm in China. Like Jinyuan, Luneng and its assets evolved over time, adopting a
range of legal and corporate forms depending on the phase of consolidation or
decentralization the industry was experiencing as economic growth rates varied.
However, while Jinyuan remained a viable corporate entity during the most recent round
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of consolidation, Luneng was dismantled and merged with its former provincial SOE.
Its operations were placed under the authority of the Shandong Provincial Power
Company and its ownership was eventually transferred to the largest of the "Big Five"
SOE power generating firmnns - Huaneng Group. In contrast, Jinyuan remains a hybrid
firm owned by a range of entities, including private individuals, a provincial government,
and the smallest of the listed "Big Five" SOE power generating firms. Its governance
structure, executives, and legal status remained intact. While 80 percent of Luneng's
shares were eventually sold to a SOE owned by the central government, 40 percent of
Jinyuan's shares remained in the hands of its original shareholders. Put simply, Luneng's
physical, financial and human assets, as well as its governance, legal status and
operations were transferred to a major SOE owned by the central government while
Jinyuan's corresponding assets and structure remained largely intact. Variation in the
evolution of these firms has led the central state to treat the consolidation and
"nationalization" process of each type of firm quite differently.
The pairing of these two case studies accomplishes two objectives. First, it
provides detailed evidence of the mechanisms and channels through which the national
regulatory and institutional reforms discussed in Chapter Two influence local firm
decisions - and therefore shape the organization of the electric power generation industry.
Second, the cases provide detailed evidence of the variation in local level outcomes that
these changes can produce, largely as a result of the firm's historical decisions relating to
the management of physical assets and investment strategies. The variation in outcome
highlights, on a firm level, the main theoretical point of the time series national data
presented in Chapter Two. The aggressive decentralization of ownership and investment
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away from the central government does not preclude subsequent reassertion of the central
government as a major actor in the restructuring of the industry, even through those very
same levers. Moreover, these periods of reassertion largely tend to occur during
economic slowdowns in which energy shortages are alleviated, central bureaucracies are
consolidated, and major incumbent SOEs support the consolidation or shuttering of
local/private/foreign competitors. However, while some firms are able to prosper and
persist through such periods of reassertion, others are unable to negotiate and their assets
are consolidated.
This case study will provide both points of comparison and contrast to the Jinyuan
case, and will highlight how both firms pursued similar strategies in human and financial
asset management to take advantage of regulatory and institutional reforms during
periods of high economic growth (particularly when growth is nine percent or more). It
will also argue that a critical early difference lay in the way in which physical capital was
managed by these two firms, eventually leading to the variation in ownership outcome.
In the case of Jinyuan, state-owned generating plants owned by Guizhou Provincial
Power Company (a SOE firm) were never transferred to the ownership of Jinyuan (an
initially private firm). These assets remained under the ownership of Guizhou Provincial
Power Company, allowing the SOE to maintain its power generation levels of output
despite the creation of the private firm. In contrast, Luneng began immediately to move
state-owned assets in the form of generating plants from the ownership of the Shandong
Provincial Power Company (a SOE finm) to the ownership of what eventually was named
Luneng Group (a mixed SOE/private shareholding firm). In addition, unlike Jinyuan,
once Luneng had grown to considerable size and was yielding major profits, Luneng
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executives forced their employees to sell their shares of the firm to two opaque private
investors without any transparent market clearing price mechanism or negotiation with
shareholders. 2 7 3 In contrast, Jinyuan's original employee shareholders remained owners
throughout Jinyuan's rise.
Similar Foundations
Upon initial examination the Luneng Group of 2009, like the Jinyuan Group of
2009, appears to be a traditional SOE in a traditional sector. Like Jinyuan, Luneng is
majority owned by a state-owned parent firm and also is the largest electricity producer in
its province. While Jinyuan's initial reliance on private capital and majority private
ownership at first seem to be an aberration for this "back-bone" industry, the founders of
Luneng, a state-owned giant, began under circumstances (and with needs) quite similar to
those of Jinyuan. More importantly, critical steps pursued by the founders of Jinyuan
were also pursued by the founders of Luneng. Financial capital was raised through the
same channels; namely employee contributions that provided seed capital and attracted
subsequent state bank loans. Human capital and regulatory resources were utilized in the
same manner, through the transfer of key personnel from the provincial state-owned firm
to the newly established private firm and the simultaneous holding of executive posts in
both the old state-owned and new private firms. In such a manner, the largest energy
firm in China's poorest province and the largest energy firm in one of its richest
provinces raised early capital through private means and established majority privately-
owned firms as vehicles of rapid growth to meet racing energy demands in their own and
273 In fact, 3 firms originally refused to sell, and told Caijing magazine that they were effectively forced to
do so. Two of three firms were electricity construction firms. See Caijing, "Shei de Luneng? ", January 8,
2007.
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their neighboring provinces. 274 Perhaps most importantly, the raising of private capital
through employees and the subsequent creation of subsidiary holding finns also served as
an attempt to capture ownership of local energy assets, mostly in the form of power
generation plants, during periods of high economic growth. Partial ownership through
further subsidiary creation was then pursued to insulate such assets from transfer to the
central government during periods of economic slowdown.
As discussed in previous chapters, the pluralization of investment channels that
began with the regulatory reforms of the mid- to late 1980s resulted in a complex range
of ownership structures in China's electric power generation industry. In 1984, the "CPC
Central Committee Decision on Reform in the Economic Structure" encouraged the
development of various types of cooperative ventures owned by the "whole-people"
(quanmin) the collective (jiti), or the individual (getihu).275 Since then, categories of
ownership have diversified along with an evolving economy in gradual phases. First, a
system of single ownership transformed into a multi-ownership system with collectively
or privately-owned enterprises supplementing the core economy owned by the "whole-
people". Second, through the introduction of enterprise shareholding, a variety of
ownership elements were allowed to coexist within one enterprise, encompassing central
state shares, local state shares, other enterprise shares, and private shares owned by
274 The decision to pursue private capital and establish private firms, particularly in an industry long
dominated by state-owned enterprises and public funds, is noteworthy given the well-documented
discrimination private entrepreneurs and private firms have encountered in China. For most recent
formulation please see Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and
the State, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
275 Liu Hongru, "Probe for A Correct Path - Questions on the Experiments in Joint Stock Companies and
Stock Market", Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige [China's Economic Structure Reform], June 23, 1992.
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individuals. 276 This shareholder form of economic entity is captured by the category
"other" in Shandong's provincial fixed asset investment data, seen in Figure 27.
Figure 27. Shandong Province Total Investment in Fixed Assets by Ownership
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Source: China Data Online, 2009.
This variety of ownership forms is also evident in the fact that employee-owned
firms with Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) emerged in geographies and areas
of economic development as diverse as Guizhou and Shandong. The Jinyuan Group
developed in Guizhou, an interior province and China's poorest. The Luneng Group took
root in the nation's second richest province, Shandong, located on the coast. 277 Other
ESOP firms have emerged in Sichuan, Hunan, Ningxia, and several other provinces. The
scale of such firms is also evident when one considers that even in wealthy Shandong,
Luneng Group has emerged to become the province's largest firm. Luneng's total assets
grew to be larger than Huaneng Power International, Air China, and Baoshan Iron and
276 See Shanghai Securities Transaction Regulations (Nov. 27, 1990), in FBIS Daily Report - China, Dec.
20, 1990; see also Shanghai Shi Gufen You Xian Gongsi Zanxing Guiding (May 18, 1992), in Zhongguo
Gushi Zonglan.
277 National Bureau of Statistics, Shandong Statistical Yearbook, 2008.
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Steel in the mid 2000s. With a diversified portfolio that ranges from electric power
generation to real estate, not unlike the portfolio that Jinyuan eventually built, Luneng
Group's total assets equaled RMB 73.81 billion in 2005.278 Luneng's total revenue
equaled RMB26 billion by the end of 2006 and by the end of 2007 its electric power
subsidiary (Shandong Luneng Development Corporation) was ranked the 12th largest
power generating firm in China.279
Shortage of Central Government Financing for Electric Power, Corporatization of Local
State Assets
The path to successful growth pursued by the founders of Luneng Group traces a
historical arc that is similar to that of the founders of Guizhou Jinyuan Power, Ltd. In
1988, two years after the national regulation that sought to attract private and local
government investment into the electricity sector, the Shandong Provincial Power
Industrial Bureau established a 100 percent state-owned subsidiary firm named Luneng
Power Development Company ("LPDC").280 Initially financed by state sources, the early
scale of the LPDC's activities was quite limited. The first general manager of the firm
recalled in a recent interview that LPDC began with five people and one office.2 81 The
firm was one of many secondary and tertiary industry firms established by provincial and
municipal level governments in China to diversify local government revenue and to
provide local employment. By the early 1990s state asset corporatization reforms had
evolved from reforming local government subsidiary assets to reforming the assets of the
278 Forbes, "The Forbes 2000", March 30, 2006.
279 Caijing, "Shei de Luneng? ", January 8, 2007; Power Industry Statistical Compilation, China Electricity
Council Statistical Department and State Grid Company Planning Investment and Finance Department,
2003, p. 58.
2s0 For reform legislation see State Council Notice document no. 86, April 17, 1986: "Provisional
Regulation on the Encouragement of Fundraising for Power Construction Investment and Implementation
of the Multi-Rate Power Tariff'. The firm name was "luneng dianli kaifa gongsi
281 Caijing, "Shei de Luneng? ", January 8, 2007.
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provincial government itself. By 1993 the Shandong Provincial Power Bureau had
established its corporate counterpart, the Shandong Provincial Power Company
("SPPC"), had transferred grid and power generating assets to the new firm, and had
become majority shareholder and regulator of the firm. Such a decision set the
foundation for the provincial power company to pursue a path that allowed for a broader
range of economic activity through diversification into "adjacent" industries not directly
related to electric power.
Figure 28. Shandong Provincial GDP by Industrial Type
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Source: China Data Online, 2008.
As Figure 28 illustrates, provincial governments and related SOE firms
capitalized upon national regulatory changes in order to diversify sources of finance
beyond the central state's declining fiscal transfers and to establish subsidiaries both in
energy and in industries other than electric power and coal. As discussed in Chapter Two,
real GDP growth rates over 9-10 percent in 1982-84 resulted in electricity shortages of 8-
9 percent of national installed capacity. Concern over lack of sufficient investment capital
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in this critical industry was apparent in the projections of the State Planning Commission
that year. The SPC report outlined that estimated investment needs for electric power
during the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) equaled RMB 53.6 billion while capital
arranged by the central state equaled only RMB 43.0 billion, yielding a gap of RMB 10.6
billion. 282 One of the key central reform measures was a YO.02/kWh consumer
surcharge. The monies were "dedicated to an Electric Power Construction Fund, which
was needed to make up the inadequacy of central funding for this capital-intensive
industry".283 In addition, the 1984 regulation that supported industry ownership
diversification was strengthened by a 1986 measure allowing investment into tertiary
industries not directly related to a finn's "core business", as well as investment by sub-
central public and private actors to enter power generation in particular. As the
provincial data reflect, the reforms opened channels for subsidiary firms to pursue
consumer light manufacturing and emerging service industries under parent firms of
traditionally state dominated infrastructure firms.
Early Attempts to Establish a Private Local Firm Falter with Lower Economic Growth
The diversification trends evident in the provincial macroeconomic data are also
evident in the decisions of the provincial government and its energy firms. The same
year the 1986 regulation had been promulgated, the Shandong provincial government,
like the Guizhou provincial government discussed in Chapter Three, introduced measures
to affiliate the provincial electric power labor union to a national union and to
subsequently grant the union "legal person" status so that investments could be made on
behalf of electricity SOE employees. The Shandong Electric Industry Labor Union itself
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282 Zhou 2007, p. 111.
283 Xu 2002, p. 136.
had been established in 1976 and on July 7, 1986 the provincial congress passed
resolution number 69, entitled "Official Reply Regarding Changing the Name of the
Provincial Electricity Labor Union and the Transformation of the Electricity and Postal
Unions' Organization". 284 This resolution allowed the electricity industry union
leadership group to change its name from the provincial level "Shandong Labor Union
Electricity Industry Work Committee" (Shandongsheng zonggonghui dianve gongzuo
weivuanhui) 285 to the national level "China Water Works and Electricity Industry Labor
Union Shandong Electricity Committee" (Zhongguo shuili dianli gonghui shandongsheng
dianli weivuanhui).28 6
The change in status from a provincial entity to a national entity placed the labor
union under the dual administration of the provincial level Shandong Federation of Labor
Unions as well as the national level China Water and Electricity Labor Union, the latter
of which could approve applications for legal person status and subsequent investment by
employees into a new electric power finm. Such status would also later lend the union a
"public" and central state-affiliated legitimacy that would prove critical in the creation of
Luneng Group. Such maneuvering at the provincial level was seemingly strengthened by
the results of the critical July 1987 State Council "National Electric Power Institutional
Reform Conference". The consensus of the discussions was issued in a "20 Word"
policy released after the meeting, which served as a guiding statement of electric power
reform goals: "Separating Government and Enterprise, Province [Level Power Finns]
284 "Guanyu genggai sheng dianve gonghui ming cheng he gaibian sheng dianye gonghui, sheng.voudian
gonghui zuzhi de pfit ".
285 "shandongsheng zonggonghui dianye gongzuo weivuanhui"
286 "zhongguo shuili dianli gonghui shandongsheng dianli weivuanhui
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Serving as the Main [Independent] Entities, Raising [Diversified] Capital to Build Plants,
Linking the Grids, Integrating Dispatch". 287
Plans to inject employee capital into a new firm were halted with the economic
slowdown and low growth rates beginning in late 1987 and lasting through early 1990.288
Real economic growth rates declined from over 11 percent in 1987 to four percent in
1988 and under four percent in 1989. At the national level, while the rights of managers
to administer state owned property were seemingly expanded in this period, the laws
were still embryonic and provisional in nature and "explicit provisions subordinating the
private economy to the socialist publicly owned economy underscored that private
enterprises were still viewed as policy concessions to the needs of economic growth and
subject to the will and the dispensation of the state." 289 The role of privately-held capital
was therefore uncertain in regulatory terms during this early period of reform,
particularly in "backbone" sectors of the economy such as electric power. This
regulatory uncertainty combined with the establishment of the Ministry of Energy in mid-
1988 to create considerable pressures to consolidate ownership in key sectors and limit
local firm growth in the power sector during the economic slowdown.290 Initial attempts
in this direction were pursued by the central state through the enforcement of safety and
287 Nanfang Chuang, "Dianli gongye gaige sanshi nian" October 10, 2008. The twenty character policy was
"zhengqifenkai, sheng wei shiti, chouzi bandian, lianhe dianwang, tongyi diaodu".
http:// \ww.n fcnmag.com/narticles/ 1099
288 Interviews SD-19, SD-4, SD-11.
289 Pitman Potter, "Globalization and economic regulation in China: selective adaptation of globalized
norms and practices," Washington Universit, Global Studies Law Review 2, no. 1 (2003), p. 129.
Provisions expanded through the "Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People", April 13,
1988. Commonly referred to as the "State-Owned Enterprise Law", the legislation was notable for the fact
that it granted SOEs independent legal status and managerial rights, and held SOEs accountable for profits
and losses through independent accounting. See also Yasheng Huang, "One country, two systems: Foreign-
invested enterprises and domestic firms in China," China Economic Review 14, no. 4 (2003): 404-416.
290 See Ministry of Energy, "China's Energy Industry Development Plan 1989-2000", June 1989. Zhou,
p.117.
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standardization of equipment regulations that had just been promulgated at that time. 291
Lastly, the low growth years of the late 1980s greatly reduced central government
estimates of electric power needs for the Eight Five-Year Plan (1991-95), and thus
reduced pressure for the state to support the growth of local power firms. For example,
figures prepared for the November 1989 fifth plenum of the 13th Communist Party of
China (CPC) Central Committee projected a 5-6 percent average annual growth rate
during 1991-1995. In reality, real annual growth rates averaged 12.4 percent. 292
Despite clear regulatory and legal maneuvering at the provincial level to create a
new local firm owned by SOE employees and subsidiary firms, the availability of
adequate capital to secure bank loans, and average annual growth rates of 10 percent in
electric power generation, such plans were deferred during the period of low economic
growth. Instead, Luneng Power Development Company (LPDC) continued to remain
under the authority of its provincial SOE parent firm through the late 1980s and into the
early 1990s. 293 LPDC financed plants through state policy loans from the China
Development Bank (beginning in 1994) and commercial bank loans to build power
generation plants and to expand into tertiary industries such as real estate and water
treatment. In 1992 over 82 percent of electric power funds deployed by SPPC were
sourced from the major commercial banks. 294
The Return of High Economic Growth and the Proliferation of Local Subsidiaries
As economic growth rebounded (surpassing 10 percent by 1992), China's
macroeconomic conditions shifted, leading to a focus on mitigating inflation and a
291 See Zhang Guobao (ed.) Energy Law and Policy Document Compilation, (Beijing: China Economic
Publishing House, 2006), p. 94.
292 Zhou, p.117.
293 Interviews SD-3, SD-8.
294 Interview B-19, SD-13.
176
resulting tightening of national credit markets. Sustained annual economic growth
between 1992 and 1997 averaged 11.9 percent, placing major pressure on infrastructure
and national energy supplies. By 1993 the Ministry of Energy had been dismantled,
fractured by internal conflicts between stakeholders and a lack of authority in policy
levers such as tariff setting and investment approval that were critical to increase energy
supply. Policy pressure once again grew to diversify financial investment and ownership
in the electric power generation industry.295 By the Third Plenum of the 14 th Party
Congress in November 1993 the State Council formally supported "separating
government and enterprise" ("zhengqifenkai") in the electric power industry through its
promulgation of the "CCP Decision Regarding Problems of Establishing Market
Socialism Economic Management Mechanisms". 296
It was during this period of rapid economic development in the early 1990s that
subsidiary corporations under Shandong Provincial Power Company were created,
including: Shandong Nuclear Group; 297 Shandong Luneng Holding Company 298 and
Luneng Material Group. As other scholars have well-documented, this diversification
allowed provincial SOEs: i) to improve their cash flow by engaging in a combination of
short- and long-cycle business activities; and ii) to increase retained earnings to be
utilized as equity investment for new plant capacity. 299 In addition, diversification
295 See for example Department of Electric Power document no. 350, September 14, 1993 "Opinion
Regarding the Guiding of Preparation to Strengthen Foreign Investment in Building Power Projects".296 "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianshe shehuizhuyi shichang jingji guanli tizhi ruogan wenti de
jueding".
297 "hedianjituan gongsi"
298 "shandong luneng konggu gongsi"
299 See for example: Mingfang Li and Yim-Yu Wong, "Diversification and Economic Performance: An
Empirical Assessment of Chinese Firms," Asia Pacific Journal of Management 20, no. 2 (June 1, 2003):
243-265; Harry G Broadman, "The business(es) of the Chinese state." World Bank Draft Paper. David Li
and Changqi Wu, "Reforming state-owned enterprises: Diversifying ownership versus improving
management", The Management of Enterprises in the People's Republic of China (2002) in Anne Tsui and
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enabled the reform of state asset productivity through the addition of firms rather than the
more difficult political task of shutting down and reforming existing firms. The
importance of increasing levels of retained earnings for SPPC has only grown over time.
Cumulative SPPC data relating to financial sources of investment for electric power
between 1993 and 2002 reveal the importance of these diversified sources of funding.
"Enterprise funds" raised by SPPC, when added to the smaller non-central financing
categories of "local transfers" and "other" (locally collected fees, etc.), amounted to a
figure equaling over five times that of central government transfers to SPPC and a third
of total commercial bank lending to SPPC over the same period.300
Centralization Pressures Emerge with Lowering Growth Rates
The economic growth rates of 13-14 percent in the early 1990s had been cut in
half by mid-1996 and into 1997. Quarterly export growth rates, year-on-year, quickly
declined from above eight percent in the first quarter of 1997 to near zero percent in the
first quarter of 1999. Corresponding figures for electric power generation match this
movement, declining from five percent in the first quarter of 1997 to near zero percent by
the second quarter of 1998.301 By March 1998 the MOEP had been disbanded, its
regulatory authority largely transferred to the State Economic and Trade Commission
(SETC) and the commercial management of its electric power generation and grid assets
(46 percent and 89 percent of national capacity, respectively) transferred to the State
Power Corporation of China (SPCC), created a year earlier.
Chung-ming Lau (eds.), The management of enterprises in the People's Republic of China, Kluwer
Publishing, 2002.; and Lixin Xu, Tian Zhu, and Yi-min Lin, "Politician control, agency problems and
ownership reform: Evidence from China," Economics of Transition 13, no. 1 (2005): 1-24.
300 Power Industry Statistical Compilation, China Electricity Council Statistical Department and State Grid
Company Planning Investment and Finance Department, 2003, p. 401.301 NBS, China Economic Yearbook, multiple years; Woo, p.6.
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The creation of the SPCC represented on the one hand a recognition that
corporatization had proven successful at the sub-central level of government as a means
of mobilizing disparate sources of capital in China and investing such capital in
productive energy activities. Central government policymakers within the MOEP and
State Planning Commission argued that the creation of large enterprise groups would
"create horizontal channels of communication and should be able to exploit economies of
scale, enjoy cross-fertilization of management and production techniques, and work
cooperatively to improve industrial development and performance." 302 On the other
hand, the creation of the central state-owned SPCC also served as an opportunity, during
a period of lower economic growth, to consolidate an industry that had grown in the
1990s through the proliferation of provincial and local firms operating both grid and
generation assets. As one long observer of the industry noted: "While corporatization was
proceeding, the MOEP wanted to entrench the government's control of the power sector
in its production, transmission, distribution and dispatching. Forming large enterprise
groupings was the chosen mechanism to achieve this goal". 303 This consolidation effort
naturally created considerable direct local resistance by provincial and local governments
whose assets were being reallocated to ownership under the SPCC. 30 4 As stated in
Chapter Two, it is noteworthy that the centralizing SPCC was created during the height
of foreign investment into the electric power generation industry, seemingly as a potential
future alternative vehicle for consolidation of state ownership.
302 Daniel Chow, "An Analysis of the Political Economy of China's Enterprise Conglomerates: A Study of
the Reform of the Electric Power Industry in China," Law and Policy in International Business 28, no. 2
(1997), p. 405.
303 Yi-Chong Xu, "A powerhouse reform: conversion from the Ministry of Electric Power to the State
Power Corporation of China," Australian Journal of Political Science 36, no. 1: 123, p. 139. See also Chow,
p. 412.
304 South China Morning Post, "Resistance Stalls Power Overhaul", June 13, 1996.
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The creation of large enterprises in the industry was not a novel concept. The
establishment of a national state power corporation had been discussed at the central state
level in the early 1990s as an eventual, mature stage of corporatization reforms and was
raised again during the drafting of the Electric Power Law in the period leading to its
promulgation in 1995.305 A January 25, 1995 report from the MOEP to the State
Planning Commission specifically highlighted the possibility of a "newly created national
power grid company". 30 6 Such reports were transmitted from the MOEP to all provincial
power bureaus, thus indicating the possibility of future asset transfers of grid and power
generation from the provincial to the central level. It was at this time, on April 18, 1995,
that Shandong Provincial Power Bureau officials established the Shandong Luneng
Development Group, Ltd. (SLDC) with registered capital of RMB 1.01 billion.30 7 This
firm served as the foundation for what eventually came to be named Luneng Group.
SLDC was created as a limited liability company (youxian zeren gongsi) that was
expressly not a wholly-owned and wholly-financed subsidiary of the Shandong
Provincial Power Bureau or the Shandong Provincial Power Corporation. Instead, the
firm was majority owned by the same provincial electric power labor union that had
pursued the legal maneuvering ten years earlier to serve as an employee investment
vehicle. The union, a state-affiliated "public entity", channeled the private monies of its
individual members and invested an absolute majority of 52.3 percent, while the recently
established subsidiary firms of the Shandong Provincial Power Company divided the
305 Interview B- 17; See also MOEP Report no. 45 "Dianli gonggvebu guihuajihuasi gtan'yu xiqaf dianli
xuqiu yuce gongzuo tiaolie de tongzhi ", January 25, 1995. Xiaoqian Zhou (ed.) China's Electric Power
Program, (Beijing: Water Power Publishing, 2007), p. 7 40 .
306 MOEP Report no. 45 "Dianli gonggebu guihuajihuasi guanyu xiafa dianli xuqiu yuce gongzuo tiaolie
de tongzhi", January 25, 1995.
307 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, "Luneng antui minvinghua.: 31yi yuangongjizi kongzhi 360vi guo'you zichan? "
February 28, 2003. See also Luneng Taishan Cable Corporation, "Luneng taishan: guanyu konggu gudong
de guquan zhuanrang tishixing gonggao ", Document no. 2008-049, December 12, 2008.
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remaining shares. Luneng Holding Company invested 19.3 percent, Luneng Wuye
Company invested 9.4 percent, Shandong Luneng Fuels Company invested 6.3 percent,
Luneng Materials Company invested 3.9 percent, and 18 other firms invested a
cumulative 8.8 percent.308
Figure 29. Shandong Luneng Development Company, Ltd.
1995 Shareholder Structure
Firm Name Share
1. Shandong Electricity Committee of the China Water and Electricity 52.3%
Industry Labor Union
2. Luneng Holding (Provincial SOE) 19.3%
3. Luneng Wuye (Provincial SOE) 9.4%
4. Shandong Luneng Fuels (Provincial SOE) 6.3%
5. Luneng Materials (Provincial SOE) 3.9%
6+ 18 other firms (Combination of SOE and other) 8.8%
Source: 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, "Luneng antui minyinghua: 31yi yuangongjizi kongzhi
360vi guovou zichan? ", February 28, 2003.
The creation of Shandong Luneng Development Company served as an attempt to
inoculate rapidly growing assets in provincial subsidiaries from potential transfer to the
central government. While the legal and regulatory steps to establish the firm were taken
by the provincial government as early as 1986, Luneng was not created until 1995. The
decision was stalled from the bottom-up by the provincial government in the face of a
plummeting growth rate that had declined by two-thirds by late 1987. As a provincial
vice-mayor involved explained, the combination of the economic slowdown and still-
embryonic corporate legal reforms created considerable uncertainty over private
ownership rights in electric power. 309 Potential deepening of central government
authority in the form of the Ministry of Energy (MOE) exacerbated such concerns. These
308 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, "Luneng antui minyinghua: 31yi yuangongjizi kongzhi 360yi guovou zichan? "
February 28, 2003; Interviews SD-8, SD-9, SD-10, SD-I 1.
309 Interview SD-18.
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fears proved to be well-founded, as the newly-created MOE in 1988 did seek to
strengthen oversight through improved safety regulations and other measures. To insulate
such assets and remove them from the bargaining table with the central government,
provincial government officials, often serving as simultaneous directors both in the
provincial power bureau and the provincial power corporation, sought to take advantage
of the already successful corporatization trends apparent in the industry and the support
of such reform by the central government.
Luneng's Creation as Pre-Emptive Measure
The disbanding of the MOE in 1993, the return of rapid economic growth of 13-
14 percent, and the strengthening of China's corporate legal regime through the
promulgation of the Company Law that same year combined to provide renewed
momentum for the firm's creation. A limited liability company (LLC) form was chosen
because capital transfer regulations for such firms are stricter than those for joint stock
firms. In particular, Article 35(2) of the Company Law states that if a shareholder seeks
to transfer his or her capital contribution to persons who are not shareholders, then the
consent of more than half of all shareholders is necessary. 310 The provision is
remarkably specific, requiring the consent of more than half of all shareholders rather
than of shareholders with more than half of all votes. This renders transfer of capital
from an LLC to potential outside shareholders rather difficult, particularly if nearly all
shareholders are affiliated with one finr and therefore will vote along similar lines of
interest. As a result of this ability to maintain ownership stability, many other firms in
China have chosen such a corporate form. By 2006, 23.9 percent of total fixed asset
310 Interview SD-3, SD-18, SD-23; Minkang Gu, Undeistanding Chinese company law (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University Press, 2006), p. 6 0 .
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investment in China was conducted by limited liability firms, third largest after
collective-owned and state-owned firms. 3" As expected, the stability of Luneng's
ownership structure was strengthened through the additional purchase of remaining
shares by subsidiary firms of the provincial power company, with which the labor union
was also affiliated through its employees. The firm then quickly began purchasing assets
(largely power generation assets) from the provincial power company, and by 1998 had
nearly tripled its assets to RMB 2.6 billion, owning over 30 generating units equaling
over 4 GW (approximately 25 percent of provincial generation capacity). 312
Figure 30. Total Fixed Asset Investment by Ownership of Enterprise, 2006
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Source: LBNL, China Energy Databook, 2008.
The protection of Shandong's provincial power assets through the establishment
of SLDC was subsequently tested with the creation of the national State Power
Corporation of China (SPCC) in 1997 and the centralization of assets initiated during the
31! LBNL China Energy Databook, 2008.312 Caijing, "Shei de Luneng? ", January 8, 2007.
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period of lower economic growth between 1997 and 1998. The seven percent economic
growth China experienced in late 1997 and into 1998, largely as a result of the East Asian
Financial Crisis, proved to be the second lowest growth rate of the 1981-2007 period. 313
The creation of the SPCC set the stage for the transfer of the majority of provincial grid
and generation assets away from the MOEP and also from several provincial
governments, including Shandong. The economic slowdown provided opportunity for
the transfer to be initiated, and by December 1998 the Shandong Provincial Power
Company had, at least in accounting and legal tens, become a direct subsidiary of the
central-level State Power Corporation of China.
In theory, all assets that were wholly owned by Shandong's provincial power firm
and its general management were placed under the auspices and ownership of the new
national firm. Delays in local implementation resulted in operational control remaining
with the provincial firmnn's executives until late 2000 - less than two years before the
national firm itself was dissolved. Transmission grid assets were transferred to the
national firm, along with power generation assets. This transfer of ownership and
authority sought to achieve the critical reform goal of "separating government from
enterprise", and removing regulatory authority from those managing commercial assets.
In the period preceding 1998, the Shandong Power Industrial Bureau served as the major
shareholder of its corporate counterpart, the Shandong Electric Power Corporation. The
same group of executives therefore controlled regulatory function and commercial
management, while provincial regulators often owned many of the assets they were
regulating. Upon legal transfer to the national firm in 1998, ownership and commercial
313 The lowest growth period was 1988-1989, during which time the Ministry of Energy was established.
Many Chinese economists consider the 1998 GDP growth rate of 7.8 percent to be an overestimate by
several percentage points - see Dittmer and Wu, pp.61.
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management passed (in theory) from the provincial government to the central
government, while regulatory powers were placed with the State Economic and Trade
Commission. Following the 1998 reform the ownership of these assets has since
remained in central government hands (with several iterations of central state actors
serving as owner, discussed below).
Delay in implementing commercial management reform allowed further
purchases of state assets by the Shandong provincial power authorities. The creation in
1995 of the SLDC allowed consolidation of electric power assets in the hands of a firm
owned by local actors, but other subsidiaries had invested in a diverse range of industries
and a larger holding company was needed to serve as an umbrella for such firms under
local management. 314 As a result, following the establishment of the national State
Power Corporation in early 1997, but prior to the transfer of the Shandong Provincial
Power Company's ownership from the provincial government to the new national firm,
the provincial government leaders of Shandong's power bureau also established the
Luneng Group Corporation (LGC) in early 1998 as a non-state holding company
(feiguoyou kongguxing gongsi), administratively independent of both the provincial
power bureau and the provincial power corporation. 31s
As was the case with SLDC, Luneng Group was established with equity
investment from SOE employees - again the labor union's Shandong Provincial
Electricity Committee. 316 The union was the largest shareholder of the firm, holding
31.52 percent of initial shares, counting 31,702 members and contributing a total of RMB
1,006,704,400. Lowest-level employees were asked to contribute 30,000 each, office
314 Interviews SD-25, B-19, B-39. See also Caijing, "Shei de Luneng? ", January 8, 2007.
315 "feiguovuo kongguxing gongsi"316 "Zhongguo shuili shuidian gonghui shandong dianli weiyuanhui"
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(chu) level employees were asked to contribute RMB 50,000, and bureau (ju) level
employees were asked to contribute RMB 80,000. Much like Jinyuan's structure in
Guizhou, the other 49 shareholders all held much smaller relative shares, ranging from
0.5 to less than 4 percent.317 In the case of Jinyuan, the provincial power company
executives who founded the firm had opted to create an entity independent from the
provincial power firm in an effort to create clearer profit incentives for managers, to build
more rapid power generation assets, and to increase their own wealth through equity
shares in the new firm. The founders of Luneng created an independent holding
company for much of the same reasons, but rather than begin with new financial capital
from employees and new physical capital through the building of new (greenfield)
electric power plants, the holding company served as a vehicle to combine new projects
with the transfer of existing plant assets from the SPPC and the LPDC to the Luneng
Group.
Figure 31. Luneng Group Shareholder Structure, 1998318
Name of Shareholder Amount Invested (RMB) Ownership (%)
1 Zhongguo shuili dianli gonghui 100,670.44 31.52
Shandong dianli weiyuanhui
2 Shandong fenghui touzi youxian gongsi 12,439.00 3.89
3 Jinan shineng touzi youxian gongsi 11,530.00 3.61
4 Shandong luyuan dianli ziyuan kaifa 9,590.00 3.00
jituan youxian gongsi
5 Feichengfuyuan ganshi fadian youxian 8,434.00 2.64
gongsi
6 Shandong luneng wuye gongsi 7,715.56 2.42
7 Zibo zhongxin dianli youxian gongsi 7,621.00 2.39
317 "Tiantjin nankai gede gufen youxian gongsi zhongda zichan goumnai baogaoshu" August 8, 2004, p. 5 .
http://download.hexun.com/ftp/pdf stockdata 2009/00/54/36/543619.pdf.
318 Zhengquan Shibao, "Guangning fazhan gongbao zhengwen di 000537 hao: 'Xiangcai zhengquan
youxianzeren gongsi guanyu tianjin kai gede gufen youxianzeren gongsi zhongda zichan goumai youguan
qingkuang zhi hecha baodao"', November 26, 2004.
ttI/-i-, a!pfi na npe.ife cng.mdata/stcJ ggzw.lp?id= 13004374&symbol=00053 7
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8 Shandongsheng dianli gongyeju 7,025.00 2.20
jiguan gonghui wei'uanhui
9 Shandong huangqin reli youxian gongsi 6,950.00 2.18
10 Qingdao xinhong fadian youxian gongsi 6,511.00 2.04
11 Qingdao y'ie hongtai touzi youxian 6,200.00 1.94
gongsi
12 Qingdao shitaijingmao fazhan youxian 6,169.00 1.93
gongsi
13 Beijingxinhuida touziyouxian gongsi 6,137.00 1.92
14 Weifang minghua dianli shebei youxian 6,028.00 1.89
gongsi
15 Zaozhuang xinlantian fenmeihui kaifa 6,004.00 1.88
youxian gongsi
16 Yantai hongyuan dianli shiye youxian 5,801.00 1.82
zeren gongsi
17 Shandong liancheng nengyuanfazhan 5,448.00 1.71
youxian gongsi
18. Qingdao hengyuan touziyouxian gongsi 5,328.00 1.67
19. Zibo hongli reneng you xian zeren 5,324.00 1.67
gongsi
20 Yantai dongyuan dianlijituan youxian 5,048.00 1.58
gongsi
21 Zaozhuang luneng liyuan dianlijituan 5,006.00 1.57
youxian gongsi
22 Heji baihui zhuzao youxian gongsi 4,822.00 1.51
23 Shandong runtong guandao gongcheng 4,700.00 1.47
youxian gongsi
24 Weifang yuanzhou touzi youxian gongsi 4,451.00 1.39
25 Jining tiande keji youxian gongsi 4,136.00 1.29
26 Linyi taoyuanjituan youxian zeren 3,990.00 1.25
gongsi
27 Laiwu zhuoyue dianlifazhan youxian 3,822.00 1.20
gongsi
28 Taian lubang dianli shiyejituan youxian 3,804.00 1.19
gongsi
29 Dezhou yingweite dianqi youxian 3,466.00 1.08
gongsi
30 Linyi changneng huanbao youxian 3,327.00 1.04
gongsi
31 Shandongfangxing dianli shiye youxian 3,113.00 0.97
gongsi
32 Liaocheng luneng huachang shiye 2,942.00 0.92
youxian gongsi
33 Shandong zhanhua shengyuanjiancai 2,916.00 0.91
youxian gongsi
34 Shandong heze tengda dianli youxian 2,861.00 0.90
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gongsi
35 Shandong ludian touzi youxian gongsi 2,850.00 0.89
36 Shandong liaocheng saida shive 2,790.00 0.87
vouxian zeren gongsi
37 Liaochengshi kangqiao shangmao 2,768.00 0.87
youxian gongsi
38 Shandong chenming konggu youxian 2,614.00 0.82
gongsi
39 Shandong bingzhou dongli dianqi 2,542.00 0.80
youxian zeren gongso
40 Shenzhen yangtong chuangve touzi 2,470.00 0.77
youxian gongsi
41 Rizhao hongun dianli fazhan youxian 2,463.00 0.77
gongsi
42 Jining longvuan gongnao youxian 1,997.00 0.62
gongsi
43 Rizhao yangguang shive youxian gongsi 1,945.00 0.61
44 Weihai dianli anzhuang gongsi 1,942.00 0.61
45 Laiwu kaiyuan kejijingmao youxian 1,617.00 0.51
gongsi
46 Taian haili kemao zhongxin 1,391.00 0.44
47 Shanying tongyuan touzi youxian zeren 1,311.00 0.41
gongsi
48 Qingdao haiqing baichuan luyou kaifa 640.00 0.20
youxian gongsi
49 Shandong huakang shangmao youxian 632.00 0.20
gongsi
50 Taian qinyuanjingii maoyi youxian 64.00 0.02
zeren gongsi
Source: Zhengquan Shibao, "Guangningfazhan gongbao zhengwen di 000537 hao: 'Xiangcai
zhengquan youxianzeren gongsi guanyu tianjin kai gede gufen youxianzeren gongsi zhongda
zichan goumai youguan qingkuang zhi hecha baodao "', November 26, 2004.
Mixing State and Firm Assets
Luneng Group immediately began purchasing stakes in a range of existing SPPC
subsidiary finns, ranging from SLDC (the core of the electric power portfolio) to Luneng
Hengyuan Assets (that had been created to serve as an enterprise management consulting
service provider). By the end of 1999 Luneng Holdings alone managed 18 specialized
firms and 391 independent legal person units (duli faren danwei), while the provincial
power company, either through the labor union or direct equity investment, had
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successfully managed to purchase shares in SLDC, Luneng Holdings, Taishan Cable, LN
Construction, Luneng Tech, SDLN electronics, and a range of other firms.319 By 2001
SLDC employed 3600 individuals, had recorded RMB 4.17 billion in operating capital
and was a partial owner of 38 firms, sole owner of three firms, three wholly owned
subsidiaries, and six branch offices. 320 Additional subsidiaries continued to be created.
In September 2000 Shandong Xinyuan Holding Co. was established with registered
capital of RMB 1.8 billion and had become the main financing arm of Luneng Group. 321
Figure 32. Luneng Group and Subsidiaries, 1999
Ultimate Controlling Entity: 31,702
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Source: "Tianjin nankai gede gufen youxian gongsi zhongda zichan goumai baogaoshu", August
8, 2004, p.4.
By early 2003, China's 21St Century Economic newspaper (ershiyi shgi jingfi
baodao) questioned how RMB 3.1 billion of employee capital could control RMB 36.0
billion of state-owned assets. The title of the article was "Luneng secretly privatizes -
319 Major firms under management included Shandong luneng touzi gongsi, Luneng fazhan gongsi, Luneng
dianli ranliao gongsi, Luneng dianli wuye gongsi, Luneng xinyi gongsi, Luneng yingda shive gongsi,
Luneng xintong gongsi, Luneng zhiye gongsi, and Luneng kuangye gongsi. See Xiao Jide, "Luneng zhi
yuan ", Dianqi Shidai (Dianqiyeshi chubanshe), vol. 6. 2002, p.19.
320 Sun Shuxin, "genshenyemao luvicantian -ji shandong luneng fazhanituan youxian gongsi ", in
Shandong Shuiwu Zongheng, 2001 no. Z1, p.3.
321 http:/finance.peQople.conc1/GB/67815/68055/4828500.htrnL]. "Shandong xinvuan kongguo gongsi"
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RMB 3.1 billion of raised employee funds controls RMB 36.0 billion of state assets".322
Soon after the article was published, Chen Wangxiang, vice director of the China
Investment Association's Energy Economic Institute sent a letter to the State Council
asking the central government to investigate. No investigation was forthcoming,
however Luneng's raised profile did result in policy changes. By August 2003 SASAC
issued document number 37 "Temporary Suspension of Electric Power Employees
Investing in Electric Power Enterprises" (zhanting dianli xitong zhigong touzi dianli
qive). This notice temporarily suspended the investment of electric power industry
employees from investing in electric power firms, however the effect was not
immediately felt and employee invested power finns continued to grow. By December
31, 2005, Luneng Group boasted total assets of RMB 73.8 billion, as estimated by the
director of the Shandong provincial subsidiary of the National Bureau of Statistics. 32 3
Full Privatization as Catalyst
After rapid expansion as a local firm majority owned by a provincial SOE labor
union, on May 27, 2006 Luneng Group's shares were fully privatized. For a total of
RMB 3.73 billion, the Shandong labor union sold its 31.52 percent share and 46 other
shareholders sold their cumulative 60.09 percent shares to two private firms: Shouda
Energy and Beijing Guoyuan United. 324 Three of the original 50 shareholder firms, Jinan
Tuoneng Investment Company, Shandong Ludian Investment Company and Shandong
Fengui Investment Company, all remained unwilling to sell and therefore maintained
their minority shares at 8.39 percent. This remaining share quickly declined to 4.12
percent. During the third shareholder meeting of 2006, on June 28 2006, Shouda Energy
322 "Shandong antui mi, inghua - 31yi yuangongjizi kongzhi 360yi guoyou zichan"
323 Sinocast, "Luneng Clear Employee Ownership", August 6, 2006.
324 "Beijing guoyiuan lianhe youxian gongsi ", "Shouda nengyuan jituan youxian gongsi
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subsequently increased its investment by RMB 1.68 billion to own 38.59 percent of
Luneng Group. Similarly, Guoyuan United then increased its investment by RMB 2.03
billion to own 57.29 percent of the firm. 325 In total, RMB 7.44 billion was paid by two
private firms for 95.88 percent ownership of Luneng Group. Now fully private, Luneng
began to purchase the remaining shareholders of certain subsidiary firms, such as
Hengyuan, which held the majority (62.35 percent) of the real estate portfolio affiliated
with Luneng. 326 At the completion of these consolidations into private hands, one
individual, Zhao Xingyin, owned 28.30 percent of Luneng Group. 327 Both buyers were
little known, even within the electricity industry, and had been recently established.
Guoyuan United had been created in March 2004 with registered capital of RMB 2.50
billion while Shouda was incorporated in October 2001 with registered capital of RMB
1.20 billion.
325 Zhong Zheng Net, "Zhao xingvin cheng hunengjituan shii kongzhiren", January 17, 2007. See also
Board of Directors Report No. 49, Shandong Luneng Taishan Cable Company, "Shandong luneng taishan
dianlan gufen youxian gongsi guanyvu konggu gudong de guquan zhuanrang tishixing gonggao", 2008, p.4 .
326 Caijing, "Shei de Luneng? ", January 8, 2007; Interview SD-24.
327 Zhong Zheng Wang, "Zhao xingyin cheng lunenglituan shiji kongzhiren", January 17, 2007. See also
Board of Directors Report No. 49, Shandong Luneng Taishan Cable Company, p.4.
Figure 33. Luneng Group Ownership Structure, January 2007
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Source: Zhong Zheng Net, "Zhao xingyin cheng luneng jituan shiji kongzhiren", January 17,
2007. http://cs.xinhuanet.comi/syh/04/200701/120070117 1039766.htm.
Nationalization
The full privatization of Luneng Group triggered a series of reactions by the
central government, and three entities in particular became actively involved. On April
26, 2007 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a "Rectification
and Reform Notice" (zeling zhenggai tongzhishu), announcing that the initial share
purchases and capital investment increases of Guoyuan United and Shouda Energy had
been against regulations ("weigui shougou he weigui zengzi kuogu"). The firms' rights
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to vote in board meetings were then suspended. 32 8 By late 2007 the State Grid
Corporation of China had also sent a report to SASAC, criticizing the privatization of
Luneng Group and the potential privileging of dispatch in the Shandong provincial grid.
On December 29, 2007 SASAC had promulgated document number 494, outlining steps
for the return of Luneng's assets to the central government. 32 9
On February 4, 2008 95.47 percent of Luneng Group's shares were sold for RMB
8.32 billion to the Shandong Provincial Power Company, the Shandong Electric Power
Labor Union, and Luneng Wuye Company. The provincial power company became the
majority shareholder, with 77.14 percent ownership. The provincial power company is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the State Grid Corporation of China. The State Grid in turn is
wholly owned by the central government through SASAC (see Appendices for ownership
charts).
328 Zhengquan Shibao, "Lunengxijiang zhonggui shandong dianlijituan", February 5, 2008.
http://stock 1.ri.com.cn/news/2008-02-05/000003270348.html.
329 SASAC document number 494, "Guanvu guanche luoshi guoziwei guoziting chanquan" 2007-494
haowen shishi fangan de piffi". See Caijing, "Shandong dianli 83 )i shouhui lunengjituan", February 25,
2008.
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Figure 34. Luneng Group's Nationalization by the Numbers, 2008
Seller Share in Price Buyer Price Differential
2006 Paid Paid (RMB million)
2006 2008
(RMB (RMB
million) million)
Guoyuan 61.79% 4,795 SPPC 5,387 +592
(Provincial
SOE)
Guoyuan 1.31% 101 Luneng 113 +12
Wuye
(Provincial
SOE
Subsidiary)
Shouda 15.35% 1,191 SPPC 1,338 +147
(Provincial
SOE)
Shouda 17.02% 1,320 SD Labor 1,484 +164
Union
(Provincial
SOE
Employees)
Total 95.47% 7,407 8,322 +915
Luneng Group was nationalized by the central government and returned to its
original owner - the Shandong Provincial Power Company, itself owned by the State
Grid Corporation of China.330 It is important to note that final nationalization did not
take the form of direct expropriation. Shares not only were purchased, but purchased at a
modest increase of the 2006 prices paid by the private firms. In this way, intervention by
the central state was the combination of regulatory enforcer (as the sale was non-
negotiable and much of the executive leadership of Luneng Group were arrested and
placed under investigation) and market actor through share purchasing. Shandong
Provincial Power Company purchased a majority 77.14 percent share of Luneng Group,
while original employee shares through the labor union and original shareholder Luneng
Wuye were also compensated.
330 SinoCast China Business Daily News, "Shandong Electric Takes Helm of Luneng Group", February 26,
2008, p. 1.
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At this stage, the major - and critical - difference between the Luneng and
Jinyuan cases was that Luneng's assets were being returned to the provincial SOE with
which the firmnn (and its founders) were originally affiliated. This placed the firm under
the direct operational and ownership control of the central government, which owned the
provincial power company through the State Grid Corporation. Jinyuan's reform allowed
the partial purchase of assets by the smallest of the listed "Big Five" generating firms,
with an indirect link to the central government through ownership (eventually) and not
operation. However, the liberalization measures of reform presented the central
government with a significant problem. The return of power generation assets to a
provincial power company that was a subsidiary of the State Grid Corporation directly
violated the reforms relating to the separation of power generation and grid asset
ownership. As this study has outlined, and the government had discovered after many
trials, dispatch manipulation under such circumstances was a distinct challenge. As a
result, 4.95 GW of Luneng Group's total of 5.69 GW of generation assets located
physically within Shandong were transferred to Huaneng Group (the largest of the "Big
Five" listed SOE generating firms) on December 11, 2008. The selling of additional
installed capacity to Huaneng Group allowed the central government to even out
competition in the province as well. After the purchase, Huaneng's installed capacity in
Shandong equaled that of its main central government SOE competitor in the province,
Huadian Group, another "Big Five" firm that owned over 10 GW of capacity.
This decision solved the conflict between reforms and the nationalization, yet
maintained the first difference between the two cases and created another difference.
First, the Shandong Provincial Power Company (under the State Grid Corporation)
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continues to have operational control over these assets (grid and generating). While
Huaneng won the right to derive a revenue stream from Luneng's activities, the central
government granted authority over the assets to the State Grid subsidiary. This authority
allowed later asset reallocation and restructuring decisions to be executed by the State
Grid Corporation rather than Huaneng. The complexity and extent of opacity relating to
the asset acquisitions fueling Luneng Group's rise rendered the firm unfit to be sold to
another corporation with full operational and management rights, as was the case with
Jinyuan.
Second, unlike the Guizhou electric power labor union employees who had
invested in Jinyuan and were able to maintain their ownership (although diluted in
relative terms), the Shandong electric power labor union employees were unable to
maintain their considerable investment in Luneng. They were forced to sell to private
investors in 2006 by the Shandong Provincial Power Company executives, and forced
again to sell to Huaneng by the central government. These employees therefore bore
initial risks of early investment and then were unable to maintain their rights to manage
their investment. Moreover, the prices at which they were forced to sell were a derivative
of the already low, negotiated and non-transparent price at which the privatization
occurred.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Implications for Theory and Policy
"Delegation never meant loss of power... Ultimately, the privatization of taxation
certainly reflected increased dependence of the state on the private sector and
especially on financial auxiliaries, and an undeniable failure of the monarchical
administration to adapt to cope with its growing needs. But the privatization never
meant the loss of influence of state power. The state power retained indirect control
over the world of finance and was assured of fiscal and financial revenue; its
intervention was fitful and often arbitrary, but it was particularly effective. This choice
of an indirect, partly privatized mode of management characterized the French
absolute monarchy regime for about two centuries - a regime that cannot be described
as impotent. "33
Summary of Findings
China's national energy sector in the past three decades has expanded on a scale
that is historically unmatched, and in 2005 China became the world's largest energy
producer. Such growth occurred during a period of time in which economic liberalization
reforms in the energy sector rapidly diffused internationally. This dissertation analyzed
the investment and ownership structure of production in China's coal and electric power
industries during this period. The motivating research question for the study addressed
the extent to which China's central state devolved ownership and investment levels in
these critical energy industries to other actors. In effect the study asked, to return to the
first paragraph of the dissertation, whether Beijing had begun to "steer" as opposed to
"row" the ship driving China's national energy sector production.
The study found, through examination of coal and electricity industry level data
as well as two case studies, that central state ownership and investment growth in these
critical industries fluctuated over time, largely according to the national electric power
balance. Moreover, the consolidation of energy regulatory institutions at the central state
level also fluctuated in related patterns, revealing shifts in central state policies in the
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33 Hibou, p.27.
sector. These findings run counter to what the dominant theories in the literature would
otherwise predict. Neo-liberal theory would predict the incremental reduction of central
state ownership in these sectors, as is evident in many of China's other industries and in
the coal and electric power generation industries of other rapidly developing economies.
Other arguments, centered on the ability of the central state to sustain "self-reproducing
authoritarianism", would predict fairly stable levels of central state investment and
ownership in this strategic sector through time as well as the presence of quite limited
liberalization. Finally, a theory privileging elite politics would indeed predict
fluctuations, yet at different turning points in time than those found in this study, and
without the sustained pattern that is evident in the extended time period under
examination, a period that spans four distinct political eras.
In the coal industry, periods of high economic growth (above nine percent) led to
national electricity balance deficits in which the growth of electricity consumption
exceeded the growth of installed electric capacity. During such periods of economic
growth (1982-1988, 1992-1995, 2001-2005), coal demand also grew rapidly while
Central State-owned (CS) and Local State-owned (LS) coal production capacity growth
grew either moderately, stagnated, or in some cases declined. In contrast, Local Non-
State (LNS) coal production (TVEs, private, and "other" ownership forms) grew during
these periods at rates that were multiples higher than the highest state-owned production
levels. In absolute production terms, LNS production levels well exceeded LS levels by
1984 and CS levels by 1993, even though significant LNS output was often not captured
by official statistics. Once high levels of economic growth subsided and electric power
surplus returned, this LNS production capacity, despite documented levels of higher
198
relative efficiency, experienced low or negative growth rates that either converged with
CS and LS rates or were significantly lower than such rates. Put simply, this LNS
production capacity therefore effectively served as a "shock absorber" of the coal system
during very high or very low growth periods.
In the electric power generation industry, a similar pattern was evident in the
foreign and domestic investment data. The introduction of local domestic capital
investment first began during the same high economic growth period of the mid 1980s,
and again was supplemented with major increases in foreign investment and technology
systematically courted during the boom of the early 1990s. The onset of the Asian
Financial Crisis and plunging economic growth rates beginning in late 1997 witnessed a
systematic and nearly comprehensive disappearance of foreign investment, followed by
the drop of a variety of local domestic private and hybrid investment in electric power
generation. The two case studies provide firm-level evidence both of the manner in
which such local firms negotiated these shifts, and of the ways in which the most recent
economic downturn led to consolidation of central state ownership and the conversion of
both domestic local firms to central state ownership.
At the central state level, the structure of regulatory institutions overseeing the
energy sector experienced similar fluctuations. During periods of slower economic
growth and electric power generation surplus, of coal and electricity industry structure
consolidation, of rising levels of central state investment and ownership, and of slowing
economic growth rates, central regulatory institutions governing the energy market also
consolidated. China's State Energy Commission governed between 1980-1982, when
economic growth dipped to five percent and averaged seven percent. The Ministry of
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Energy, another short-lived attempt at consolidation, was created in mid-1988 and
eventually dismantled in 1993. During this period GDP growth dropped to under four
percent, its lowest point in the past three decades. The establishment of the de facto
electric power monopoly, the State Power Corporation of China (SPCC), and the most
significant closing of over 10 central state ministries occurred between 1997 and 1999,
when the Asian Financial Crisis affected China's economy and revised independent GDP
growth estimates averaged five to six percent. 332 During periods in which high economic
growth rates resumed, the structure of the coal and electricity generating industries
diversified, and non-central state-owned actors invested at scale, the central state
regulatory institutions similarly diversified in an effort to manage the greater complexity
of the industry.
Summary ofArgument
This study best explained such long-term fluctuation in industry structure by
constructing a state-centered argument in which China's central state seeks to mitigate
the considerable economic and political risk inherent in securing adequate national
energy supply by managing the coal and electric power generation firms as a portfolio of
assets. Rather than allow creeping liberalization to reduce incrementally the share of
state-owned energy production or sacrifice sustaining high rates of economic growth by
maintaining policies that undermined local and foreign investment and ownership, the
central state actively manages the composition of investment and ownership types in
these strategic industries. Much of this was and is accomplished through the stable
central state regulatory institutions intimately involved in the energy sector (including the
332 Albert Keidel, formerly of the Carnegie Endowment, produces much of the most recent reliable revised
estimates of GDP growth, calculated from national expenditure figures.
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NDRC and the Central Organization Department (COD) of the Party). Such composition
is managed largely through changes in policies regulating mechanisms of market access
through project approval, contract pricing and terms, forced direct mergers by central
state-owned firmnns and personnel. The study tracked these policy changes on an
individual level and major shifts were also measured at the macro level through the
alternating consolidation and diversification of regulatory institutions within the central
state. As stated previously, these policy shifts coincided with national electricity balance
shifts, as major changes in economic growth either strained or eased central state-owned
energy production capacity.
Functionalist analysis is most useful in understanding the central state's active
periodic support of non-central state firms during times of high economic growth rates
and inadequate energy supply. During these periods Central State-owned (CS) and Local
State-owned (LS) coal production capacity growth stall or increase at a rate significantly
lower than demand growth. As has been well documented by others, such state-owned
coal capacity is both inefficient and often lacking sufficient finance capital to meet such
major demand increases. High rates of annual economic growth (usually above nine
percent) thus strain existing limited state-owned energy production capacity and create a
functional need for the state to identify alternative means to increase supply. This
functional need requires changes in formal policy ranging from contract terms (rate-of-
return agreements, depreciation rates, tax incentives) to market access and pricing.
Under such circumstances, the central state elects to dilute its ownership and investment,
thus expanding the portfolio of types of firms participating in coal and electric power
provision.
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However, despite such significant economic liberalization reform in the coal and
electric power industries as well as the efficiency of this local- and foreign-owned
capacity, the corresponding ownership and investment share of production in these
industries have not gradually superseded that of central state-owned firms. Instead,
periods of lower growth and energy surplus provide the opportunity for the central state
to reassess industry structure. Were the state's portfolio approach strictly functionalist in
nature, the often less-efficient central state-owned firmnns in coal and electric power
generation would be shuttered during periods of energy surplus, as their output is no
longer needed and they are less able to fulfill demand efficiently. Instead, the central
state often uses such periods to remove local- and foreign-owned competitors from the
market. Some of these firms are closed down while others are allowed to be consolidated
by eager central SOE incumbents. This occurs because these periods of lower growth
remove the pressures of short supply and allow ideational concerns over ownership in
this critical industry to regain political force. Ideational resources and rhetoric that are
rendered secondary to ensuring adequate energy supply are regularly redeployed and re-
emphasized once such supply is met. The central state then accomplishes such change in
ownership and investment through the exercise of, primarily, levers of market access,
contract price parameters, and personnel management that remain under the authority of
stable central state entities such as the NDRC and COD. China's coal and electric power
industries are therefore best understood as actively managed portfolios of firms, not the
self-regulating systems of market actors that strict functionalism would suggest.
Theoretical Implications
Jonah Levy, writing of the convergence/divergence debate in political economy
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between neo-liberal scholars and scholars focused on the persistence of institutional
diversity in the advanced industrialized economies, argues that scholars of the second
camp, who temper the first camp's "demise of the state" argument by forwarding
evidence of state inertia, do not develop their criticism to its logical endpoint. Rather,
many of these scholars "leave unchallenged the presumption that contemporary change
pushes in a single direction, toward the reduction of state intervention."'' 333  Levy
concludes that as a result of such omission "politics is destined to defend an ever smaller,
less relevant, and embattled sphere of state activity across time." 334 The dominant
theoretical arguments reviewed in this study share this evolutionary assumption. 335
The literature reviewed in this study has greatly advanced our collective
understanding of the changing role of the state in economic development and the range of
mechanisms available to the state and firms in negotiating such change. Proponents of the
neo-liberal camp have rightly highlighted the importance of economic liberalization, if
not outright privatization, in strengthening productive economic activity and these
arguments have been made forcefully in application to the energy sector. The importance
of such reforms in boosting China's economic growth and energy production growth is
considerable. In contrast, scholars arguing that later-developing countries require
interventionist and activist states to achieve industrialization goals, particularly in the
capital-intensive and strategic energy sector, rightly highlight the many ways in which
neo-liberal blueprints for reform do not address the wide variety of institutional contexts
333 Jonah Levy, The state afier statism: new state activities in the age of liberalization (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2006), p. 13 .
334 Levy, p.13.
335 As Yasheng Huang (2008) repeatedly observes, even scholars that forward the third approach discussed
in this study, focused on elite politics, argue that China's leadership has incrementally increased support of
economic liberalization policies since the initial reforms of the late 1970s.
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in the developing world. Such scholars cite China's form of energy governance as
evidence of this view, a leading example of the manner in which a self-reproducing
authoritarian state has successfully overcome late-developer challenges (through what
they characterize as marginal liberalization measures) and has nevertheless achieved
rapid energy production growth. Such wide-ranging debate is perhaps understandable
given the fluctuation in central state ownership and investment over time that this study
documents. Careful selection of data from selectively biased time periods could marshal
evidence for either view.
However, both arguments implicitly argue that economic liberalization policies are
the ultimate goal of reform, rather than simply a means to sustain growth. Both
arguments implicitly argue that for industry to grow in the long-term, the state must
eventually shift its role from that of "rowing" and of providing the driving force for
industrial development, to that of "steering" and of providing the regulatory guidance for
such development. Neo-liberals argue that successfully productive industries and
national economies must begin early to follow a reform path that reduces direct state
involvement in the economy. Neo-developmental statists argue that historical timing
matters and that given the challenges that "later-developing" economies have in
competing with the advanced industrialized economies, state involvement must first ramp
up to provide a variety of resources for industrialization, and only then be dismantled
largely along the lines of the neo-liberal prescription. As Danny Breznitz writes: "...the
neo-development argument implicitly calls for the state to manage a process in which it
lets the industry gain more and more power to decide its own future as it finds its feet and
grows. Hence, the state needs to be able to change its role from that of initiator and
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leader to that of supporting actor. '33 6 Both approaches view economic liberalization as a
reform goal - a progressive and uni-directional set of policies that cumulatively narrow
state economic policy options as the market transactions to be regulated become ever
more complex.
As a result of this shared assumption, the interventionist tools of state-led "late
development", often linked to authoritarian regimes like those found in Taiwan and South
Korea during their early post-war industrialization periods, are framed in temporal and
sequential opposition to the market-enabling neo-liberal tools of market development.
While both camps argue whether state-led approaches produce growth and
industrialization, both agree that economic liberalization eventually follows state-led
tools of development as outlined by Gerschenkron and others. As argued in Chapter One,
this study's findings suggest that these are not separate models, but rather collections of
tools available to the state on a policy continuum that remain available to the state
through time.
The study's first main implication is that neo-liberal means can be deployed to
achieve state-led ends. At the firm level, the Jinyuan Group case provides clear
illustration of this point. Jinyuan, a firm founded with private capital and linked to local
government, was a product of liberalization policies and became able to access the
nation's electric power generation and coal markets. In doing so, it became a linchpin of
what arguably became China's largest modern central state-led infrastructure project: the
"Develop the West" campaign and the related West-to-East-Power-Transmission-Project
(WEPTP). Similarly, at the industry level, it is clear from China's coal and electric
336 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State.: Development strategies for high-technology industries in a
world of fragmented production:. Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007),
p. 3 1.
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power generation industry data that in periods of high economic growth, neo-liberal
policies of loosening prices and diversifying ownership can be pursued by the state to
achieve goals of "late development", such as rapid capital agglomeration and
industrialization, only to then be curtailed in periods of lower growth.
Second, the study provides evidence that economic liberalization reform need not
be incremental and is, in fact, reversible. Use of neo-liberal policies does not preclude the
state from reasserting traditional interventionist policies later in the development process
to consolidate central state ownership, despite the creation of powerful finns and local
state interests in the process of reform. As stated in Chapter One, China's central state
has proven quite successful in allowing periodic reductions in state ownership, pricing
authority, and monopoly producer rights to ensure the growth of what is arguably the
most politically critical sector of the economy. It has also proven capable of reasserting
its claims on assets when private, local state, and foreign sources of investment are
perceived to be no longer necessary to satisfy development objectives. It is during these
periods that ideological concerns privileging central state ownership, always present,
return to enjoy political currency.
The study documents several examples of such central state reassertion. For
example, in the electric power generation industry, the electric power deficits of the early
to mid-1990s resulted in the major overhaul of market access terms, project rate-of-return
terms, tax incentives, depreciation rates, on-grid price guarantees, approval procedures
and other policies by the central state to attract systematically foreign investment and
high efficiency power generation technology. As quickly as such investment ramped up,
it collapsed when all such seemingly long-term and long-cycle policies were
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systematically revised to exclude foreign investment during the Asian Financial Crisis
and the resulting economic slowdown beginning in 1997. Both cases illustrate how far-
reaching these shifts in central state policy changes can be, restructuring the ownership
and investment of domestic firms as well. The cases provide detailed evidence of how
two highly independent, sophisticated and large-scale local firmnns with a range of
differences in geography, levels of economic development, and levels of local
government support, both undergo ownership conversion and are consolidated with large
central state-owned firms within months of one another.
Such shifts towards industry structure consolidation and away from economic
liberalization are equally clear in the study's treatment of the coal industry. For example,
during the rapid rise of local and foreign investment in the electric power generation
industry of the early to mid-1990s, described above, a similar diversification of financial
sources was occurring in coal production capacity. Local non-state coal production
capacity rose from a third (36 percent) of total production in 1990, to one-half (48
percent) in 1996. After the Asian Financial Crisis and central state ownership
consolidation, local production capacity dropped to a low of 28 percent in 2000, despite
the higher capital and labor efficiency of local mines.337 In sum, the industry level data
and case studies support the main argument of this study and illustrate the ability of the
central state to manage the ownership and investment structure of the energy sector over
time.
Third, the case studies reveal that firm decisions have a significant impact on the
execution of these powerful and broad central state policy changes that periodically
reshape the structure of China's energy sector. Despite the fact that both firms were
337 Even if estimates of underreported local coal production are included, the share is still quite low.
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eventually consolidated with large central state-owned firms, considerable differences in
corporate management and structure remained after such conversion, highlighting the
importance of a firm's past decisions of asset acquisition, shareholder treatment, and
corporate governance.
Jinyuan Group, a firm that was built upon greenfield plant construction and was
careful to manage through lease, and not own, pre-existing electricity assets owned by the
central and/or local state, was not perceived as stripping state assets in the course of
meeting local economic development needs. As discussed, the firm's model of employee
ownership was even supported and encouraged by the central state's SASAC in recent
years among firms owned by SASAC. Moreover, the broad range of shareholders
remained shareholders throughout the course of Jinyuan's rise and not forcibly removed
through opaque privatization to outside investors. While undoubtedly not the paragon of
corporate governance, Jinyuan nevertheless represented to the central state resourceful
local actors building a productive firm with fairly consistent, diversified ownership
representation and with relatively transparent asset management practices. When
conversion to central state ownership occurred, the firm was merged with the smallest of
the "Big Five" listed generating firms through a sale of 60 percent of its ownership.
Employee and local government ownership was certainly diluted, but the diversification
of ownership remained, many of the mid-level executives remained in place, and the
assets were not simply merged directly with the local government firm from which many
of Jinyuan's executives originally came.
Luneng Group, also a local state-owned firm producing electricity that began with
private capital and then diversified through local government capital infusions and human
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assets transferred from local SOEs, made different decisions relating to physical asset
management. Luneng's growth strategy included greenfield plants and the transfer of
assets from the electricity generating firm owned by the provincial government to
Luneng. In addition, the original employee shareholders, whose investment bore the
initial risk before the firm became successful, were disenfranchised later when the firm
was privatized and sold at negotiated non-market prices to two outside investors. Several
shareholders attempted to block the sale. This opaque form of growth was very much
viewed as asset stripping by the central state, and Luneng was consolidated and converted
to central state ownership. Unlike Jinyuan, Luneng's assets were not purchased
immediately by one of the "Big Five" listed firms. Authority over Luneng's assets was
transferred to the Shandong Provincial Government SOE from which many of the assets
were originally stripped. Only then was the ownership of such assets transferred to
Huaneng Group, the largest of the "Big Five" central state-owned electricity generating
firms. The management authority remained with the provincial government, however. It
is important to note here that Luneng and Jinyuan were consolidated during a period of
energy surplus and during the beginning of an economic downturn, following the larger
pattern described in this study.
Policy Implications
This study also raises important implications relating to public policy, and in
particular the ability of the Chinese state to fulfill aggressive greenhouse gas emission
reductions in an effort to mitigate climate change. Rapid environmental degradation is
arguably the greatest long-term governance challenge facing China's leadership, and the
energy industries that served as the focus of this dissertation - coal and electric power
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generation - are central to the design of viable solutions. China's supply side energy
growth strategy was largely successful in meeting demand, as this dissertation illustrates,
but also created significant unintended consequences. As Emily Yeh and Joanna Lewis
write:
"not everything is working out according to the party-state's plan to maintain
control while also reaping the fruits of partial reform...unintended consequences
include growing regional inequality and environmental problems stemming from
both coal combustion and large-scale hydropower projects. Although not wholly
unintended, the possible challenges to state legitimacy arising from these effects
may be greater than Party reformers anticipated. Indeed, the consequences of the
CCP's plans for power sector reform are likely to exacerbate all of the big-
picture challenges facing the CCP in this new century, particularly those related
to the environment, corruption and the need for serious political reform."33
This final section will outline briefly the interdependence between these two industries
and China's climate challenge, then suggest how two of the theoretical implications
discussed previously may best inform policy analysis moving forward.
China's utilization of coal has enabled the nation to maintain high levels of
energy self-sufficiency but has also elevated it to become the world's leading greenhouse
gas emitter. Coal combustion accounted for an incredible 82 percent of China's total
national emissions in 2006.339 The corresponding figure for the US is 36 percent, largely
because of petroleum's large contribution to US energy supply. In particular, coal also
produced nearly 90 percent of China's sulfur dioxide (SOz) and over two-thirds of the
country's carbon dioxide (CO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). The electric power
industry's demand for coal is most responsible for these figures, with China's electric
power industry accounting for the single largest contribution of air pollutants. The local
cost of health damage from air pollution is considerable, projected to equal 13 percent of
338 Emily Yeh and Joanna Lewis, "State power and the logic of reform in China's electricity sector," Pacific
Affairs (2004), p. 4 64 .
39 Energy Information Agency, US Department of Energy, International Energy Annual, 2006.
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China's GDP by 2020 under the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, as estimated by an
OECD study.3 40 Chinese researchers are tracking the impact of climate change on China,
citing an array of variables including decreasing crop yields and river run-off, rising sea
levels of 1.4-3.2 millimeters (mm) annually along the coastal areas, decreasing sea ice in
the Bohai Sea and Yellow Sea, significant loss of glacial areas in the northwestern
regions, and thinning Tibetan pennafrost. 34  The impact of China's continued supply
side solutions has already registered globally. 342 While it is clear that the developed
world, led by the US and Europe, has contributed the vast majority of the current stock of
CO 2, moving forward, the EIA has estimated that China will produce well over one
quarter of world CO 2 emissions through 2030, while the US will contribute less than 20
percent.
Recognition by the central state of this daunting range of complex challenges has
dramatically increased. At the domestic level, a "National Climate Change Program"
report was released June 4, 2007 and quickly followed by a "Climate Change White
Paper" in October 2008. These documents sought to catalog Chinese efforts to date to
address climate change. A range of legislative actions have also been adopted. Most
notably in the legal realm, the Renewable Energy Law of 2005 was followed by the
Energy Conservation Law of 2008. How best to execute and implement these new laws
was captured by the NDRC-issued "Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan for
Renewable Energy" as well as a report entitled "Several Opinions Regarding
340 World Bank, "Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages" (Washington:
World Bank) 2007.
341 Lin Erda, Xu Yinlong, Wu Shaolong, Ju Hui, Ma Shiming, "China's national assessment report on
climate change (I1)", Advances in Climate Change Research 3 (Suppl. 2007), p. 7 .
www.climatechange.cn/qikan/manage/wenzhang/02.pdf
342 For an informative view regarding China's approach to climate change, please see Joanna Lewis,
"China's Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations," Washington Quarterlv 31, no.
1 (December 1,2007): 155-174.
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Acceleration of Shutting down Small Thermal Power Generating Units". The 1 1th Five-
Year Plan (2006-2010) also contained numerous references to addressing energy
conservation and related policies.3 4 3 At the international level, China ratified both the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto
Protocol. Such ratification of course came with little cost as China's status as a
developing country allowed the emissions targets to be non-binding and merely notional.
China has been engaged in the carbon market and financial mechanisms created by
Kyoto, quickly rising to become the world's largest seller of Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) credits. As of 2006 China accounted for 61 percent of global CDM
sales volume. 344
While China's ability to deliver the energy necessary for economic growth through
supply side management has been considerable, its future energy (and increasingly
environmental) needs are clearly more complex than simply meeting soaring
consumption with supply side solutions. As the IEA's 2007 World Energy Outlook made
clear, China's approach to energy growth that has privileged supply side solutions over
demand side solutions will not meet the nation's future needs. The combination of a
rapid corporatization of energy assets, national energy demand on pace to soon surpass
that of the US, and strong continued investments in heavy industry have created pressing
regulatory challenges on the demand side of the energy equation. The recent leveling of
energy intensity levels is troubling. Had such dramatic reductions in energy intensity not
taken place and had the energy intensity levels of 1980 remained static, China would
343 Congressional Research Services (CRS), "China's Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies"
(September 10, 2008), p. 19.
344 Karan Capoor et al., "State and Trends of the Carbon Market, 2007" (World Bank Carbon Finance Unit,
2007).
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have burned twice as much coal in 1995 than needed to produce that year's GDP.3 45
Between 2002 and 2005 the historical trend of declining energy intensity reversed
itself, and energy consumption grew at a rate faster than economic output (see Figure 35).
In recognition of such a trend, energy intensity reduction targets were one of the few
quantitative goals enumerated in the II1 1 th Five Year Plan. These targets have not been
met thus far. On March 9, 2009, Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC)
Standing Committee Wu Bangguo delivered the committee work report during the
second plenary session of the 11th NPC. The report specifically highlighted this failure to
meet efficiency goals (italics added):
"...two major binding targets - energy consumption per unit of GDP and total
emissions of major pollutants - fell far short of the set goals. To a great extent
this showed that the pattern of China's economic development had not been
transformed fundamentally: industry still holds the dominant position in the
industrial structure, exports and investment still play the leading role in the
demand structure, and serious problems such as mounting pressure on resources
and the environment, increasing difficulty in expanding employment, and
insufficient consumption still exist." 346
The 11 th Five Year Plan calls for China's energy intensity in 2010 to be 20 percent below
2005 levels. This would require an annual reduction of about 4.5 percent between 2006
and 2010. However, 2006 resulted in a reduction of a mere 1.23 percent and 2007
achieved a still-low 3.27 percent. Mid-2008 reduction figures equaled 2.88 percent.347
345 Smil (1998), p. 94 7 .
346 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/16/content_11018210_1 
.htm.
347 Philip Andrews-Speed, "China's ongoing energy efficiency drive: Origins, progress and prospects,"
Energy Policy (2009), p.4
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Figure 35. Energy Intensity Trends
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The lack of reductions in energy intensity, combined with heightened
urbanization and continued industrialization trends, may be outstripping the ability of
local actors to invest in domestic infrastructure, despite the current stimulus package
under consideration by the central government. 90 percent of China's coal reserves are
located in the hinterland while the vast majority of its demand and industrial centers are
located in the coastal areas. Failure to mitigate energy intensity will exacerbate this
strain and will increase demand growth over the next decade to much higher absolute
levels. Significantly, China became a net coal importer in the first half of 2007, signaling
pressures on this infrastructure.
Changing China's emissions trajectory will therefore require: i) significant
investment and policy strengthening in efficiency-enhancing supply side and demand side
management; ii) significant investment in some form of Carbon Capture and
Sequestration (CCS) or similar technology to manage the unsustainable levels of carbon
dioxide that will continue to be produced by the nation's rapidly expanding coal-fired
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power plants; and iii) the diversification of fuel supply to reduce coal use. Major
demand side efficiency gains are most immediate and effective, as they prevent power
plants from ever being built in the first place and therefore reduce supply through the
accumulation of what Amory Lovins termed "negawatts". Some form of CCS, despite
the enormous costs involved, is necessary because coal-fired power plants in China have
grown on an unprecedented scale and most credible projections of electricity generation
supply composition predict that even under optimal investment conditions and aggressive
climate change policies in China, coal will still account for between 60 and 70 percent of
electric power generation by 2020. Lastly, fuel diversification is important to reduce the
need for coal conversion that accounts for over 80 percent of total emissions, however it
is unclear the extent to which China's energy system will be able to diversify fuel at any
significant scale. Two of the implications raised by this study relate directly to analysis
of whether China will be able to mobilize adequate resources to achieve the first and
second of these goals.
First, as China's past illustrates, neo-liberal tools can be marshaled to achieve
state-led goals in the energy sector. As a result, there is considerable hope that efficiency
gains on the supply and demand side will take place. On the supply side, there is already
evidence of this in the advances in boiler technologies and efficiencies being purchased
and utilized by China's electric power plants. The graduated liberalization of coal prices
by the central state initially served to attract investment from the local domestic and
foreign firms entering the coal industry to meet booming demand. Such price reform also
drastically increased the fuel costs of electric power generation finms, creating
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considerable incentive to invest in more highly efficient combustion technology - some
forms of which also reduce emissions enforcement costs.
As data from the MIT China Energy Survey illustrate, there is a clear trend in
installed boiler technology pressure and type through time. For plants that came online
(connected to the grid) between 1985 and 2001, over 50 percent of the plants sampled
utilized subcritical boilers with pressures of less than 9.9 Megapascals (MPa). For plants
commissioned in 2002 and later, this ratio dropped to under 40 percent. 348 Significantly,
fluidized beds were utilized in under 10 percent of the sampled plants commissioned
before 1985, and 50 percent of the plants commissioned from 2002 and later. As
efficiency is enhanced through the higher pressure and temperature of supercritical
boilers, fluidized bed boilers also enhance efficiency by blowing jets of air to suspend the
coal that is being combusted. This agitation enables higher efficiency, as it allows more
chemical reaction and heat transfer to occur, and also improves emissions rates. The
agitation also allows combustion-stage capture of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
emissions, as absorbent chemicals such as dolomite or limestone can mix with the flue
gases. This form of capture does not require expensive post-combustion stage add-on
controls such as flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) "scrubber" towers. Fluidized bed boilers
therefore accomplish both efficiency gains stated of central state policy and aid greatly in
the reduction of emissions control enforcement costs, another critical policy goal. FGD
scrubbers are often turned off (at least those without continuous emissions monitoring) or
simply not installed. Parasitic power loss created by FGD controls is in the range of one
to two percent, and operating cost is often in excess of the US$ 0.0019/kWh (RMB
348 Data from MIT China Energy Survey. Edward Steinfeld, Richard Lester, and Edward Cunningham,
"Power Plant Emissions: Lessons from Sulfur", China Economic Quarterly, September 2008.
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0.015/kWh) subsidy that FGD-compliant plants receive in the price paid to them by the
grid.
Figure 36. Electric Power Generation Boiler Efficiency and Technology
Getting hotter Getting fancier
Boiler efficiency by plant age, % of Boiler technology by plant age, % of
plants surveyed plants surveyed
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Medium: pressure between 9.9 and 17.5 Mpa
High: pressure above 17.5 Mpa
Source. MIT China Energy Survey Source: MIT China Energy Survey
There is precedence for the ability of the Chinese energy system to engage in
significant efficiency improvement. Past gains in energy efficiency have been
impressive, and seemingly provide grounds for hope. As has been well documented by
others, China's energy intensity (ratio of energy consumption to GDP) dropped rapidly
despite major economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, between 1980 and
2000 China quadrupled its GDP and only doubled its energy consumption. Vaclav Smil
praised such progress:
"The long-term decline of energy/GDP intensities is expected with advancing
economic modernization and it has been quite pronounced in both North America
and in Western Europe - but the recent Chinese improvements have occurred at
an even faster rate. Using the State Statistical Bureau data on energy
consumption and inflation-adjusted values of the GDP, the national average of
energy intensity was about 0.7 kilograms of coal equivalent (kgce) per 1 yuan of
GDP; by 1990 the rate had declined to 0.42 kgce/1980 yuan, and in 1995 it was
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slightly below 0.35 kgce - a bit less than half its value 15 years ago. Such a rate
of decline is unmatched by any other major modernizing economy.",349
While the changing composition and structure of China's economy undoubtedly explains
one aspect of these gains, others have argued with much empirical support that energy
policies (conservation in particular), rather than structural changes in the economy, were
the primary driver of efficiency gains after 1980.350
The second implication of this study that can be applied to understanding of
China's capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is that the actions of finms clearly
influence the impact of major central policy execution, and this creates space for
important innovation. This innovation has an impact on both demand side efficiency
gains and on the need for investment in carbon storage technologies such as CCS.
Environmental technology design and management in China, as well as risk capital for
major R+D projects such as CCS are increasingly being provided by corporations seeking
to diversify their revenue sources and to profit from perceived shifts in public policy.
An important byproduct of Jinyuan's corporate rise in Case One was the creation
of a large subsidiary to license foreign flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) equipment to coal-
fired power plants in Guizhou. This diversification then evolved to the production,
operations and management of domestic FGD equipment. The commercial incentive for
corporations to provide technological solutions to fulfill China's environmental policy
goals is significant. One need only look to Shenhua, China's largest coal company, and
the firm's major investments in projects such as the $3.58 billion CCS facility in Ordos,
Inner Mongolia, to understand the importance of such corporate involvement. However,
349 Vaclav Smil, "China's Energy and Resource Uses: Continuity and Change," China Quarter/v (1998),
p. 94 7 .
350 Xiannuan Lin, China's Energy Strategy: Economic Structure, Technological Choices, and Energy
Consumption (Westport, CT Praeger, 1996).
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it is striking that the bias of this corporate involvement is still towards supply-side
solutions.
Supporting a "California Effect" vs. Recentralizing Regulatory Institutions
In historical terms, China's central state has proven to be a capable risk manager
in a critical sector undergoing considerable change. Beijing has been quite successful in
coordinating periodic reductions in central state ownership and investment, the lowering
of barriers to market access, and the market-friendly revision of terms of contracts,
pricing and other aspects of what is arguably the most politically critical sector of the
economy. As Zhang and Heller write of the electric power industry: "Where the central
government ran up against inefficient state bank lending and macroeconomic limits on
state credit expansion, it allowed local governments and some foreign investors to
develop a more diverse array of plants to supplement the state core." 351 Without such
reforms in the energy sector, China's remarkable growth story could not have occurred.
China's vast geography and regional variation in economic development will in all
likelihood require local customization of approaches to climate change mitigation and
environmental protection. Many observers credit what (albeit still limited) progress the
US has made in this regard to forward-looking state governments legislating local
environmental standards that are more stringent than federal standards. David Vogel has
written about the "California Effect" and improvements in US federal automobile
emissions standards that were nudged along through legislative action in California, a
state able to influence the design of car manufacturing through the scale of its auto
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351 Zhang and Heller, p. 107.
market.352 Decentralized approaches to regulatory reform in the case of the environment
can function well, and it is often the wealthier regions with large consumer markets that
can provide regulatory momentum.353 As recent data mapped by Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory graphically illustrates, China's more wealthy coastal provinces are
indeed leading the way in areas such as energy intensity reduction (see Appendix III).
However, as Aden and Sinton write: "Gradual adoption of more liberalized energy
markets can influence China's EEKC [energy-environmental Kuznets curve] in
combination with local political reform: increased economic liberalization without
expanded rights or accountability is likely to augment supply-side dominance and an
upward-sloping EEKC." 3 54
In the context of the current global economic downturn, the diversification reforms
of the past, born during periods of high growth and energy shortage, are again being
revisited and reversed. In particular, the portfolio of ownership and investment in the
energy sector is being reassessed with the creation of the centralizing National Energy
Commission, and in other 'back bone" sector such as the airlines, telecommunications,
and transportation, central state ownership again appears to be consolidating. The case
studies in this dissertation lend considerable credence to this recent trend. However, the
strengthening of incumbent SOE firms through consolidation may prove to be highly
problematic in meeting the challenges discussed above, given the lack of comprehensive
reform in corporate governance, in regulatory independence, as well as in media and
legal independence. Firms and local governments pursuing their own economic interests
352 David Vogel, Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation in a global economy (Harvard
University Press, 1995).
353 As has been well documented, past reforms of economic liberalization were first experimented at the
local level in China and eventually extended nationally.
354 Aden and Sinton, p.268.
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on the whole served well the central state's goal of increasing national energy supply
throughout the past three decades. These interests do not align in the same manner when
the policy goal shifts to other objectives, such as the rapid reduction of energy intensity,
energy demand, and the implementation of a national strategy to combat climate change.
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APPENDIX I.
Subsidiaries in which Jinvuan has a Controllin2
Share
Power Plants Owned or Managed
Guiz hou
Jinyuan
Group, Ltd.
Guizhou West Power Shareholding, Ltd
GuizhouZhongshui Energy Development, Ltd.
Guizho u Xineng Pow er Constructio n, L td.
Guizhou Nengfa Fuels Development, Ltd.
Guizhou Jinyuan Power Generating
Operations, Ltd.
Guizhou Xingyun Environ. Protection, Ltd .
-AI Guizhou Xichen Power, Ltd.
Qianbei Plant
Nayong Plant
Nayong #2 Plant
Xishui Plant
YemazaiPlant
Qianxi Plant
Faer Plant
Yafu Plant (Under Management)
PannanPlant (Under Management)
Guizhou Jinlong Real Estate Development,
Ltd.
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APPENDIX 11.
A. Luneng Ownership Matrix, Feb. 2008 - Dec. 2008
SASAC (Central Gov)
100%
State Grid Corp. Of China
(Central Govt)
100%
Shandong Electric Power
Group
(Central Govtj
100%
1 Shandong Luneng GmupiI,~ ~ _~ _ _ __
. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . .
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B. Luneng Ownership Matrix, December 2008 -
SASAC (Central Govt)
100%
Huaneng Group
(Central Gov)
100%
Huaneng Shandong
Electric Power Company,
LTD (est. May 2008)
100%
SShandong Luneng Group i| m n " n
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APPENDIX Ill.
Energy Intensity by Province, 2006
I.,
N
2006
l
Provincial Energy Intensity (kgcelk RMB GDP)
Insufficient Data
1 - 104
105 - 155
156- 233
234 - 394
Source: LBNL, China Energy Databook 2008.
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